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Kuykendall, Davis W.  Ph.D. Purdue University, August 2016.  Leibniz on Intra-
substantial Causation and Change.  Major Professor:  Jan Cover.   
 
Leibniz argued that in natural world, only intra-substantial or immanent causation is 
possible— the causation that takes place within an individual, when an individual brings 
about a change in itself.  In this dissertation, I address issues arising from Leibniz’s 
arguments against the rival view that posits a world of causally interacting substances and 
issues pertaining to Leibniz’s own positive metaphysics of immanent causation and 
change.    
Chapter 1 is devoted to stage setting for the remainder of the dissertation. I first 
offer a historically informed overview of efficient causation and change before 
introducing Leibniz’s novel views, including his criticisms of competing accounts and his 
own positive account.  After presenting a detailed roadmap of my project, I articulate the 
idealistic interpretation of Leibniz assumed in this dissertation, where the only genuine 
substances are simple monads.  Finally, I articulate the methodological approaches I 
employ.   
In Chapters 2 and 3, I reconstruct and assess Leibniz’s most frequent argument 
against transeunt causation (the causation that occurs when a substance produces a 
property in a numerically distinct substance), what I call the “Transference Argument.”  
Leibniz argued that a created substance’s causing an accident in a numerically distinct 
 x 
substance is possible only if the agent (the cause) transfers the accident from itself to the 
patient (the recipient of the effect), where upon transference the agent no longer 
possesses the accident it transfered.  Call the transeunt causal requirement that the agent 
transfer the accident produced from itself to the patient the “Transference Condition.”   
Chapter 2 is devoted to two problems with Leibniz’s transference condition.  
First, Leibniz stated the transference condition throughout his career, but offered little 
argument for it.  Second, God is a transeunt cause in Leibniz’s metaphysics yet God’s 
causation does not consist in transference.  Thus, Leibniz needs a principled way to 
require transference for creaturely causation while denying that divine transeunt 
causation consists in transference.  I shall argue that Leibniz thought that if an agent 
transeuntly caused an accident without transferring the accident, the agent created the 
accident. For the recipient substance contributed no reality to the accident and the agent 
lost no reality in causing the accident. However, only an omnipotent being—God—can 
create. Therefore, only God can transeuntly cause without transferring what is caused.  
Finally, I close off chapter 2 by drawing attention to an important weakness with the 
transference condition that has not yet been recognized by Leibniz scholars.   Based on 
arguments Leibniz develops against occasionalism in his Theodicy concerning the 
production of modifications, I shall argue that Leibniz ultimately only had reasons to 
require transference for the transeunt production of non-modal accidents, such as real 
qualities.   
In Chapter 3, I argue that there is nothing in Leibniz’s ontology that could be 
transferred from the cause to the recipient of the effect.  I first argue that  
 xi 
Leibniz’s ontology consists of simple non-corporeal substances and their modifications. 
Second, I present and articulate a number of important theses Leibniz affirmed about 
substances and their modifications, which entail that neither could be transferred. I also 
show that most of these theses were not unique to Leibniz, but were in fact widely 
endorsed by his predecessors who defended the possibility of creaturely transeunt 
causation.  
 In chapter 4, I continue the study of the nature of Leibnizian accidents, shifting 
the focus from their role in Leibniz’s critique of creaturely transeunt causation to their 
positive role in change and as causal relata, where such accidents are the effects of 
immanent causation.  Specifically, I reconstruct and assess Leibniz’s reasons for holding 
that accidents are modifications or limitations.  Drawing from Leibniz’s 1688 essay “De 
Realitate Accidentium” and his later mereological writings, I shall argue that Leibniz’s 
thesis that accidents are modifications or limitations allowed him to posit mereologically 
simple substance that have a multitude of accidents at a time and change accidents over 
time.   
 In Chapter 5, I address an issue that has divided Leibniz scholars concerning the 
precise relata in Leibnizian immanent efficient causation.  In many passages, Leibniz 
writes as if it is the substance or individual itself that efficiently causes its later properties 
or accidents.  Call this the “Efficacious-substance” account.  The efficacious-substance 
account is difficult to reconcile with Leibniz’s requirements that change be intelligible 
and deterministic.   In plenty of other passages, he writes as if it is the substances earlier 
properties or accidents that cause its later accidents.  Call this the “Efficacious-accident” 
account.  The efficacious-accident account explains how change is intelligible and 
 xii 
deterministic but it faces a “plurality of agents” objection.  If a substance’s accidents are 
the efficient causes of later accidents, then prima facie there is a plurality of efficient 
causal agents in a substance.  This view is incompatible with Leibniz’s requirement that 
substances be simple, unified entities.   
Drawing upon a Scholastic distinction made between two kinds of efficient 
causes— principle quod efficient causes (efficient causal agents) and principle quo 
efficient causes (powers by which agents cause), I shall argue that for Leibniz, substances 
are principle quod efficient causes and their appetitions (desire-like accidents that are a 
subset of a substance’s accidents) are principle quo efficient causes.  This interpretation 
combines the strengths of the Efficacious-substance and Efficacious-accident accounts 
while overcoming their weaknesses.  There is just one causal agent, the substance, but 
change is both intelligible and deterministic because as what an agent produces is 












CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the 17th century, causation took center stage as one of the most debated topics by 
philosophers who were increasingly forced to rethink natural philosophy given the 
challenges the scientific revolution posed to the Aristotelian-Scholasticism, which still 
dominated university curricula.1  One of the most important disputants was the German 
philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), whose views on causation and 
change are the subject of my dissertation.2  Leibniz argued that at the fundamental level 
of the natural world, only intra-substantial or immanent causation occurred— the 
causation that takes place within an individual, when an individual brings about a change 
in itself.3  Leibniz argued that his counter-intuitive theory overcame serious defects that 
plagued the other dominant causal theories of his time, while also providing a 
                                                
1 For helpful overviews of the causation debate in the late middle ages and early modern era, see Kenneth 
Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1999), Steven Nadler 
ed. Causation in Early Modern Philosophy (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1993), and Walter Ott, Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
2 For general overviews of Leibniz’s life and thought, see Nicholas Jolley, ed., The Cambridge Companion 
to Leibniz, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Brandon C. Look, "Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/leibniz/, The Continuum Companion to Leibniz, (London: 
Continuum, 2011); and Benson Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986). 
3 A classic statement of this thesis is found in Leibniz’s Monadology, where he writes, “It follows from 
what we have just said that the monad’s [individual’s] natural changes come from an internal principle, 
since no external cause can influence it internally.” See (G VI.608: AG 214).  See also AG 33, (G IV.439: 
AG 47), (G VI.351-52: T 396), and T 400 (G V.353-54). 
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philosophical underpinning for the increasingly successful enlightenment physical 
theories.  
In the first half of this dissertation, I address issues arising from Leibniz’s 
criticisms of what I’ll call the Traditional Causal View of his time— the view that created 
substances genuinely causally interact.  In the second half, I address issues pertaining to 
his positive account of change and creaturely immanent efficient causation.  In this 
introductory chapter, I present a historically informed overview of efficient causation and 
change in §1.  In §2, I segue to an overview of Leibniz’s own distinctive views on 
causation and change before presenting a detailed roadmap of my project in §3.  In §4, I 
articulate the idealistic interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics that I assume in this 
dissertation.  Finally, I discuss the methodological approaches I employ in this 
dissertation in §5.   
 
§1 Efficient Causation and Change 
In section 1, I draw attention to some important but mostly non-controversial features of 
what I mean by efficient causation and change, which will come from a brief historical 
overview.  Giving such an account might strike the reader as unnecessary, as efficient 
causation is the type of causation that is the most familiar to present day philosophers.  In 
fact, since the early modern era, it has largely been the only type of causation considered.  
However, as will become apparent in this project, the nature of efficient causation has 
historically been one of the most controversial topics in metaphysics.  I note that my aim 
in this overview is not to precisely define efficient causation.  Instead, I highlight some
 3 
important features found in some of the most influential accounts of efficient causation 
prior to Leibniz, and which are also found in Leibniz’s own account.   
While efficient causation—of some sort—played a role in metaphysics prior to 
Aristotle, it is appropriate to start with Aristotle’s account, as his influence will loom 
large in what follows.4  According to Aristotle, all causes are principles of change.  As 
principles of change, causes explain change.5  Thus, the efficient cause of some change is 
also a principle and therefore explainer of that change.  Specifically, in some change, the 
efficient cause is the origin or source of the change.6  Aristotle’s famous example is the 
coming-to-be of a statue.7  Take some clay that has been molded into a statue with the 
shape of Socrates.  The clay is the statue’s material cause, the shape is the statue’s formal 
cause, and to-be-admired could be the statue’s final cause.  The efficient cause of the 
statue is the sculptor, who molds the clay into Socrates shape.  In this scenario, the 
sculptor efficiently causes the statue by giving or creating a new form in the clay— the 
shape of Socrates.  The clay acquires a new property or more appropriate to the 
metaphysics of Leibniz’s time, an accident— the accident of a particular shape.  What’s 
key here is that the effect produced by the efficient cause is, in some sense, a new being 
or entity— such as a new shape in the clay.8      
                                                
4 For a helpful and in depth overview of Aristotle’s account of efficient causation, see Thomas M. Tuozzo, 
“Aristotle and the Discovery of Efficient Causation,” in Tad M. Schmaltz, ed., Efficient Causation: A 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
5 See Aristotle, Physics, II.3, 194b16-24.  For Aristotle’s definition of a principle, see Metaphysics, V.1, 
1012b33-1013a23.  
6 See Physics, II.3, 194b30-32 and Metaphysics, I.3, 984a27. 
7 See Physics II.3 and Metaphysics V.2. 
8 In just what sense it is a new being or entity which is produced was a matter of great controversy which I 
address in significant portions of chapters 2-4. 
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We can build on Aristotle’s account by turning to Aquinas, as Aquinas’s 
influential account is heavily informed by and influenced by Aristotle’s.  According to 
Aquinas, the efficient cause—such as the sculptor—is the principle that acts.9  Another 
way Aquinas puts it is that the efficient cause is a cause insofar as it acts.10  This, 
according to Aquinas, distinguishes the efficient cause from the material, final, and 
formal cause.  The efficient cause, as the cause that acts, is the causal agent.11   
Since the efficient cause is one of the principles and explainers of change, it’s also 
worth briefly discussing what I mean by change in this section.  As with efficient 
causation, my aim is not to offer a precise definition or metaphysics of change.  Instead 
it’s to draw attention to some important features of it that can serve as a launch pad for 
this project.  By change, I mean an individual’s acquiring and losing properties.  For 
example, the clay changes when it acquires the property of Socrates’ shape and loses its 
previous shape.12    
So the efficient cause is to be understood as a principle and explainer of change, 
specifically the cause from which the change or effect originates, as the efficient cause is 
the agent that acts and by acting produces a new form or property or accident in an 
individual, which the individual acquires.  Once one probes further into these concepts 
and inquires into just what the new beings are that are produced, what it is precisely that 
does the producing, and how the new beings produced are related to the individual they 
                                                
9 See Aquinas, On the Principles of Nature 3.15, DPN 1.4, In Meta I.12.199,, V.2.775, and QDV q28, a8c. 
10 Leibniz is in agreement with Aquinas, arguing that the efficient cause is the “active cause” or the “cause 
through action.”  See C 472 and A.VI.ii.490.  
11 See On the Principles of Nature 3.15.  See also Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.7, 1032a13-14. 
12 I explore Leibniz’s precise definition of change in much greater depth in chapter 5. 
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are beings in, one enters into more difficult terrain— terrain that I’ll be in throughout this 
project.13  
Philosophers before and during Leibniz’s era further distinguished between two 
types of efficient causes— transeunt and immanent causes.14  An individual is a transeunt 
cause when it brings about a change or produces a property in a numerically distinct 
individual. For example, when a particle p1 collides with a different particle p2, p1 is the 
transeunt cause of p2’s change in velocity. In contrast, an individual is an immanent cause 
when it produces a property in itself. While less discussed in studies of causation, we are 
more intimately acquainted with this second kind, as many examples come from human 
action. When a person moves her hand, she is the immanent cause of her hand moving. 
When a person imagines a cloud, she is the immanent cause of the mental image formed.  
It is with this distinction between transeunt and immanent causation that Leibniz’s 
views on causation and change merit attention.  The central early modern philosophical 
debate about causation was whether (i) both immanent and transeunt creaturely causation 
are possible; (ii) only one of the two is possible; or (iii) neither are possible. Aristotelian-
Scholastics, such as the late medieval/renaissance philosopher Francisco Suarez and 
notable early modern philosophers such as Rene Descartes argued for (i), what I’ll call 
                                                
13 While the focus of my study is creaturely or secondary efficient causation, I note that the case is different 
with divine efficient causation as the effect is not always simply a form or accident in some pre-existent 
substrata, such as prime matter or a substance, but instead the whole substance in cases of creation, a type 
of efficient causality exclusive to God alone, according to most classical theists. 
14 The distinction traces back to Aristotle but finds more detailed expression in Medieval philosophers. For 





the “Traditional” view.15 Second-generation Cartesians, such as Malebranche, La Forge, 
and Cordemoy, challenged (i) and argued for (iii), the view known as Occasionalism.16 
Occasionalists argued that God is the only real cause of change and any creaturely 
causation so-called was merely apparent. First defended centuries earlier by the medieval 
Muslim philosopher Al Ghazali, the early modern occasionalists revived the theory with 
novel and powerful arguments.17   
 
§2 Leibniz’s on Efficient Causation and Change 
Leibniz entered into this debate by defending a unique and strikingly counterintuitive 
option, which he rigorously defended throughout his career.  On the one hand, with the 
Aristotelians and contra the Occasionalists, Leibniz argued that the very essence of 
substances consists in their being causally efficacious.18  With the Aristotelians and 
Descartes, Leibniz also affirmed the fundamentality of immanent causation, again, contra 
the Occasionalists. 
On the other hand, Leibniz rejected the Traditional view that posited a world 
populated by causally interactive created substances.  Instead, Leibniz defended a world 
of spontaneous substances.  A substance is spontaneous when it is solely causally 
                                                
15 See Suarez, DM 18.1; Aquinas, SCG III.I.69, 28.  Descartes’ views are more complicated, as scholars 
debate whether he thought one body could transeuntly cause a change in a different body.  However, 
Descartes did argue that mental substance could transeunt cause changes in extended substance.  The best 
resource for Descartes’ more complicated causal views is Tad M. Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).    
16 For a helpful overview of occasionalism, see Sukjae Lee, "Occasionalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/occasionalism/>. 
17 In this first part of my study where I examine Leibniz’s criticisms of competing causal theories, I am 
primarily concerned with Leibniz’s response to the Traditional view.   
18 See (G VI.608: AG 214), AG 33, (G IV.439: AG 47), (G VI.351-52: T 396), and (G V.353-54: T 400). 
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responsible for all of its natural changes and properties.19  In this world, immanent 
efficient causation is fundamental while transeunt causation is merely phenomenal and 
reducible in some sense to the immanent causal activity of individuals. 20  So Leibniz 
defended position (ii) against (i) and (iii).  The spontaneity of substances and the 
fundamentality of immanent rather than transeunt causation are foundational theses of 
Leibniz’s metaphysics, which Leibniz also utilized in his philosophical theology.  He also 
argued that these counterintuitive causal views provided a powerful philosophical 
underpinning for the increasingly successful enlightenment physics.     
Leibniz’s views are challenging in at least three ways, which I take up in my 
dissertation. First, Leibniz rigorously defends some aspects of his criticisms of competing 
causal theories, while he passes over other crucial premises without pausing to develop 
them. One explanation for this is that the reasoning would have been obvious to his 17th 
                                                
19 I use the term “natural” because Leibniz allows for the possibility of miracles, such as a case where God 
is solely responsible for some of a created substance’s accidents.  Additionally, Leibniz was a concurrentist 
who, with other concurrentists, argued that God’s causal input is required for the production of even non-
miraculuous accidents.  For a treatment of Leibniz’s theory of divine concurrence, see See Timothy Allan 
Hillman, “Leibniz on Monadic Action & Divine Concurrence,” (PhD Diss., Purdue University, 2008). 
20 The reduction of transeunt causal activity to immanent causal activity actually occurs in multiple levels 
in Leibniz’s metaphysics.  First, it is a crucial feature of Leibniz’s theory of pre-established harmony.  On 
the theory of pre-established harmony, all non-initial properties of created individuals are immanently 
caused by such individuals.  However, God created the world in such a way that all the immanently caused 
properties are coordinated or harmonious.  Second, corporeal individuals—such as organisms and the 
particles studied by impact mechanics—are reducible to individual simple non-extended individuals or 
substances (what Leibniz calls “monads”) and their accidents.  Thus, any transeunt causal activity between 
two bodies is reducible to the immanent causal activity of monads.  Third, immanent causal activity is 
prominent when focusing solely on impact mechanics and Leibniz’s science of dynamics.  Leibniz argued 
that when two bodies b1 and b2 collide, rather than b1 causing b2’s change in velocity, b2’s change in 
velocity is caused by the elastic nature of the particles composing b2.  The focus on my dissertation, I note, 
is not the reduction of transeunt causal activity to immanent causal activity.  Instead, it is the metaphysics 
of immanent causation as such— what happens when an individual causes a property in itself.  A coherent 
account of immanent causation as such is a necessary condition of Leibniz’s reduction of transeunt 
causation to immanent causation.   
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century peers, even though the reasoning is lost on us. I dredge out the missing support 
for some of the key premises that have baffled scholars.21  
Second, Leibniz never stops to rigorously and systematically develop at length his 
own positive account of what happens when an individual produces a change in itself.22  
This absence leaves many unanswered questions.  A task confronting scholars—as yet 
undone—is to reconstruct his positive account from both his many scattered criticisms of 
alternative causal theories and his equally scattered remarks of the positive elements of 
causation.23 In the second half of my dissertation, I contribute to such an eventual 
positive account of a substance’s producing a change in itself by carefully examining two 
issues:  how simple substances can have a multitude of accidents at a time and over time 
                                                
21 I describe in greater detail the missing premises and how one might fairly go about supplying them in 
Chapters 2-5.   
22 One explanation for why Leibniz never produces a lengthy, rigorous, systematic treatise on his positive 
account of immanent causation is that most of his writings were letters to various philosophers, scientists, 
and theologians he dialogued with.  Hence, his remarks on causation are scattered, written in response to 
specific concerns raised by disputants, usually using the technical vocabulary of his interlocutors instead of 
using Leibniz’s own carefully worked out terminology.   
23 While very little work addresses creaturely immanent efficient causation, specifically the metaphysics of 
what happens when a created individual causes a property in itself, there has been flurry of work on (i) 
Leibniz’s account of divine efficient causation, some notable work on (ii) creaturely final causation and (iii) 
Leibniz’s theory of pre-established harmony— Leibniz’s account of how God coordinates the immanent 
causal activity of all created individuals.  For examples of (i), see: J. Von Bodelschwingh, “Leibniz on 
Concurrence, Spontaneity, and Authorship,” Modern Schoolman, 88(2011): 267–297; Marc Bobro. 
“Leibniz on Concurrence and Efficient Causation,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 46 (2008): 317–38; 
Nicholas Jolley, “Causality and Creation in Leibniz,” The Monist, 81(1998): 591–611; Sukjae Lee, 
“Leibniz on Divine Concurrence,” Philosophical Review, 113(2004): 203–48.  For examples of (ii), see 
Lawrence Carlin, “Leibniz on Final Causes,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 44(2006): 217–33 and 
Jeffrey K. McDonough, “Leibniz’s Two Realms Revisited,” Nous 42(2008): 673-696.  For examples of 
(iii), see H. Ishiguro, “Pre-established harmony versus constant conjunction,” Proceedings of the British 
Academy, 63(1977): 239–63. Mark Kulstad, “Causation and Preestablished Harmony in the Early 
Development of Leibniz's Philosophy,” Causation in Early Modern Philosophy, Steven Nadler (ed.), 





and how substances can be efficient causal agents that deterministically and immanently 
efficiently cause their accidents.    
Finally, Leibniz’s causal views are relevant to contemporary theories of causation 
in at least three respects.  First, Leibniz offers novel reasons both for and against 
persistence theories of causation.24  Second, and related to the first, his views also point 
to some consequences of persistence theories of causation, which, while not entailing 
their truth or falsity, are important.25  Mainly, persistence theories of causation are 
inconsistent with causal overdetermination.  Third, Leibniz, I mentioned above and shall 
argue in greater depth, has principled reasons to wed substance causation with 
determinism—two metaphysical views typically viewed as at odds with each other.26     
 
§3 Dissertation Roadmap 
With the broad overview of efficient causation, change, and Leibniz’s distinctive views 
on both, I now turn to the specific issues that arise his metaphysics of change and 
causation, which will be the subject of my dissertation.  In Chapter 2, I address Leibniz’s 
criticisms of the dominant version of the Traditional view of his time that defended the 
                                                
24 A persistence theory of causation holds that causation consists in the persistence of an entity from the 
cause to the effect. Persistence theories are a family, with each theory distinguished by what it holds to 
persist, e.g., energy of momentum, mass-energy, tropes, or properties.  See Hector-Neri Castaneda, 
“Causes, Causity, and Energy,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1984): 17-27; Douglas Ehring, Causation 
and Persistence: A Theory of Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); David Fair, “Causation 
and the Flow of Energy,” Erkenntnis 14 (1979): 210-250;  S.D. Rieber, “Causation as Property 
Acquisition,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 109, 
No. 1 (2002): 53-74; and Wesley Salmon, “Causality Without Counterfactuals,” Philosophy of Science 61 
(1994): 297-312. 
25 In Appendix A, I argue that one sort of persistence theory of causation which Leibniz attributes to the 
Traditional view of efficient causation is inconsistent with causal overdetermination. 
26 I address this in Chapter 5 and give a more detailed summary of this issue in the dissertation roadmap 
below. 
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fundamentality of natural or creaturely transeunt causation— Physical Influx. Physical 
influx was endorsed by figures of wide-ranging views, such as the renaissance 
Aristotelian-Scholastic philosopher Francisco Suarez and enlightenment philosophers 
such as Rene Descartes.27 Physical influx’s central tenant was that transeunt causation 
consisted in the communication of the effect from the cause to the recipient of the 
effect.28 Physical Influx was utilized to explain a wide variety of change, including 
perception and impact mechanics. In perception, the perceived object communicates a 
likeness or representation—what Scholastics called a “species”—of itself to the 
percipient. In impact mechanics, one particle changes the velocity of another by 
communicating its motion. On Leibniz’s understanding of Physical Influx, which is 
strikingly similar to many contemporary persistence theories of causation, the agent 
substance’s (cause) communication of the effect consisted in the accident caused by the 
agent first detaching itself from the agent and being sent to the recipient of effect (the 
patient).29 Call this literal detachment of the accident from the agent and its being sent to 
the patient ‘Transference’, where upon transference, the agent no longer possesses the 
accident it causes.     
Leibniz’s criticisms of the fundamentality of creaturely transeunt causation then 
consisted of two claims: 
                                                
27 For an overview of Leibniz’s understanding of Physical Influx, see See Eileen O’Neill, 
“Influxus Physicus,” in Steven Nadler (ed.) Causation in Early Modern Philosophy (University Park: Penn 
State Press, 1993), 27-56.  
28 See for example Suarez, DM 17.1.6.  For an overview of Aristotelian-Scholastic theories of physical 
influx and transeunt efficient causation, with special attention given to Suarez’s theory, who in turn heavily 
influenced Descartes, see A.J. Freddoso’s introduction to Francisco Suarez, S.J., On Creation, 
Conservation, & Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20-22 (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 
2002), xliii-lix.   
29 See for example AG 33, (G II.251: AG 176), (G VI.607-8: AG 213-14), and G IV.498f. 
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C1.   Creaturely transeunt causation is fundamental only if the transference of 
 accidents is possible. 
C2.   The transference of accidents is not possible.   
 
C1 is confronted with two problems—interpretive and philosophical—that I address in 
Chapter 2. First, Leibniz stated C1 throughout his career, but offered little argument for 
it. The lack of defense is startling as most who affirmed the fundamentality of creaturely 
transeunt causation also surprisingly but nevertheless vehemently denied C1. In fact, 
Thomas Aquinas called the transference condition “laughable.”30 Second, God is a 
transeunt cause in Leibniz’s philosophy. Yet God’s transeunt causation does not consist 
in transference. Thus, Leibniz needs a principled way to affirm C1 and deny that divine 
transeunt causation consists in transference.31   
 I argue that Leibniz had a solution to both puzzles.  While Leibniz never 
explicitly states it, I make the case that Leibniz thought that if an agent transeuntly caused 
an accident without transferring the accident, the agent created the accident. For the 
recipient substance contributed no reality to the accident and the agent lost no reality in 
causing the accident. However, only an omnipotent being—God—can create. Therefore, 
only God can transeuntly cause without transferring what is caused.  I also argue in 
Chapter 2 that the argument for C1 is consistent with creaturely immanent causation.  
Finally, I close off chapter 2 by drawing attention to an important weakness with C1 that 
has not yet been recognized by Leibniz scholars.   Based on some important arguments 
Leibniz develops against occasionalism in his Theodicy concerning the causation of 
modifications, I argue that Leibniz ultimately only has reasons to hold that the 
                                                
30 See Aquinas, SCG, Bk. III, Pt. 1, Ch. 69, 28. 
31 Freddoso raises this problem, which to date has not been addressed.  See Freddoso, Ibid., xlix. 
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transference condition is a condition of the production of non-modal accidents, such as 
real qualities.   
In Chapter 3, I address Leibniz’s support for C2. Unlike C1, Leibniz provides 
ample support for C2 throughout his career, making C2 much easier to defend than C1. 
Additionally, unlike C1, C2 enjoys much support throughout the history of philosophy, 
especially by defenders of creaturely transeunt causation who denied C1. I argue, in two 
stages, that there is nothing in Leibniz’s ontology that could be transferred from the cause 
to the recipient of the effect. First, I articulate the thesis that Leibniz’s ontology consists 
of simple non-corporeal substances and their accidents.32  
Second, I present and articulate a number of important theses Leibniz affirmed 
about substances and their accidents, which entail that neither could be transferred. I also 
show that most of these theses were not unique to Leibniz, but in fact were widely 
endorsed by his predecessors who affirmed the fundamentality of creaturely transeunt 
causation.33  The majority of the second half of Chapter 3 is devoted to Leibniz’s theses 
on accidents, specifically his claims that accidents are modifications or limitations, as 
these features of accidents are most relevant to why they could not be transferred.   These 
theses also provide material which will be utilized in the next chapter when I investigate 
                                                
32 A classic statement of Leibniz’s ontology can be found in a 1715 letter to Des Bosses, where Leibniz 
writes, “Whatever is not a modification can be called a substance.”  (G II.503-4: L 614).  Leibniz’s most 
extensive defense and articulation of his metaphysics of fundamental, simple and non-extended individuals 
is his Monadology.  See (G VI.607-23: AG 213-25) 
33 The two most important theses concern properties.   First, for any property P, P exists only if P is some 
individual s such that P is a property of s.  Second, for any property P and any individual s1, if P is a 
property of s1 then there is not some individual s2 such that P is a property of s2.  The first thesis entails that 
properties must exist in an individual— they cannot float free.  The second thesis entails that a property 
cannot exist in more than one individual (i) at the same time; (ii) at different times; (iii) or in different 
possible worlds.  The second thesis was affirmed by nearly every medieval and early modern philosopher 
and has recently been revived by contemporary philosophers.  Contemporary metaphysicians call it the 
thesis of “non-transferability”.   
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the nature of accidents insofar as they are the effects of immanent causation and the role 
they play in change.   
In chapter 4, I continue my study of the nature of Leibnizian accidents, shifting 
the focus from their role in Leibniz’s critique of the Traditional view to their positive role 
in change and as causal relata, where such accidents are the effects of immanent 
causation.  Specifically, I reconstruct and assess Leibniz’s argument that accidents are 
modifications or limitations34, a thesis which was widely held by early modern 
philosophers and which set them apart from their medieval predecessors and also which 
played an crucially important role in Leibniz’s positive account of change and immanent 
causation.35  In a key passage, in a 1703 letter to De Volder, Leibniz clarifies what it is 
for an accident to be a modification or limitation: 
. . . a modification is a varying limitation, and modes merely limit things but do 
not increase them and hence cannot contain any absolute perfection which is not 
in the thing itself which they modify.  Otherwise, in fact, these accidents must be 
thought of in the manner of substances, namely, something which stands per se.36   
 
I shall argue that holding that accidents are modifications or limitations allowed Leibniz 
to posit that substances are mereologically simple while synchronically and 
diachronically complex— they have a multitude of accidents at a time and change 
accidents over time.   
                                                
34 See (G VI.598: AG 207), (G VI.590: AG 265), (G II.458: L 606), and (G II.503-4: L 614). 
35 For a helpful paper on why it was significant and controversial that early modern philosophers only 
posited one type of accident—modifications—in their ontology, see Stephen Menn, “The Greatest 
Stumbling Block:  Descartes’ Denial of Real Qualities,” in Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene, ed., 
Descartes and His Contemporaries:  Meditations, Objections, and Replies (Chicago:  The University of 
Chicago Press, 1995), 182-207. 
36 (G II.257: L 532). 
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To do so, I first reconstruct Leibniz’s argument in his not yet translated 1688 “De 
Realitate Accidentium,” (DRA) which I also provide a translation of in Appendix B.37  
DRA is one of the few texts in which Leibniz goes into any length in arguing that all 
accidents are modifications.  In this lesser known essay, Leibniz draws from premises the 
he utilized throughout his career.   
After I reconstruct the argument in DRA, I address an issue arising from his 
arguments in DRA.  The issue is that while Leibniz’s arguments in DRA prima facie 
support the conclusion that accidents are modifications, he gives a surprisingly non-
committal or agnostic conclusion as to whether there are any accidents at all.  I argue that 
Leibniz hesitates to posit even modifications because he worried that the problems he 
raised with non-modal accidents apply to modifications as well.38  Specifically, Leibniz’s 
arguments against non-modal accidents stem from such accidents being parts of 
substances, which is inconsistent with substantial simplicity.  The arguments of DRA 
prima facie also entail that not only are non-modal accidents parts, but modal accidents 
are parts as well.  Not much later, Leibniz changed his mind and posited modal accidents 
in his ontology, without, however, ever explicitly addressing how such accidents could be 
in a substance without being a part of it.  Drawing from Leibniz’s later mereological and 
geometrical writings and his understanding of modifications as limitations, I argue that 
Leibniz had the resources to posit simple substances that have a multitude of 
modifications at a time and change such modifications over time.  By doing so, I fill one 
scholarly void in this chapter by applying Leibniz’s developed mereological theses to not 
                                                
37 A.VI.4A.994-996. 
38 By “non-modal accidents,” I mean accidents that are not modifications.     
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only showing how substances can have a multitude of modes at a time and over time, but 
also showing why simple substances cannot have non-modal accidents (such as real 
qualities).    
In Chapter 5, I address an issue that has divided Leibniz scholars concerning the 
precise relata in Leibnizian immanent efficient causation.  In many passages, Leibniz 
writes as if it is the substance or individual itself that efficiently causes its later properties 
or accidents.39  Yet in plenty of other passages, he writes as if it is the substances earlier 
properties or accidents that cause its later accidents.40  Call the former view the 
Efficacious-substance interpretation, which Bobro, Clatterbaugh, and Jorati defend.41  
Most recent scholars such as Rutherford, Carlin, Kulstad, and Bolton, who defend the 
latter view, argue that it isn’t just any accident in Leibniz’s ontology but rather 
appetitions, which strictly speaking, produce a substance’s later accidents.42  Call this the 
Efficacious-appetition interpretation.43   
In this chapter, I present and defend a novel version of the Efficacious-substance 
interpretation which incorporates the strengths of the Efficacious-appetition 
interpretation.  I focus primarily on Donald Rutherford’s arguments for the efficacious-
                                                
39 See (G V.194: NE 210), (G VI.295-6: T 300), and (G IV.509: AG 160). 
40 See (G IV.439: AG 47), (G II.91-2: AG 82), (G VI.356-7: T 403), and G IV, 532-3. 
41 See Marc Bobro and Kenneth Clatterbaugh, “Unpacking the Monad, Leibniz's Theory of Causality,” The 
Monist, (1996) 79: 409–26 and Julia Jorati, “Leibniz on Causation –Part 1,” Philosophy Compass (2015) 
10: 389-397. 
42 See Martha Brand Bolton, “Change in the Monad,” in Eric Watkins, ed. The Divine Order, the Human 
Order, and the Order of Nature: Historical Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 178; 
Laurence Carlin, “Leibniz on Final Causes,” Journal of the History of Philosophy (2006) 44: 231; and 
Donald Rutherford, “Laws and Powers in Leibniz,” The Divine Order, the Human Order, and the Order of 
Nature: Historical Perspectives. Ed. Eric Watkins. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 167 and 
“Leibniz on Spontaneity.” Leibniz: Nature and Freedom. Eds. Donald Rutherford, and Jan A. Cover, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 167. 
43 Textual support can be found in passages where Leibniz argues that appetitions are principles of change.  
See (G VI.598: AG 207) and (G VI.609: AG 215). 
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appetition interpretation, as he has presented the lengthiest and strongest case for it.  
Rutherford argues that the Efficacious-substance interpretation is incompatible with 
Leibniz’s determinism and his requirement that change be intelligible—  the change must 
explained by the substance’s own nature.44  Instead, Rutherford argues that if appetitions 
are what produce the later accidents of a substance, then monadic change is both 
deterministic and intelligible.  A substance s is determined to change from state N to N+1 
because the appetitions of s that partially constitute N are both appetitions for the 
accidents of state N+1 and what produce the accidents which make up N+1.   The change 
is intelligible because it is explained by s’s nature— specifically s’s nature as modified 
by its appetitions.  What is key in Rutherford’s argument is that what does the explaining 
is what does the producing— the efficient causal agent of the change.   
However, the Efficacious-appetition interpretation succumbs to a serious 
objection originally raised by Locke and endorsed by Leibniz himself in his New Essays 
on Human Understanding, what I’ll call the Multiplication of Agents objection.45   If 
appetitions, rather than substances, are efficient causes of a substance’s later accidents, 
then there is a plurality of distinct efficient causal agents in a substance, a view that 
Leibniz explicitly rejects, and, moreover that, runs afoul of the simplicity and unity of 
created substances.  The Efficacious-substance interpretation avoids this objection as 
there is just one efficient causal agent— the substance.   
                                                
44 Leibniz writes, “Whenever we find some quality in a subject, we ought to believe that if we understood 
the nature of both the subject and the quality we would conceive how the quality could arise from it. So 
within the order of nature (miracles apart) it is not at God’s arbitrary discretion to attach this or that quality 
haphazardly to substances. He will never give them any that are not natural to them, that is, that cannot 
arise from their nature as explicable modifications.” See A.VI.6.66.  
45 See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 
2.21.20/243-44 and (G V.159: NE 174). 
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I further argue that the efficacious-substance account can be reconciled with 
Leibniz’s determinism and strictures on explanation. Leibniz utilized a distinction found 
as early as Aquinas and developed at length by Suarez between two different kinds of 
efficient causes— the principle quod efficient cause or efficient causal agent and the 
principle quo efficient cause or power by which the agent acts.46 Scholastics such as 
Suarez held that in most cases, substances are efficient causal agents yet they also had 
principled accounts of how substances could be efficient causal agents and yet act 
deterministically or of necessity in some sense.47 I argue that Leibniz had similar reasons 
to consistently hold that substances are efficient causal agents—and so avoid the 
Multiplication of Agents objection—but also hold that such substances deterministically 
produce their effects in a way that satisfies Leibniz’s strictures on explanation.  Mainly, 
appetitions are powers by which a substance efficiently causes its later accidents.   
In the Appendix A, I argue that there are resources within Leibniz’s metaphysics 
of causation to provide the support for a premise that scholars have argued is missing but 
needed in a different argument Leibniz made against creaturely causal interaction.  Early 
in his career, Leibniz denied creaturely causal interaction because of his thesis of 
substantial spontaneity, specifically a variant of spontaneity in which all of a substance’s 
states follow from its complete concept or notion.48  Scholars have rightly pointed out 
that Leibniz cannot deny causal interaction from spontaneity alone.  Instead, Leibniz also 
needs a premise ruling out causal overetermination.  Otherwise, there is no inconsistency 
                                                
46 See, for example, Aquinas, ST 1a q36 a1 and Suarez, DM 22.1.19.   
47 DM 19.1 
48 See AG 33 and (G IV.439: AG 47). 
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in affirming both that substances are spontaneous and that some states of a substance are 
caused by distinct substances.   
Leibniz never offers an argument against overdetermination, nor does he even 
deny it.  However, in Appendix A, I argue that given Leibniz’s understanding of 
creaturely transeunt efficient causation— specifically his Transference condition, Leibniz 
has the resources to deny causal overdetermination.  That is, if creaturely causal 
interaction consisted in transference, as Leibniz insists it must if it occurred—with a 
literal detaching of the accident caused from the agent and its being transferred to the 
patient, then overdetermination is not possible.  If Leibniz can rule out overdetermination 
from his understanding of creaturely transeunt causation, then he can deny that an 
accident transeuntly caused is also immanently and spontaneously caused.  However, if 
Leibniz can deny spontaneity from creaturely transeunt causation, then he can deny 
creaturely transeunt causation from spontaneity via contraposition.   
In the Appendix B, I address early and late Leibniz’s views on Transubstantiation. 
While at various times in Leibniz’s career, he offered accounts of the metaphysics of 
transubstantiation, I argue that the mature Leibniz, ultimately, did not affirm 
Transubstantiation.  In Appendix C, I offer a translation of Leibniz’s “De Realitate 
Accidentium.”  
 
§4 The Idealistic Interpretation of Leibniz 
As dissertation is a study of Leibniz’s metaphysics of intra-substantial causation and 
change, it’s important to get clear on what count as substances in Leibniz’s metaphysics.  
In this dissertation, I assume the idealistic interpretation of the mature Leibniz’s 
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metaphysics—the period starting around the publication of his Discourse on Metaphysics 
in 1686 up until his death in 171649—in which the only entities that are substances, 
strictly speaking, are simple substances or monads.50  We find Leibniz expressing this 
thesis in his “Against Barbaric Physics,” written sometime between 1710 and 1716, 
where he claims that “only monads (among which the best are souls, and among souls, 
the best are minds) are substances.”51  Writing to his friend Nicolas Remond, in the last 
year of his life, Leibniz again claims that “Absolute reality rests only in monads and their 
perceptions.”52   
While I will draw upon texts that both clarify and support the idealistic 
interpretation in this section, my aim is not to offer a full-scale defense of the idealistic 
reading of Leibniz.  Adequately defending the idealistic or non-idealistic interpretation of 
Leibniz is a task demanding its own dissertation.  Space and time constraints wouldn’t 
allow me to do justice in addressing the numerous issues that must be dealt with in 
defending one interpretation over the other.  I do note, however, that the idealist 
interpretation has been the dominant interpretation, both historically and presently. 
To clarify the idealist interpretation in which, strictly speaking, the only entities 
that are substances are simple substances, it’s important to get clear on the reasons 
                                                
49 I will draw upon earlier texts at various stages in this project, when relevant, but will indicate when I do 
so. 
50 For scholars who defend the idealist interpretation of Leibniz, see J.A. Cover and John Hawthorne, 
Substance and Individuation in Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Christia Mercer, 
Leibniz’s Metaphysics: It’s Origins and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); 
Robert Merrihew Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); 
Donald Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995);  and R.C. Sleigh Jr., Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on their Correspondence (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1990). 
51 AG 319. 
52 (G III.636: L 659). 
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Leibniz’s offers in favor of that thesis.  To do so, I start by looking at some features of 
Leibnizian substances.   According to Leibniz, a substance is a true unity or an unum per 
se.  In a letter to Arnauld, Leibniz writes, “that what is not truly one being is not truly one 
being either.”53  In order to be a true unity, however, a substance must be indivisible.  In 
another letter to Arnauld, Leibniz writes, “A substantial unity requires a thoroughly 
indivisible and naturally indestructible being, since its notion includes everything that 
will happen to it, something which can be found neither in shape nor in motion (both of 
which involve something imaginary, as I could demonstrate) but which can be found in a 
soul or substantial form, on the model of what is called me.”54  Thus, according to 
Leibniz the only genuine substances, which have true unity, are simple substances.  We 
find Leibniz expressing this thesis several decades later in a 1704 or 1705 letter to De 
Volder, writing that simple substances “alone have unity and absolute reality.”55 
Bodies, however, are divisible and therefore cannot be substances.  Bodies, being 
shaped, are extended and therefore have parts.56  Instead, of counting as substances, 
bodies are divisible aggregates of substances, as Leibniz argues in his “Comments on 
Michel Angelo Fardella”.57  Given that bodies are beings by aggregation, they “have their 
unity in our mind only,” according to Leibniz.58  Bodies are “unities”, Leibniz argues, in 
                                                
53 (G II.97: AG 86). 
54 (G II.76: AG 79). 
55 AG 181. 
56 AG 207. 
57 AG 103. 





the sense that circle of men holding hands are a unity.59  Since bodies are aggregates, they 
are not substances.  In a 1703 letter to De Volder, Leibinz writes, “Since only simple 
things are true things, what remains are only entities by aggregation.”60   
As aggregates, such as bodies, are not substances, they are instead phenomena.61  
Specifically, bodies are well-founded phenomena that result from simple substances.62 
Bodies, then, are not eliminated from Leibniz’s metaphysics.  Instead they are reduced, in 
some sense, to simple substances and their accidents. Support for this understanding of 
bodies is found, for example, in a fictional dialogue between Philarete and Ariste written 
in 1712, when Philarete (speaking for Leibniz) claims, “My friend [Leibniz], whose 
opinion I have just related, gives enough evidence that he leans in this direction, since he 
reduces everything to monads, or to simple substances and their modifications. . .”.63  
Earlier, in a 1704 letter to De Volder, Leibniz writes: “Considering the matter carefully, 
we must say that there is nothing in things but simple substances, and in them, perception 
and appetition.”64  Bodies, reduced in some sense to simple substances and their 
accidents, have a phenomenal existence.  Leibniz continues, “Moreover, matter and 
motion are not substances or things as much as they are the phenomena of perceivers, the 
                                                
59 Ibid.  Leibniz also writes to Arnauld: “We can therefore say of these composites and similar things what 
Democritus said so well of them, namely, they depend for their being on opinion or custom.  And Plato 
held the same opinion about everything which is purely material.  Our mind notices or conceives some true 
substances which have certain modes; these modes involve relations to other substances, so the mind takes 
the occasion to join them together in thought and to make one name account for all these things together.  
This is useful for reasoning, but we must not allow ourselves to be misled into making substances or true 
beings of them.”  See AG 89. 
60 AG 177. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 (G VI.590: AG 265). 
64 (G II.270: AG 181). 
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reality of which is situated in the harmony of the perceivers with themselves (at different 
times) and with other perceivers).65   
 This is the idealistic interpretation I shall assume in this dissertation.  The only 
substances, strictly speaking, are simple substances.  Bodies are reducible in some sense 
to simple substances and their accidents.  While bodies are not substances, but well-
founded phenomena that result from, in some sense, simple substances, there is a 
complication.  There is a distinction between plain old composite bodies (e.g., a pebble) 
and organisms or animals.  In a letter to De Volder, Leibniz writes:   
I distinguish: (1) the primitive entelechy or soul; (2) the matter, namely, the 
primary matter or primitive passive power; (3) the monad made up of these two 
things; (4) the mass or secondary matter, or the organic machine in which 
innumerable subordinate monads come together; and (5) the animal, that is, the 
corporeal substance, which the dominating monad makes into one machine.66   
 
An animal, according to Leibniz, is a corporeal substance made up of a very large 
number of monads or simple substances.  Prima facie, an animal is a composite—made 
up of a large number of monads—but also a substance.  Specifically, an animal consists 
in a dominant monad and a plurality of subordinate monads.  In the Monadology, Leibniz 
writes, “Thus we see that each living body has a dominant entelechy, which in the animal 
is the soul; but the limbs of this living body are full of other living beings, plants, 
animals, each of which also has its entelechy, or its dominant soul.”67   
 There are two interpretations one could take on Leibniz’s writings on organisms.  
First, these animals—which consist of a plurality of monads—are genuine corporeal 
substances, which while composite are nonetheless active true unities.  The downside of 
                                                
65 Ibid. 
66 (G II.252: AG 177). 
67 (G VI.619: AG 222). 
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this interpretation is that it conflicts with Leibniz’s claims about substantial simplicity.  
The second interpretation is that these corporeal substances are not genuine substances.  
Instead, they are aggregates of monads, like pebbles, only with additional special 
relations between the dominating monad and its subordinate monads.  On this latter 
interpretation, composite corporeal substances or animals are reducible as well, in some 
sense, to simple substances and their accidents.  I will assume this latter interpretation in 
this dissertation.  However, there is still much of value in this dissertation to scholars who 
subscribe the non-idealist reading of Leibniz.  Scholars who believe that the mature 
Leibniz posited corporeal substances in addition to simple substances should understand 
my project not as a study of intra-substantial causation and change but as a study on 
Leibniz’s metaphysics of intra-monadic causation and change.   
 
§5 Methodological Approaches 
As this dissertation is a work in the history of philosophy, I close off this introductory 
chapter by explaining the methodological approaches I’ll be utilizing in the remaining 
chapters.  There is more than one worthwhile approach to the history of philosophy, and 
most worthwhile approaches have exemplars in Leibniz scholarship.  Using a distinction 
recognized by Leibniz scholars such as Mates, Sleigh, Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, 
these approaches can broadly be construed as “Exegetical” history of philosophy and 
“Philosophical” history of philosophy.68   
                                                
68 See J.A. Cover and John O’Leary-Hawthorne, Substance and Individuation in Leibniz (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 5-9; Benson Mates, “Individuals and Modality in the Philosophy of 
Leibniz,” Studia Leibnitiana 1972: 83-84; and R.C. Sleigh, Leibniz & Arnauld: A Commentary on their 
Correspondence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 2-6. 
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 I’ll start with exegetical or what can also be called “historical” history of 
philosophy.  Mates characterizes exegetical history philosophy as “an attempt to discover 
and set forth, as accurately, objectively, and completely as possible the philosophical 
views of various historical figures”.69  Building on Mates’s description, Sleigh 
distinguishes two components of exegetical history of philosophy— a fact-finding 
component and an explanatory component.  According to Sleigh, the fact-finding 
component is not simply collecting various statements by a philosophy.  Instead, it 
involves the careful task of formulating a philosopher’s central views on a topic using 
sentences whose meaning is obvious in that we know what propositions the sentences 
express.70  While the outcome of mere fact-finding is—in and of itself—rarely if ever a 
significant contribution to the history of philosophy, it is at the very least a necessary 
component of work in the history of philosophy.  My own project is no exception-- there 
will be such fact-finding when appropriate in this project, which will be used in the 
service of what Sleigh calls the explanatory component.   
 Sleigh describes the explanatory component as not simply determining what a 
philosopher said but explaining why the philosopher said it.71  By explanation, Sleigh 
means the rational basis, as opposed to the psychological motivations for a philosopher’s 
views.72  The explanatory component is more difficult.  As Sleigh writes, “Usually, many 
aspects of the intellectual setting that bear on philosophical theses ultimately accepted by 
                                                
69 Mates, Ibid. 
70 Sleigh, 4. 
71 Ibid., 5-6. 
72 Ibid. 
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our philosopher go unstated.”73  This is especially true with some of the reasons for some 
of Leibniz’s most important and daring metaphysical theses, some of which are the 
subject of my project.  I highlight this in order to note that the aims of my project are 
primarily explanatory.  I aim to explain why Leibniz held certain theses, especially in 
Chapters 2-4.     
Sleigh also notes that the explanatory component can benefit from what he calls 
philosophical history of philosophy as well, which Jonathan Bennett (whom Sleigh cites) 
describes as discussing some philosophical topic “in the company” of a historical 
figure.74  The style of philosophical history of philosophy I adopt in parts of this project 
can be described as follows.  Leibniz may argue that some proposition P1 is true because 
of a different proposition P2.  The reasoning for why P2 entails P1 may be lost on us.  
Operating on a principle of charity that is more than appropriate when studying a 
philosopher of Leibniz’s caliber, one should assume—initially, at least—that Leibniz had 
good reasons for arguing that P1 follows from P2.  The work of figuring out how P2 
entails P1 requires finding additional premises, usually premises that are not explicitly 
stated by Leibniz as linking P1 and P2.  Finding these premises can involve:  (i) searching 
throughout Leibniz’s thought for theses he did explicitly defend which can also link P1 
and P2, even though Leibniz does not show that or even state that such theses link P1 and 
P2; (ii) looking broader at theses widely held by historical figures whom Leibniz was 
familiar with which could link P1 and P2 and which Leibniz would have no reason to 
reject; or (iii) engaging in plain old metaphysical reasoning oneself to rationally 
                                                
73 Ibid., 6. 
74 Ibid., 3. 
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reconstruct a link between P1 and P2.   Oftentimes, it involves a combination of (i) 
through (iii), with a high preference for (i) and (ii).  With respect to (ii) and (iii), good 
philosophical history should start and end with the figure being studied.75  In parts of this 
dissertation, I also engage in such “philosophical” history of philosophy, with the 
intention of utilizing it to serve explanatory history of philosophy. In the main body of 
this dissertation, I try to stick with methods (i) and (ii) but I will go into the territory of 






                                                
75 As Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne note and have done in their own work on Leibniz’s metaphysics of 
substance.  See Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, Ibid., 8-9. 
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CHAPTER 2.  LEIBNIZ’S TRANSFERENCE ARGUMENT CREATURELY 




In this chapter and the next, I assess Leibniz’s criticisms of the traditional view of 
creaturely causation of his time— what Leibniz called “physical influx”, which defended 
the fundamentality of creaturely transeunt causation and posited a world of causally 
interacting created substances.76  A central tenant of the traditional view was that 
transeunt causation consisted in the giving or communication of the effect from the 
cause—the agent—to the recipient of the effect— the patient.77  On Leibniz’s 
understanding of physical influx, which is strikingly similar to many contemporary 
persistence theories of causation, the agent substance’s communication of the effect 
consisted in the accident caused by the agent first detaching itself from the agent and 
being sent to the patient.78 Call this literal detachment of the accident from the agent and 
its being sent to the patient “transference”, where upon transference, the agent no longer 
possesses the accident it caused.  Leibniz’s criticisms of the possibility of creaturely 
transeunt causation then consisted of two claims.  First, creaturely transeunt causation is 
                                                
76 For an overview of Leibniz’s understanding of Physical Influx, see See Eileen O’Neill, “Influxus 
Physicus,” in Steven Nadler (ed.) Causation in Early Modern Philosophy (University Park: Penn State 
Press, 1993), 27-56. 
77 See for example Suarez, DM 17.1.6. For an overview of Aristotelian-Scholastic theories of physical 
influx and transeunt efficient causation, with special attention given to Suarez’s theory, which in turn was a 
major influence on Descartes, see A.J. Freddoso’s introduction to Francisco Suarez, S.J., On Creation, 
Conservation, & Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20-22 (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 
2002), xliii-lix. 
78 In the appendix to this chapter, I explore in greater depth the similarities between Leibniz’s 
understanding of physical influx and contemporary persistence theories of causation. 
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possible only if the transference of accidents is possible.  Second, the transference of 
accidents is not possible. 
In this chapter, I address two problems—interpretative and philosophical—that 
confront the first claim, what I’ll call the “transference condition”.  First, Leibniz stated 
the transference condition throughout his career but offered little argument for it. This 
lack of any sustained defense is striking because most who affirmed the fundamentality 
of creaturely transeunt causation vehemently denied the transference condition. In fact, as 
we’ll see soon, Thomas Aquinas, a proponent of creaturely transeunt causation called the 
transference condition “laughable.”79  Second, God is a transeunt cause in Leibniz’s 
philosophy and yet God’s transeunt causation does not consist in transference.80 Thus, 
Leibniz needs a principled way to hold that the transference condition is a requisite of 
creaturely transeunt causation while denying that divine transeunt causation consists in 
transference. 
I argue that Leibniz had a solution to both problems. While Leibniz never 
explicitly states it, I argue that Leibniz thought that if an agent transeuntly caused an 
accident without transferring the accident, the agent created the accident. For the 
recipient substance contributed no reality to the accident and the agent lost no reality in 
causing the accident. However, only an omnipotent being—God—can create. Therefore, 
only God can transeuntly cause without transferring what is caused.   
In §1, I articulate and defend a specific interpretation of Leibniz’s transference 
condition, where creaturely transeunt causation consists in the effect being transferred 
                                                
79 Aquinas, SCG, Bk. III, Pt. 1, Ch. 69, 28. 
80 According to Leibniz, God’s transeunt causal activity consists in creation, conservation, and concurrence.  
See for example (G VI.118-19: T 27) and (G IV.457-58: AG 63). 
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from the agent to the patient, where upon transference, the agent no longer possesses 
what it produces in the patient.  In §2, I address the two puzzles that scholars have raised 
against Leibniz’s transference condition. After showing that Leibniz has principled 
reasons for holding that creaturely transeunt causation must consist in transference while 
divine causation does not, I draw attention in §3 to a weakness that has not yet been 
addressed with the transference condition.  Based on some important arguments Leibniz 
develops against occasionalism in his Theodicy concerning the causation of 
modifications, I argue that Leibniz ultimately has reasons only to hold that the 
transference condition is a condition of the production of non-modal accidents, such as 
real qualities.81   
 
§1 The Transference Condition 
Take a non-initial accident A inhering in some created substance s.  What could be the 
efficient cause of A?  Adherents of the traditional view (nearly everyone except Leibniz 
and the occasionalists) would say that either s itself or God or a different created 
substance s’ could have caused A.  For example, suppose Davis’s face turns red.  Davis 
could have produced the redness in his face by holding his breath.  On the assumption of 
Theism, God could have produced the redness in Davis’s face.  But it also seems trivially 
true that some other created substance, such as Davis’s grandmother, could have 
produced the redness in Davis’s face (perhaps by slapping him).  I’ll call cases where a 
                                                
81 Non-modal accidents are accidents that are not modifications.   
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substance produces or efficiently causes an accident in a different created substance cases 
of transeunt causation.82   
In this chapter and the next, I address Leibniz’s (in)famous denial of the 
possibility of creaturely transeunt causation, specifically his requirement that some of the 
being of the agent substance be transferred to the patient substance in such causal 
interaction, which Leibniz in turn claimed is impossible.  I will call Leibniz’s argument 
the “Transference argument”.  The argument is worth focusing on for two reasons.  First, 
some of the key metaphysical theses and constraints used in Leibniz’s transference 
argument also play important roles in Leibniz’s positive views on efficient causation and 
change, which are the subjects of chapters 4 and 5.  Second, the transference argument is 
the argument Leibniz most frequently invokes against the possibility of creaturely causal 
interaction throughout his career.  For example, in his 1686 “Primary Truths”, Leibniz 
writes: 
Strictly speaking, one can say that no created substances exerts a metaphysical 
action or influx on any thing.  For not to mention the fact that one cannot explain 
how something can pass from one thing into the substance of another, we have 
already shown that from the notion of each and every thing follows all of its 
future states.83   
 
In a later 1703 letter to de Volder, expressing his more mature metaphysics, Leibniz 
writes, “Properly speaking, I don’t admit the action of substances on one another, since 
there appears to be no way for one monad to flow into another.”84  Around the same time, 
in his Monadology, Leibniz continues to deny the possibility of creaturely causal 
                                                
82 In this chapter, I’m primarily focused on Leibniz’s criticisms of creaturely transeunt causation, so 
transeunt causation should be understood as creaturely transeunt causation.  I’ll call cases where God is a 
transeunt cause, “divine transeunt causation”. 
83 AG 33. 
84 (G II.251: AG 176). 
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interaction, writing, “There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or 
changed internally by some other creature.”  Leibniz’s reason again is that “Accidents 
cannot be detached, nor can they go about outside of substances, as the sensible species 
of the Scholastics once did.  Thus, neither substance nor accident can enter a monad from 
without.”85   
 All of these passages express roughly the same argument, which has the following 
structure:  Creaturely causal interaction (or transeunt causation) is not possible because x 
is not possible.  The variable x is a placeholder for statements in the passages above about 
some entity passing or flowing or detaching from the cause to the effect— or better put, 
from the agent to the patient.  Call this “passing” or “flowing” or “detaching” of some 
entity from the agent to the patient “Transference”.  Leibniz’s argument then is that 
creaturely transeunt causation is not possible because transference is not possible.  Given 
that Leibniz argues that creaturely causation is not possible because transference is not 
possible, it is evident that Leibniz takes such transference to be a necessary condition of 
creaturely transeunt causation.   
It is important to get a grip on how Leibniz understands transference.  I argue that 
Leibniz thinks such transference consists in the effect moving from the agent to the 
patient, such that upon transference, the agent no longer possesses what was transferred 
to the patient.  That is, when an agent produces an effect in a patient, the agent transfers 
some of its own being to the patient.  Key passages support this understanding of 
transference.  For example, in his 1695 A New System of Nature, Leibniz writes: 
                                                
85 (G VI.607-8: AG 213-14). 
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Further, the action of one substance upon another is not an emission or a 
transplanting of some entity, as is commonly supposed; and it can be understood 
reasonably only in the way just shown.  It is true that we can easily conceive of 
both the emission and the reception of the parts in matter and can in this way 
reasonably explain all the phenomena of physics mechanically.  But since 
material mass is not a substance, it is clear that the action of substance itself can 
be only what I have just described.86  
 
Similar support is found a year later in his 1696 “Second Explanation of the New 
System,” where he writes: 
The way of influence is that of the common philosophy.  But since it is impossible 
to conceive of material particles or species or immaterial qualities which can pass 
from one of these substances into the other, this view must be rejected.87   
 
Further support is found a decade later in Leibniz’s New Essays on Human 
Understanding:   
I am not surprised that you encounter insurmountable problems when you seem to 
be entertaining something as inconceivable as an accident’s passing from one 
subject to another; but I see no reason why we have to suppose such a thing.  It is 
almost as strange as the Scholastics’ notion of accidents which are not in any 
subject; though they are careful to attribute theirs solely to the miraculous 
workings of divine omnipotence.88 
 
In these passages and the previous set of passages we looked at, Leibniz is criticizing the 
possibility of creaturely causal interaction—specifically “the way of influence,” which he 
describes as some entity being detached (detacher) or emitted (emission) from the 
substance and being passed (passer) or transplanted (transplantation) from the agent to 
the patient.  This detaching of the entity implies that the entity was previously attached to 
the subject.  That the entity emitted and detached by the substance goes outside of the 
substance implies that the entity was previously inside.   Hence, whatever it was that was 
                                                
86 (G IV.486: L 459). 
87 (G IV.498-99: L 460). 
88 (G V.208: NE 224). 
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passed or transplanted or detached or emitted to the patient first belonged to the agent 
until its reception in the patient.  Leibniz’s statement that “It is true that we can easily 
conceive of both the emission and the reception of the parts in matter” is especially 
strong evidence for this understanding of transference.  For when a material part is passed 
from one body to another, the material part surely does not belong to the originating body 
upon its reception in the receiving body but was a part of the originating body prior to 
transference.  Similar reasoning applies when the entity transferred is a material particle.    
 Leibniz entertains several different kinds of entities as candidates for transference, 
such as atoms, sensible species, accidents and monads.  For three reasons, however, I’ll 
focus primarily on accidents in this chapter and the next.  First, Leibniz has other reasons 
for denying the possibility of one created substance causing the existence of a different 
created substance.  Mainly, he holds that all created substances begin to exist by divine 
creation and can only cease to exist via divine annihilation.89  Second, Leibniz is an 
idealist who—in his strict ontology—denies the existence of physical atoms.  His 
idealism also leaves no place for sensible species.90  This leaves accidents.  Exploring 
why accidents could not be transeuntly caused or transferred, in addition to the first two 
reasons, also sheds much light on his own positive account of the created substances 
immanently causing and changing their own accidents.  
                                                
89 Leibniz denies the possibility of created substances efficiently causing other created substance to come 
into existence because he argues that created substances are mereologically simple.  Given that they are 
simple, they can only begin to exist and cease to exist via divine creation and annihilation. See (G VI.607: 
AG 213). 
90 I articulated and to a limited extent defend the idealistic interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics in 
Chapter 1.  
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 So in this chapter, I focus on Leibniz’s reasons for his claim that one substance 
can transeuntly cause an accident in a different substance only if the agent transfers the 
accident from itself to the patient, with such transference resulting in a loss of some of 
the being of the agent— the being of the accident gained by the patient.  This is the 
transference condition, which I formally express thus: 
The Transference Condition:  For any created substance s1 and any created 
substance s2 and any accident A, s1 efficiently causes A to inhere in s2 only if s1 
transfers A from s1 to s2.91 
 
s1’s transferring of A from itself to s2, as I argue Leibniz understands it, entails that s1 
loses A or loses the being of A that it transfers to s2.  The accident A or the being of A first 
belonged to s1 and then is gained by s2, upon which A no longer belongs to s1.  That is 
how I argue that Leibniz understands it and the version of transference I shall work with 
throughout this chapter.  While not a definition, I can at least offer some constraints to 
further clarify what transference consists in: 
For any created substance s1 and any created substance s2 and any accident A, s1 
 transfers A to s2 only if: 
 
(i) s1 is not identical to s2; 
(ii) A first belongs to s1;92 
(iii) A second belongs to s2. 
                                                
91 An alternative formulation, which will make sense in the third section of this chapter when I articulate 
the causal adequacy principle, can be expressed thus: For any created substance s1 and any created 
substance s2 and any accident A, s1 efficiently causes A to inhere in s1 only if s1 transfers the being of A 
from s1 to s2.  For now, I stick with the original formulation.   
92 Prima facie, the use of ordinals in conditions (iv) and (v) suggest a temporal ordering, where A is a part 
of s1 at a time earlier than when A is a part of s2.  Invoking time in elucidating transference is prima facie 
controversial then, as Leibniz defines time in terms of causality rather than vice versa. However, the use of 
ordinals in (iv) and (v) doesn’t necessarily mean that transference is defined partly by temporal concepts.  
Ordinals in a statement do not always entail a temporal ordering.  For example, “B” is the second letter of 
the alphabet.  That doesn’t mean that “B” occurs temporally later than “A”. For works addressing the 
relation between time and causality in Leibniz, see J.A. Cover, “Non-Basic Time and Reductive Strategies: 
Leibniz’s Theory of Time,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 28 (1997): 289-318 and Michael 
Futch, Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Time and Space (New York: Springer, 2008). 
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(iv) If A belongs to s1 then A does not belong to s2; 
(v) If A belongs to s2 then A does not belong to s1; 
 
I note two things about these constraints on transference.  First, I am not claiming that (i) 
– (v) are sufficient for transeunt causation, as it could be the case that God moved A from 
s1 to s2, in which case we would say that God, rather than s1, caused s2 to have A.93  
Second, the term “belong” is undefined.  In the case of s2, A’s belonging to s2 just is A’s 
inhering in s2.  However, I’ll assume, for now, that “belonging” is broader in extension 
than just inherence, leaving open the possibility that A’s belonging to s1 does not entail 
that A inheres in s1.  This will be relevant in §2 when I address the causal adequacy 
principle.   
With transference clarified, Leibniz’s transference argument against creaturely 
transeunt causation can be expressed thus: 
(P1) Creaturely transeunt causation is possible only if the transference of  
  accidents is possible. 
(P2) The transference of accidents is not possible. 
(C)             So, creaturely transeunt causation is not possible.   
 
I address each premise in turn, focusing on Leibniz’s reasons for (P1) in this chapter and 
(P2) in chapter 3. 
 
§2 Leibniz’s Defense of the Transference Condition 
(P1), a restatement of the transference Condition, is the most controversial premise in 
Leibniz’s transference argument.  Appropriately, I’ll devote the rest of this chapter to 
                                                
93 This is in contrast to the recent persistence theory of causation defended by S.D. Rieber who claims 
“causation is nothing more than a property moving from one object to another.”  See S.D. Reiber, 
“Causation as Property Acquisition,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the 
Analytic Tradition 109, no. 1 (2002): 53-74. 
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addressing what reasons Leibniz could and does give in support of it.  The controversy 
concerning the transference condition is three-fold.  First, most philosophers who 
defended the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation denied the transference 
condition.  Second, Leibniz offers very little in defense of the transference condition 
himself.  Instead, he oftentimes just asserts the transference condition, as noted in the 
passages above.  Third, God is a transeunt cause in Leibniz’s metaphysics, and yet divine 
transeunt causation (unlike creaturely transeunt causation) does not consist in 
transference.  Thus, Leibniz needs principled reasons for holding that creaturely transeunt 
causation must consist in transference while divine causation does not.     
2.1 Philosophers who denied the Transference Condition 
Many philosophers who not only devoted significant space to defending the possibility of 
creaturely transeunt causation but also developed sophisticated accounts of it vehemently 
denied the transference condition and therefore the truth of (P1).  For example, in an 
often-quoted passage, where Aquinas is arguing against a medieval version of 
occasionalism that assumed something like the transference condition, Aquinas writes:  
Again, it is laughable to say that a body does not act because an accident does not 
pass from subject to subject.  For a hot body is not said to give off heat in this 
sense, that numerically the same heat which is in the heating body passes over 
into the heated body.94   
 
Aquinas denies the very same thing we saw Leibniz deny above— that an accident which 
belonged to one subject could be detached and sent to a different subject.  Instead, 
Aquinas argues that such creaturely transeunt causation—such as a hot body heating a 
different body—occurs through what Scholastics called “eduction”: 
                                                
94 Aquinas, SCG, Bk. III, Pt. 1, Ch. 69, 28. 
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Rather, by the power of the heat which is in the heating body, a numerically 
different heat is made actual in the heated body, a heat which was previously in it 
in potency.  For a natural agent does not hand over its own form to another 
subject, but it reduces (reducens) the passive subject from potency to act.95  
  
Roger Bacon, who defended a similar account of transeunt causation known as the 
“Multiplication of Species” account, also denied that creaturely transeunt causation 
consists in transference.  Bacon writes, “Acting does not destroy and corrupt an agent, 
but perfects it, since  . . . a thing is perfect when it is able to produce a like thing.”96  
Bacon’s denial of the acting of an agent destroying or corrupting it just seems to be a 
denial that in acting, an agent loses any of its own being.  Focusing on species, when an 
agent produces a species in a recipient, the agent does not transfer the species, but rather, 
by a “bringing forth out of the active potentiality in the recipient matter”, the species is 
generated.97  Bacon’s denial is noteworthy because the language Leibniz often uses in 
describing transference—such as the transmission of species—is heavily drawn from 
Bacon’s account of transeunt causation.     
Finally, Suarez—from whom Leibniz gets the term “influx”—also denied that 
creaturely transeunt causation consists in transference.  Suarez writes: 
The efficient cause . . . causes by means of a proper action that flows from it.  
And in this it is also included that the efficient cause does not give its own proper 
and formal esse to the effect, but instead gives another esse that emanates from it 
by means of an action . . . The efficient cause . . . is an extrinsic cause, that is, a 
cause that does not communicate its own proper and (as I will put it) individual 
esse to the effect but instead communicates to it a different esse, which really 
flows forth and emanates from such a cause by means of an action.98 
 
                                                
95 Ibid. 
96 RB 45. 
97 RB 53. 
98 DM 17.1.6.  See also DM 12.2.7. 
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Here Suarez is explicit—the being (esse) that the cause gives to the effect is not any of 
the efficient causes own being.  Thus, the efficient cause does not lose any of its own 
being in producing an effect.   
2.2 Was Leibniz arguing against a strawman? 
The similarities between the language Leibniz uses in his transference argument and the 
terminology of Aquinas’s, Bacon’s, and Suarez’s accounts of creaturely transeunt 
causation are not at all surprising.  Aquinas’s, Bacon’s, and Suarez’s accounts were 
heavily influential and well known in Leibniz’s time.  Prima facie, Leibniz was arguing 
against a straw man.  He argues that creaturely transeunt causation is not possible 
because transference is not possible, and he often describes such transference as the 
transmission of species, or accidents detaching, or influx.  This leads to a dilemma:  
Either Leibniz did not understand the dominant accounts of transeunt causation or he did 
understand but nonetheless argued against a caricatured account.    
 A passage in one of Leibniz’s earlier writings—his 1670 “Preface to an Edition of 
Nizolius”—calls into doubt the first horn of the dilemma.  Criticizing Suarez’s account of 
causation, Leibniz writes:  
. . . so far as we have shown that technical terms are to be avoided as far as 
possible.  Now we must note that whether terms are popular or technical, they 
ought to involve either no figures of speech or few and apt ones.  Of this, the 
Scholastics have taken little notice, for strange though this sounds, their speech 
abounds with figures.  What else are such terms as to ‘depend’, to ‘inhere’, to 
‘emanate’, and to ‘inflow’ (influere)?  On the invention of this last word Suarez 
prides himself not a little.  The Scholastics before him had been exerting 
themselves to find a general concept of cause, but fitting words had not occurred 
to them.  Suarez was not cleverer than they, but bolder, and introducing 
ingeniously the word influx (influxus), he defined cause as what flows being into 
something else, a most barbarous and obscure expression.  Even the construction 
is inept, since influere is transformed from an intransitive into a transitive verb; 
and this influx is metaphorical and more obscure than what it defines.  I should 
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think it an easier task to define the term ‘cause’ than this term influx, used in such 
an unnatural sense.99   
 
In this passage, the young Leibniz indicates that he is aware that terms such as ‘influx’ 
and ‘inflow’ have a metaphorical meaning when used in defining efficient causation.  
Leibniz’s criticism of the usage of such terms is that he argues that one should not use a 
metaphorical term at the ground level of one’s metaphysics.  This is especially the case in 
defining a term such as ‘cause’, for using a metaphorical term obscures, rather than 
clarifies causation. With the above passage as evidence, I herewith suggest that Leibniz 
was aware that scholastics such as Suarez do not literally mean that the agent gives a part 
of its being to the patient.  However, if Leibniz understands that causation does not 
consist in transference in sophisticated and influential accounts of transeunt causation 
(such as Suarez’s), then Leibniz is in a worse position, leading to the second horn of the 
dilemma:  Leibniz knowingly argued against a caricatured understanding of transeunt 
causation.   
In response to this second horn, Eileen O’Neill—who in her own work has 
contributed much towards understanding Leibniz’s transference condition—draws 
attention to two points in Leibniz’s favor indicating that he was not arguing against a 
straw man but rather thought that transeunt causation was committed to transference.100  
First, in spite of all the talk about eduction and the strongly worded denials of 
transference from scholastics such as Bacon, Aquinas and Suarez, they use the language 
                                                
99 L 126. 
100 See Eileen O’Neill, “Influxus Physicus,” in Nadler, Steven ed. Causation in Early Modern Philosophy 
(University Park: Penn State Press, 1993), 27-56. 
 40 
of transference when describing body-to-body causation.  Take the following quote by 
Suarez on sensible species: 
It is known by many experiences that species shoot forth from an object.  The first 
is, because we see ourselves in another’s pupil, which cannot be understood to 
happen otherwise than by some little form which represents me having been 
impressed on the other’s pupil.101   
 
Second, when describing causation between entities of a different nature, such as bodies 
and minds, the scholastics often use language suggesting occasionalism or pre-
established harmony— further implying a denial of transeunt causation in these cases 
because transference between entities of a different nature is difficult to conceive.  Again, 
Suarez writes: 
The phantasm and also the intellect of man are rooted in one and the same soul.  
For, here it turns out that they have a wonderful order and agreement in their 
operation, whence . . . for the same reason that the intellect operates, the 
imagination also senses.  Therefore, in this way, I think . . . there is spiritual force 
in a rational soul for bringing about, in the possible intellect, species of these 
things . . . , while sensible cognition itself does not at all concur efficiently to that 
action.102   
 
According to O’Neill, Leibniz takes the scholastics’ reverting to the language of 
transference when discussing interaction between entities of similar natures or Pre-
established Harmony/occasionalism when discussing interaction between entities of 
different natures as evidence that Leibniz thought they ultimately have no intelligible 
notion of creaturely transeunt causation.  Instead, transference at the phenomenal level of 
description—bodies—is intelligible and the only conceivable model we have.  At the 
                                                
101 Francisco Suarez, Opera Omnia, edited by L. Vives (Paris, 1856-78), V 164, quoted in O’Neill, 
“Influxus Physicus,” 49.   
102 Suarez, Opera Omnia, V 719, quoted in O’Neill, “Influxus Physicus,” 50. 
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metaphysical level of description of simple substances, there is no conceivable model of 
creaturely transeunt causation.103    
2.3 Divine transeunt causation and transference 
Suppose Leibniz’s argument is as O’Neill suggests it is— that creaturely transeunt is 
unintelligible if no model can be given for it and there is no way of describing it without 
using language suggestive of either transference (between entities of similar natures) or 
pre-established harmony/occasionalism (between entities of different natures).  Suppose 
further that such unintelligibility is evidence of impossibility.  Alfred Fredosso has a 
response:  “. . . it is better to have mysteries emerge at the end of one’s investigation into 
an obvious starting point than to deny the obvious starting point itself – in this case, the 
reality of action as an observable, basic primitive.”104  If Fredosso is right, then creaturely 
transeunt causation ultimately bottoms out in a mystery or a primitive.   While 
dissatisfying, especially to one like Leibniz who places a high premium on explanation, 
such mystery does not entail impossibility.105  Figures such as Suarez might respond that 
the cost of rejecting something as obvious as creaturely transeunt causation is too high of 
a price to pay to avoid a mystery or primitive at some level of one’s explanation.    
In this chapter, I do not aim to resolve this particular issue, as doing so requires a 
detailed examination of Leibniz’s strictures on metaphysical explanation and its 
connection to possibility.106  Instead, I turn here to what I argue is a more pressing 
problem for Leibniz’s Transference argument:  Leibniz is prima facie guilty of having a 
                                                
103 Ibid., 52. 
104 Fredosso, MD 20-22., xlix. 
105 At least on the strictures of explanation endorsed by figures such as Aquinas, Bacon, Suarez, and others.  
106 I address in greater depth Leibniz’s strictures on explanation in chapter 5.  
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very similar mystery emerge in his own metaphysics of causation, specifically in cases of 
divine transeunt causation.  Continuing his critique of Leibniz and others who denied 
creaturely transeunt causation, Fredosso argues that philosophers such as Leibniz who 
deny creaturely transeunt causation while affirming divine transeunt causation must 
answer the question they themselves pose to defenders of creaturely causation:  “What 
does God’s transeunt action consist in?”107  This question is important for Leibniz, as 
divine transeunt causation is not just a mere possibility but a crucial element of his 
systematic metaphysics.  There would not even be created substances without God’s 
creation and conservation, and these are kinds of transeunt causation.  Such divine 
transeunt causation does not, because it could not, consist in transference.  That would 
entail God losing some of His being— an impossibility on the classical conception of a 
simple God.  Leibniz then needs a principled way to argue that creaturely transeunt 
causation must consist in transference while divine transeunt causation does not.  In what 
follows, I develop a way that Leibniz could take up this challenge.   
2.4 The Argument for the Transference Condition 
Leibniz needs reasons to defend the transference condition or (P1) of his transference 
argument:  
(P1)   Creaturely transeunt causation is possible only if the transference of  
  accidents is possible. 
 
But the reasons for (P1) must not entail that divine transeunt causation consists in 
transference or that the transference condition is a necessary condition of divine transeunt 
causation.  The reasons for the transference condition instead must be consistent with 
                                                
107 Ibid., xlviii. 
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denying that divine causation consists in transference.  Further, rather than ad hoc 
reasons, Leibniz needs principled reasons for affirming (P1) while denying that divine 
causation consists in transference.  I argue that Leibniz has such reasons.   
My argumentative strategy is as follows.  I first articulate three key theses or 
constraints on creaturely transeunt causation that were endorsed and utilized by notable 
medieval and early figures in their accounts of creaturely transeunt causation.  These 
theses are connected to one another and follow upon one another in a logical progression 
of sorts.  From these three theses, I develop an argument for (P1) that I contend was 
lurking behind Leibniz’s transference condition.  The argument for (P1), as I shall show, 
is also consistent with denying that divine transeunt causation consists in transference.  In 
fact, the argument is an argument for why specifically creaturely transeunt causation 
must consist in transference.  After developing the argument, I argue in 2.5 that it was the 
argument behind Leibniz’s repeated statements of the transference condition.   
I note that the argument for (P1) I develop and defend as Leibniz’s is drawn from 
what is at most a very thin skeleton in Leibniz’s writings.  In this section, then, I trudge 
into the terrain of philosophical history of philosophy.  I do so with the aim, however, of 
serving explanatory exegetical history of philosophy.  My aim is to explain why Leibniz 
repeatedly endorsed the transference condition.  I note as well that I do not conclude that 
Leibniz ultimately had a successful argument for (P1).  In fact, I draw attention to a 
significant weakness with it in §3.  Instead, I aim to make sense of why Leibniz thought 
(P1) was true while denying that divine causation required transference.   
The first thesis is what I’ll call the “Causal Adequacy Principle”.  The causal 
adequacy principle was not merely endorsed by both medieval and early modern 
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philosophers but was central to some of their most important metaphysical views.  
Expressed in various ways, the causal adequacy principle required that effects pre-exist, 
somehow, in their causes or that causes must, somehow, contain their effects.  The 
principle traces back at least to Aristotle, who argued that something that is potentially F 
can only be made actually F by something that is or contains the actuality of F.108 Many 
centuries later, we find Descartes—known for defending a metaphysics which is largely 
anti-Aristotelian—putting the principle to use as a key premise in his causal argument for 
God’s existence in his third meditation.  Descartes writes, “there must be at least as much 
reality in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause.”109    
In between Aristotle and early modern figures such as Descartes, we find the 
principle explicitly defended by some medieval philosophers.  For example, Aquinas 
endorsed and utilized the principle both in his own metaphysics of causation and in other 
important areas of his metaphysics, including his account of the divine nature.   A classic 
statement of the principle is found in Part I of the Summa Theologiae:  “For effects 
proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since 
every agent produces its like.”110  Centuries later, Suarez endorses the very same 
principle, writing, “It is proved that nothing of perfection is in the effect that it does not 
                                                
108 Aristotle writes, “So far as the things formed by nature or by human art are concerned, the formation of 
that which is potentially is brought about by that which is in actuality; so that the Form, or conformation, of 
B would have to be contained in A.”  On Generation and Corruption, 734a30-32. 
109 CSM II, 28. 
110 ST 1, q19, a4.  Commenting on Aquinas’s usage of the principle, John Wippel writes, “This [the causal 
adequacy principle] is to say simply that the agent has the power to produce the effect.”  Metaphysical 
Thought of Aquinas, 490 
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have from its causes”111 and “The effect can have no perfection which does not pre-exist 
in some of its causes.”112   
One might suppose that the causal adequacy principle is all Leibniz needs to 
argue against the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation instead of the more 
complicated transference argument.  Consider the familiar but philosophically knotty 
cases of transeunt causation between substances of vastly different natures, such as mind-
body causation in the context of Cartesian metaphysics.113  Suppose, for example, some 
mind efficiently caused a body to change its shape, such as when—within the 
metaphysics of Cartesian substance dualism—Socrates decides to rise from sitting and 
changes his shape.  In this case, Socrates’ mind produced a new accident in his body— a 
new shape.  Given the causal adequacy principle, Socrates’ mind can only produce a new 
accident in his body—a new shape—if the accident pre-exists in his mind.  However, a 
shape is an accident appropriate for an extended thing while the accidents of a mental 
substance—such as Socrates’ mind—would be accidents appropriate to non-extended 
mental things, such as beliefs and desires.  The burden for defenders of transeunt 
causation between entities of very different natures—such as Descartes—was to explain 
how a mental substance could cause a change in a bodily substance (or vice versa) when 
the mental substance lacked the accidents it caused in the body.  The challenge, that is, 
was to explain how Socrates’ mental substance—which willed the standing—produced 
                                                
111 DM XXVI.1, quoted in Tad Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation, 52. 
112 DM 4 XXVI 1.2 
113 According to Descartes, there are two fundamentally different kinds of created substances:  bodies and 
mental substances.  The essence of bodily substances is extension and all changes in bodily substances are 
grounded in changes in their extension.  The essence of mental substances, on the other hand, is thought.  
Descartes’ most rigorous articulation of his metaphysics is found in his Principles of Philosophy.  See CSM 
I, 177-292.  
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the change in shape in his body when his mental substance isn’t shaped or capable of 
being shaped.   
However, in addition to the fact that it takes us no further towards understanding 
Leibniz’s reasons for (P1), there are at least two reasons why the causal adequacy 
principle is not sufficient to argue even against the possibility of transeunt causation.  
Clearly, the argument against transeunt causation from the causal adequacy principle, as 
presented above, gains purchase only only in cases of causation between entities of 
different natures, such as minds and bodies.  It would not apply to entities of the same 
nature, such as cases of mind/mind or body/body causation.  An extended substance 
would be a suitable candidate to produce an accident in a different extended substance, 
unlike a non-extended substance, because the agent extended substance itself possesses 
the types of accidents it causes in the patient.  Leibniz, however, is adamant that transeunt 
causation is not possible between any created substances.   
Second, the few brief passages and argument given above present an overly 
simplistic and grossly misrepresentative version of the causal adequacy principle.  As 
initially presented, the causal adequacy principle requires that a cause have an accident of 
the exact same type it causes in the effect, whether it be numerically the same (as Leibniz 
would argue) or a different token of the same type.  This is plausible in causes of what 
the scholastics call univocal causation, such as fire heating a pan.114  But it scarcely 
applies to cases such as fire’s heat hardening clay, where the cause does not have an 
                                                
114 See DM 17.2 for Suarez’s discussion of univocal causes. 
 47 
accident as the same type as the effect.  A more pressing burden for many theists would 
be to explain how a non-extended God could create extended corporeal substances.   
Instead, the simplistic version of the causal adequacy principle that entails the 
impossibility of causal interaction between substances of different natures is not the 
version of the principle that figures such as Aquinas, Suarez, and Descartes endorsed, 
even though they sometimes wrote as if it were.  Instead, they endorsed a more refined 
version of the principle that is consistent with causal interaction between substances of 
different natures.  Thus, Aquinas writes: 
I answer that, all created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as 
universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator, Metaph. v) any 
excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two 
considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists in an effect must be 
found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal 
agent—as when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an 
equivocal agent—thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the 
sun's power.115   
 
From Suarez: 
An effect cannot exceed in perfection all of its causes taken together.  It is proved 
that nothing of perfection is in the effect that it does not have from its cause; 
therefore the effect can have nothing of perfection that does not pre-exist in any of 
its causes, either formally or eminently, because causes cannot give what they in 
no way contain.116   
 
And Descartes: 
A stone, for example, which previously did not exist, cannot begin to exist unless 
it is produced by something which contains, either formally or eminently, 
everything to be found in the stone [i.e. it will contain in itself the same things as 
are in the stone or other more excellent things; similarly, heat cannot begin to 
exist unless it is produced in an object which was not previously hot, except by 
                                                
115 ST 1, q4, a2, emphasis added. 
116 DM XXVI.1, quoted in Tad Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation, 52.  Emphasis added. 
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something of at least the same order (degree or kind) of perfection as heat, and so 
on.117   
 
Aquinas, Suarez, and Descartes all argue that the cause must formally or eminently 
contain the effect.  The requirement of causes formally containing the effect applies to 
cases of univocal causation and is what was assumed in the initial argument against 
transeunt causation from the causal adequacy principle.  That requirement drove figures 
such as Descartes’ pupil Princess Elizabeth to question the possibility of transeunt 
causation between substances of different natures.  In 1643, she writes to Descartes, “I 
admit that it would be easier for me to concede matter and extension to the mind than it 
would be for me to concede to an immaterial thing the capacity to move the body and be 
moved by one.”118  Elizabeth assumed a version of the causal adequacy principle such as 
the following: 
 For any substance s1 and any substance s2 and any accident A, s1 efficiently causes 
 A to inhere in s2 only if s1 formally contains A. 
 
But as the texts above make clear, Aquinas, Suarez, Descartes, and many others in fact 
affirmed a more generous version: 
 For any substance s1 and any substance s2 and any accident A, s1 efficiently causes 
 A to inhere in s2 only if s1 formally contains A or s1 eminently contains A. 
 
Formal containment is fairly easy to understand in contrast to eminent containment.  Fire 
can heat a metal pan because the fire itself is hot.119  A precise formulation of eminent 
containment is more difficult to offer.  There is indeed much disagreement on how a 
                                                
117 CSM II, 28.  Emphasis Added. 
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119 Formal containment can be expressed thus:  For any substance s and any accident A, s formally contains 
A if and only if there is an accident F such that F is the same type of accident as A and F inheres in s.  In 
this definition, A and F may be numerically distinct or identical.  Many texts suggest that Leibniz thought 
A=F. 
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cause can eminently contain an effect.120  Rather than shoulder that burden, it will suffice, 
for the purposes of this section, to briefly draw attention to a feature of eminent 
containment that most philosophers familiar to Leibniz would have recognized.  When an 
effect is eminently contained in its cause, the effect exists in the cause, in some “higher 
way” than in the effect.121  How, though, can an effect exist in a higher way in its cause?  
While various answers have been posed and defended, all answers agree that it is because 
the cause is more perfect or the cause has more reality than the effect.  For example, 
Suarez writes, “Nevertheless, it should be briefly said that to contain eminently is to have 
such a perfection of a superior ratio, which virtually contains whatever is in the lower 
perfection.”122   
Notably, at least two philosophers influenced by Descartes—Malebranche123 and 
Spinoza124—rejected eminent containment because of difficulties in giving a precise 
                                                
120 Most of the discussion has centered around Descartes’ usage of the notion of eminent containment.  See, 
for example, Kenneth Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy and 17-46, Tad M. 
Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation, 49-86. 
121 See, for example, Aquinas, SCG I, 30 and ST 1, q13, a4.  See also Descartes, CSM II, 30.  Suarez gives 
the lengthiest defense and articulation of eminent containment that I have found.  See DM XXX.1. 
122 DM XXX 1.10. 
123 Consider the following passage from Malebranche (where a univocal cause formally contains the effect 
and an equivocal cause eminently containst the effect) in LO 277:  “And if one objects against their false 
and incomprehensible suppositions that fire must be composed of very highly agitated particles because it 
produces such violent motion, and that a thing cannot communicate what it does not have (which is 
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and imaginary distinction (such as that between equivocal and univocal causes) in order to appear to say 
something when in effect they have said nothing.  For at bottom it is a common notion among attentive 
minds that there is no such thing in nature as a true equivocal cause (in the sense they understand it) and 










account of it.  Spinoza’s rejection of eminent containment, and thus likely affirmation of 
the stricter version of the causal adequacy principle, would suffice to secure the falsity of 
transeunt causation between substances of different natures (but not suffice alone to 
secure the falsity of causal interaction between substances of the same nature).  Leibniz, 
however, could not have appealed to that option in arguing against creaturely transeunt 
causation.  In addition to that version of the causal adequacy principle still not entailing 
the falsity of causal interaction between substances of the same nature, Leibniz himself 
assumed eminent containment, at least in cases of divine causation.  In the Discourse on 
Metaphysics, Leibniz wrote, “This simple primitive substance [God] must eminently 
(eminemment) include the perfections contained in the derivative substances which are its 
effects.”125 
The causal adequacy principle alone then does not provide Leibniz with sufficient 
reason to deny the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation.  The principle will, 
however, provide Leibniz with support for the first premise of his transference argument 
and it does so in a way consistent with denying that divine causation consists in 
transference.  To see the role the principle plays in the argument, we must see why 
philosophers endorsed the causal adequacy principle.   
                                                
124 Spinoza denies transeunt causation between substances of different natures in his Ethics, writing “When 
things have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other.”  See Ethics 1, Proposition 3.  
Spinoza seems to give epistemological reasons for Proposition 3 in the Ethics, writing, “If things have 
nothing in common, then (Ax. 5) they cannot be understood through one another, and so (Ax. 4) one cannot 
be the cause of the other.  (Ethics I, prop. 3.)  However, Francesca di Poppa has recently argued that the 
proposition in the Ethics is ultimately due to problems Spinoza found with eminent containment, leading to 
a metaphysics where all modes are formally contained in God, who immanently causes them.  See 
Francesca di Poppa, “God Acts from the Laws of His Nature Alone: From the Nihil Ex Nihilo Axiom to 
Causation as Expression in Spinoza’s Metaphysics,” (PhD Diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2006). 
125 See (G VI.602: AG 210).  See also (G VI.613: AG 218). 
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Recall the passage from Suarez where he writes, “. . . the effect can have nothing 
of the perfection that does not pre-exist in any of its causes, either formally or eminently, 
because causes cannot give what they in no way contain.”  The causal adequacy principle 
is the constraint expressed before the word ‘because’.  Granted, Suarez expresses the 
principle somewhat differently that I have, requiring that the perfection of the effect pre-
exist or be contained in the cause, while I my formulation of the principle requires the 
accident to pre-exist in the cause.  I’ll continue to use the term accident.  I do so, 
however, while noting that scholastics such as Aquinas and Suarez tended to use the term 
‘perfection’ (perfectiones) in expressing the causal adequacy principle while Descartes 
tended to use the terms ‘reality’ and ‘perfection’ interchangeably.126  However, my usage 
of the term ‘accident’ will not impact the argument, thus I’ll assume the following bi-
conditional: 
 For any substance s and any accident A, s formally contains A or s eminently 
 contains A if and only if s contains the perfection of A.    
 
If s contains A, surely s contains the perfection of A.  For similar reasons, I’ll also assume 
the bi-conditional: 
 For any substance s and any accident A, s formally contains A or s eminently 
 contains A if and only if s contains the reality of A.   
 
Notice then that in the passage from Suarez, whatever is written after the word ‘because’ 
is a reason for the causal adequacy principle.  The phrase Suarez uses is “causes cannot 
give (dare) what they in no way contain”, expressing what I’ll call the “Causing-as-
                                                
126 The term “reality” has a nuanced technical meaning in Leibniz’s metaphysics, which I soon address in 
§3 in this chapter and in much greater depth in chapter 4. 
 52 
Giving” principle, the second thesis.127  The causing-as-giving principle is a reason for 
the causal adequacy principle and the causal adequacy principle is a necessary condition 
of the causing-as-giving principle.  This relation between the two principles is expressed 
in other ways, most notably as “nihil dat quod non habet.”  If some pan heats some 
water— i.e., the pan gives heat to the water, then the pan must itself contain heat.  To put 
it slightly differently: what reason might one offer for the causal adequacy principle?  
The answer is the causing-as-giving principle.  If x gives F to y, x must possess F.  I can’t 
give my sister fifty dollars for her birthday unless I have fifty dollars.  The same 
restriction applies to causal transactions.128 
Leibniz can agree with Suarez and others that the causing-as-giving principle is a 
reason for the causal adequacy principle and that the causal adequacy principle is a 
necessary condition of the causing-as-giving principle.  That is, Leibniz can agree that: 
 For any substance s1 and any substance s2 and any accident A, s1 gives the reality 
 of A to s2 only if s1 formally contains A or s1 eminently contains A.   
 
But Leibniz holds further that once you give what you have, you longer possess it 
yourself.  While Leibniz doesn’t explicitly make the following claim, there are plausible 
reasons to suppose that it is lurking behind his repeated assertions of the transference 
condition: 
 For any created substance s1 and any created substance s2 and any accident A, s1 
 gives the reality of A to s2 only if s1 transfers A from s1 to s2.   
                                                
127 Aquinas writes, “In De divinis nominibus Dionysii 4.5: “For these three things seem to belong to the 
notion of an efficient cause: to give being, to move, and to conserve.”  Quoted in Michael Rota, 
“Causation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, edited by Brian Davies & Eleonore Stump (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2012), 104-114. 
128 In DM 12.2.3, Suarez argues that a cause’s “pouring being into another” is synonymous with the cause 
“giving or communicating being to another thing.”  Quoted in Stephan Schmidt, “Efficient Causality: The 
Metaphysics of Production,” 85. 
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An objection immediately comes to mind with respect to arguing that the causing-as-
giving principle entails the transference condition.  It’s not necessarily the case that if you 
give something, you no longer possesses what you gave.  For example, Paul’s giving 
Timothy advice does not entail that Paul no longer possesses that advice.  Yet Paul can’t 
give Timothy advice unless Paul possesses, in some sense, the advice he gives.  Thus, 
Paul’s giving advice must satisfy a constraint similar to the causal adequacy principle 
while at the same time not satisfying a constraint such as the transference condition.  So 
giving what one has doesn’t entail that one loses what they give.   
Leibniz would have to respond that there is an equivocal meaning to ‘give’ 
between ‘giving’ advice and ‘giving’ money, where the giving in causation is like the 
latter rather than the former.  An immediate objection is that this move is ad hoc.  Leibniz 
could respond, however, that it is not ad hoc, as the crucial difference between giving 
advice and the notion of giving in the causing-as-giving principle lies crucially in what is 
given.  In cases of causing-as-giving, what is given are accidents— genuine beings that 
the patient substance gains.129  
One might further object that God can give an accident to a patient without God 
losing the reality of that accident.  Moreover, God’s giving an accident is not necessarily 
equivocal in meaning to a created substance’s giving an accident, unlike Paul’s giving 
Timothy advice.  This returns us to Fredosso’s objection:  If God can give the reality of 
an accident to a patient substance without God losing what he gives, why can’t a created 
substance do the same? 
                                                
129 I address in greater depth how to understand that accidents are beings in the third part of this chapter and 
throughout chapters 3 and 4. 
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There are reasons available to Leibniz—which I shall argue were his reasons in 
2.5—that address both objections:  The reason causing-as-giving in transeunt causation is 
more like the giving of money when the giver is a created substance while God’s giving 
is more like the giving of advice is that only God can create.  In support of this claim, I 
turn to the third thesis—in addition to the causal adequacy principle and the causing-as-
giving principle—that applies to transeunt causation, what I’ll call the “No-Reality-from-
Patient” principle.  The No-reality-from-patient principle is the common sense principle 
that the patient does not contribute reality to the effect in transeunt causation, where the 
reality of the effect is the perfection of the effect or more simply put, the accident 
produced.  While this principle needs little defense, it’s helpful to look at least one 
example of a philosopher who affirmed it.  In Aquinas’s account of an agent substance’s 
educing an effect in a patient, the agent contributes actuality to the effect, while the 
patient does not.  Instead, the patient supplies the potency for the effect, which is reduced 
to act by the agent.  A pan must actually be hot if it is to produce heat in water that is 
only hot in potency.  In the following passage, Aquinas defends the no-reality-from-
patient principle: 
Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause: and 
although to pre-exist in the potentially of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more 
imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; 
still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more 
imperfect, but in a more perfect way.130   
 
While Aquinas is contrasting the perfection contributed by the efficient cause with the 
perfection contributed by the material cause, and while he does not use the term 
                                                
130 ST 1, q4, a2 
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“patient”, his claims supports the no-reality-from-patient principle.  The efficient cause is 
the agent and the agent contributes a form that inheres in matter— in this case either in 
prime matter (if the agent contributes a substantial form) or in the patient substance (if 
the agent contributes an accidental form).  If the effect exists in a more imperfect way in 
the patient or material cause, the patient or material cause surely cannot be what 
contributes the perfection—or in other words the reality—of the accident.   I note further 
that while Descartes does not avail himself of the act/potency distinction, his description 
of the causal adequacy principle conveys basically the same idea.  That is, in transeunt 
causation, the substance acted on is not the source of the reality of the effect.   
Further support for the no-reality-from-patient principle can be found in how the 
causal-adequacy principle is often expressed.  For example, Suarez writes, “An effect 
cannot exceed in perfection all of its causes together.  It is proved that nothing of 
perfection is in the effect that it does not have from its cause.”131  Suarez’s statement is 
consistent with the effect exceeding in perfection the patient substance of a transeuntly 
caused accident.  The reason is that the patient does not contribute perfection to the 
effect.  If perfection is co-extensive with reality, then the patient does not contribute 
reality to the effect.  The no-reality-from-patient principle can then be stated thus: 
 For any substance s1 and any substance s2 and any accident A, if s1 efficiently 
 causes A to inhere in s2 and it is not the case that s2 efficiently causes A to inhere 
 in s2, then it is not the case that s2 gives the reality of A to s2.   
 
It is from these three principles that Leibniz has an argument for (P1) that is consistent 
with denying that divine transeunt causation must consist in transference.  Leibniz would 
                                                
131 DM XXVI.1 
 56 
argue that those who defend the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation could not 
endorse the causal adequacy principle, causing-as-giving principle, and no-reality-from-
patient principle while at the same time rejecting the transference condition.  While he 
never supplies it, his reasoning could be as follows:  If the patient contributes no reality 
to the effect and the agent does not lose the reality it contains when it gives the reality of 
the effect to the patient, then the reality of the accident caused to inhere in the patient 
must have been created.132  However, only God can create, as only an omnipotent being 
can create and only God is omnipotent.  So one of these must be rejected by defenders of 
creaturely transeunt causation: the causal adequacy principle, the causing-as-giving 
principle, the no-reality-from-patient principle, or the denial of the transference 
condition.  If you give up the denial of the transference condition and instead affirm (P1), 
then the production of an accident in a patient is not a case of creation.  So the denial of 
(P1)—the denial of the transference condition for created substances—is the culprit.  
Affirm, rather than deny, the transference condition and you no longer have created 
substances themselves creating.  Leibniz thus has an argument for the transference 
condition and (P1) of the transference argument that is not only consistent with holding 
that divine causation does not consist in transference but also makes sense of it.   
                                                
132 I note that Thomas Pinkston, in his dissertation on Suarez’s account of efficient causation, claims that 
efficient causation for Suarez—even when the cause is a created substance—is a type of creation.  Pinkston 
writes: “Moreover, inasmuch as the efficient cause makes to be something that was not, and, inasmuch as 
the esse of the cause is strictly separated from that of its effect, one might reasonably speak of a cause 
“creating” its effect.  Obviously, such a use of ‘create’ excludes any connotation of supernatural ex nihilo 
creation.  Nevertheless, use of the term, suitably qualified, underscores the radical nature of efficient 
causality as understood by most scholastics, including Suarez.”  As will be obvious in the following pages, 
the argument I give on behalf of Leibniz can be understood to press Pinkston (or Pinkston’s reading of 
Suarez) on just how the transeunt causation of accidents can satisfy the causal adequacy principle, causing-
as-giving, and the no-reality-from-patient principle while also denying the transference condition, and not 
being the type of creation traditionally understood to require omnipotence.  See Pinkston, 56. 
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2.5  The argument for the Transference Condition is a Leibnizian Argument 
While it cannot be stated with certainty, two broad reasons point in favor of the argument 
developed in 2.4 being Leibniz’s reasons for (P1).  First, the argument for (P1) makes 
sense of why Leibniz thinks creaturely immanent causation is possible even though 
creaturely transeunt causation is not, something which to date has not been dealt with in 
the scholarly literature.  Specifically, the argument makes sense of how the causal 
adequacy principle can be a constraint on immanent causation without immanent 
causation requiring the transference or creation of accidents.  Take a created substance s 
immanently producing an accident A, so that A inheres in s.  On the causal adequacy 
principle, s must have contained or possessed the reality of A prior to causing A to inhere 
in itself.  The reality of A did not move from s to another substance when s produced A.  
The reality of A also didn’t just pop into being from another substance, nor did it just pop 
into being it itself.  Instead, the reality of A was already in s.  So the production of A 
resulted in no net gain of reality in s.   
Using a crude but appropriate metaphor given our discussion of the causal 
adequacy principle, s is a container, and the reality of A never left the container, nor did 
new reality appear in the container when A was produced, in addition to the reality 
already present in s.  Instead, the reality was “moved around” but within the same 
substance.133  Were s to efficiently cause A to inhere in a different substance s’, and were 
                                                
 
133 In the Theodicy, Leibniz claims as much, writing, “. . . substances produce accidents by the changes of 
their limits.”  The nature of accidental reality, how accidents are connected to their substances, and how 
substances immanently produce their accidents will occupy a significant portion of this dissertation, 
including the next section, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4.  See (G VI.351: T 395).  For similar claims by 
Leibniz, see (G II.257: L 532) and (G II.270: AG 180).  
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this case of transeunt causation to satisfy the causal adequacy principle, causing-as-giving 
principle, no-reality-from-patient principle, and the denial of transference, then Leibniz 
would call that creation.  There would be a net gain in reality in the patient substance—
the reality of the accident produced by the agent—with no loss of the agent’s being.  
Hence, Leibniz can say that creaturely immanent causation is possible because it requires 
neither creation nor transmission, unlike transeunt causation.134   
Second, the argument for the transference condition has historical precedent in 
philosophers not merely familiar to Leibniz but whom he claimed to have influenced 
important areas of his thought.  Notably, the argument for the transference condition 
makes sense of two important areas of agreement between Leibniz and the occasionalists: 
(i) creaturely transeunt causation is impossible while (ii) divine transeunt causation is 
possible.  With respect to (i), Malebranche—the most well known occasionalist and one 
who corresponded with Leibniz—also argued that one influential account of creaturely 
transeunt causation was inconceivable without transference. Arguing against the 
                                                
134 In conversation, Jeffrey Brower has raised an important objection to this account of immanent causation.  
Brower argues that Leibniz faces a dilemma with respect to the causal adequacy principle, the possibility of 
immanent causation, and the defense of the transference condition.  Take again a created substance s 
immanently causing an accident A to inhere in itself.  If s contains A, as the causal adequacy principle 
requires, then s either formally contains A or eminently contains A.  If s formally contains A, then s didn’t 
really change, as what it is for a substance to formally contain an accident just is for the accident (or an 
accident of the same type) to inhere in and be an accident of that substance.  If s eminently contains A, on 
the other hand, then s created A.   
I concede the first horn:  If s formally contained A, then in immanently producing A, s didn’t really 
change. The next section of this chapter and the next two chapters do deal with topics relevant to the 
second horn of the dilemma raised by Brower, including what kind of reality accidents have, what kind of 
reality substances have, how they are related, and how a substance changes its accidents.   In the next 
section of this chapter, I draw attention to a similar problem:  Leibniz’s argument for the transference 
condition ultimately only applies to non-modal accidents, such as real qualities.  It does not, I argue, apply 
to modifications—the only kind of accidents Leibniz posits in his ontology, as I argue in Chapter 3.  Were 
Leibniz to hold that monads produce non-modal accidents, such as real qualities, then the dilemma applies:  
Either the accident would be created or the monad would not change.  Modifications, Leibniz argues, have 
no reality of their own but instead are limitations on the positive reality of a monad, thus the immanent 
causation of a modification by a monad would not result in a net gain in reality.     
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multiplication of species model of causation developed at length by Roger Bacon, 
Malebranche wrote in The Search After Truth III.2.2, “Finally, it is inconceivable how a 
body that does not sensibly diminish could continually emit species in all directions, or 
how it could continually fill the vast spaces around it with them—and all this with 
inconceivable speed.”135  Malebranche finds it puzzling that a body (the causal agent) 
could emit species—the first effect of a natural cause in Bacon’s account—without the 
body diminishing.  In other words, Malebranche finds it inconceivable how a body could 
produce a species distinct from it without losing some of its own being.  So Malebranche 
argued that a major account of transeunt causation was inconceivable without 
transference.  We find here Malebranche endorsing a premise very similar to (P1) of 
Leibniz’s transference argument.  Malebranche, of course, also agreed with the 
conclusion of the Transference argument—that creaturely transeunt causation is 
impossible.136  
For a different but related line of evidence that the argument for (P1) expresses 
Leibniz’s reasons for the transference condition, and one again based on Leibniz’s 
agreement with Malebranche, I turn to a key passage in Leibniz’s 1695 “A New System 
of the Nature and Communication of Substances, and of the Union of the Soul and 
Body.”  This work expresses some of Leibniz’s most mature metaphysics.  In it, Leibniz 
not only agrees with the occasionalists on (i) and (ii), but also explicitly states that he 
                                                
135 LO 220-21. 
136 I leave open the question of whether or not Malebranche would have agreed with (P2) of the 
transference argument— substances can’t diminish in being in the way required for transference.  
Malebranche in fact develops different reasons for the conclusion of the transference argument, which I 
soon present. 
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agrees —to some extent—with the their reasons for (i) and (ii).  I present the passage in 
full:  
For I could not find any way of explaining how the body makes anything happen 
in the soul, or vice versa, or how one substance can communicate with another 
created substance.  Descartes had given up the game at this point, as far as we can 
determine from his writings.  But his disciples, seeing that the common opinion is 
inconceivable, judged that we sense the qualities of bodies because God causes 
thoughts to arise in the soul on the occasion of motions of matter, and that when 
our soul, in turn, wishes to move the body, it is God who moves the body for it.  
And since the communications of motions also seemed inconceivable to them, 
they believed that God imparts motion to a body on the occasion of the motion of 
another body.  That is what they call the system of occasional causes, which has 
been made very fashionable by the beautiful reflections of the author 
[Malebranche] of The Search after Truth. 
I must admit that they have penetrated the difficulty by articulating what 
could not possibly be the case, but their explanation of what actually happens 
does not appear to eliminate the difficulty.  It is quite true that, speaking with 
metaphysical rigor, there is no real influence of one created substance on another, 
and that all things, with all their reality, are continually produced by the power of 
God.  . . .  
Therefore, since I was forced to agree that it is not possible for the soul or 
any other true substance to receive something from without, except by divine 
omnipotence, I was led, little by little, to a view that surprised me, but which 
seems inevitable, and which, in fact, has very great advantages and rather 
considerable beauty. . .”137 
 
Leibniz agrees with the occasionalists’ denial of the possibility of creaturely transeunt 
causation.  Further, Leibniz admits that the occasionalists “penetrated the difficulty”, 
suggesting that Leibniz agrees to some extent with their reasoning against the possibility 
of creaturely transeunt causation.  Finally, Leibniz agrees with the occasionalists that 
divine transeunt causation is the only possible kind of transeunt causation, and the 
reasons have something to do with God’s omnipotence.  According to both Leibniz and 
the occasionalists, only an omnipotent being can produce an accident in a different 
                                                
137 (G IV.482-83: AG 142-43). 
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substance.  So the reason Leibniz and the occasionalists deny creaturely transeunt 
causation but affirm divine transeunt causation is because they are convinced that only 
God is powerful enough or has the right kind of power to produce accidents in other 
substances, while created substances do not.   
It is important to note a reason why Leibniz did not agree with the occasionalists 
that only an omnipotent being can be a transeunt cause.  Malebranche famously argued 
that one reason that only an omnipotent being can produce an accident in another 
substance is because there must be a necessary connection between a cause and an effect, 
something that obtains only when the cause is God’s will.138  Malebranche’s reasoning 
can be expressed thus:   
(M1)   Transeunt causation is possible only if there is a necessary connection  
  between the cause and the effect.139 
(M2)   There is a necessary connection between a cause and an effect only when  
  the cause is an omnipotent being.140 
(M3)   So, Transeunt causastion is possible only when the cause is an omnipotent 
being.141   
 
                                                
138 Malebranche writes, “A true cause as I understand it is one such that the mind perceives a necessary 
connection between it and its effect.”  See LO 450. 
139 Actually, Malebranche defends an even stronger conditional:  (M1’) Efficient causation is possible only 
if there is a necessary connection between the cause and the effect, where even immanent efficient causes 
require a necessary connection between cause and effect.  Thus, Malebranche also affirms the stronger 
conclusion (M3’) So, efficient causation is possible only when the cause is an omnipotent being.  For the 
purposes of this section, the weaker M1 and M3 suffice. 
140 Malebranche continues, “Now the mind perceives a necessary connection only between the will of an 
infinitely perfect being and its effects.  Therefore, it is only God who is the true cause and who truly has the 
power to move bodies.  I say further that it is inconceivable that God could communicate his power to 
move bodies to men or angels, and that those who claim that our power to move our arms is a true power 
should admit that God can also give to minds the power to create, annihilate, and do all possible things; in 
short, that He can render them omnipotent, as I shall show.”  See Ibid. 
141 Malebranche’s argument was originally given centuries earlier by Al-Ghazālī' in The Incoherence of the 
Philosophers.  See Al-Ghazālī', The Incoherence of the Philosophers, translated by Michael E. Marmura 
(Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1997), 170-181 and Malebranche, The Search After Truth, VI.2.3 
in LO 446-452.  
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Leibniz denied that a necessary connection is the link between transeunt causation and 
omnipotence.142  But he agreed with the conclusion:  something related to power is the 
reason why divine transeunt causation is possible while creaturely transeunt causation is 
not. The reason, I propose, is that creaturely transeunt causation without transference is 
creation.  But once again, only an omnipotent being can create—a conclusion that theists 
of all stripes have generally agreed upon.  They just have not agreed that creaturely 
transeunt causation involves creation, a point I take Leibniz and the occasionalists to be 
pressing them on.  Recall Fredosso’s challenge: If divine transeunt causation doesn’t 
consist in transference, why must creaturely transeunt causation consist in it?  Leibniz 
and the occasionalists would both say that it is because created substances are not 
powerful enough.  With respect to Leibniz, the reason is that if you deny the transference 
condition while affirming the familiar causal adequacy principle, the causing-as-giving 
principle, and the no-reality-from-patient principle, then the accident is created— 
something that only God can do. 
The argument for the transference condition also bears a strong resemblance to an 
argument Aquinas attributed to Avicenna concerning the production of substantial forms 
in Aquinas’s Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei.143  Aquinas characterizes 
Avicenna’s argument thus:  
                                                
142 Leibniz writes, “Malebranche’s strongest argument for why God alone acts reduces to this in this end—
a true cause is that which the effect follows from necessarily, but an effect follows necessarily from the will 
of God alone.  However, it should be noted that if the state of any entity is known perfectly, then the state 
of any other entity can be inferred infallibly (although not, I grant, necessarily, i.e., not in such a way that it 
could ever be demonstrated that the contrary implies a contradiction, since analysis goes on ad infinitum.”  
Quoted in Robert C. Sleigh, Jr., “Leibniz on Malebranche on Causality,” in J.A. Cover and Mark Kulstad, 
ed., Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy: Essays Presented to Jonathan Bennett (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1990), 171. 
143 Kara Richardson has recently argued that the argument Aquinas attributes to Avicenna is partly 
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That which has no matter as a constituent part cannot be made of matter.  Now 
forms have no matter as a constituent part: because form is contradistinguished 
both from matter and from composite things.  Since, then, forms are made since 
they have a beginning of existence, it would seem that they are not made out of 
matter; and consequently are made out of nothing and therefore are created.144  
  
The argument Aquinas attributes to Avicenna specifically concerns the production of 
substantial forms.  However, Aquinas later argues that if the argument applies to 
substantial forms, it also applies to accidental forms.145  In keeping with the focus on the 
production of accidents in this chapter, the argument can be reconstructed to apply to 
both substantial and accidental forms: 
(1) Forms have a beginning of existence. 
(2) So, forms are made.  
(3) Whatever is made is made out of something or made out of nothing.   
(4) Something can be made out of matter only if that something has matter as a 
constituent part. 
(5) Forms do not have matter as a constituent part. 
(6) So, forms cannot be made out of matter. 
(7) So, forms are made out of nothing. 
(8) Whatever is made out of nothing is created. 
(9) So, forms are created.   
 
With the emphasis on accidental forms, let’s take (1) to mean that an accident caused to 
inhere in a patient substance has a beginning of existence simpliciter.  This is certainly 
true if the accident was not transferred from the agent in the way transference is 
characterized, where once the agent transfers an accident, the agent no longer possesses 
                                                
misleading.  Her reasons are complicated but can be summarized thus:  First, Aquinas’s interpretation of 
Avicenna renders Avicenna an Occasionalist, which Avicenna is not.  Second, Aquinas’s reading of 
Avicenna conceals many important areas of agreement he has with Avicenna, especially ideas Aquinas 
adopts for his eduction model of generation.  See Kara Richardson, “Avicenna and Aquinas on Form and 
Generation,” in Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci, ed., The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of 
Avicenna's Metaphysics (Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co., 2011), 251-74. 
144 Aquinas, QDP, q3, a8, objection 6. 
145 Aquinas writes, “Moreover, just as matter is not a part of the substantial form so neither is it a part of the 
accidental form.  Hence, if the reason why substantial forms must be produced by creation is because they 
have no matter, the same argument will apply to accidental forms.”  See QDP, q3, a8, sed contra. 
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it.  While the text makes no mention of transference, it is also fair to say that the 
argument assumes the denial of transference.  Were the accident transferred, it would not 
have a beginning of existence simpliciter in that causal transaction.  Instead, it would 
only begin to exist in the patient.  The denial that an accident can be made out of matter 
can be taken to be a variant of the no-reality-from-patient principle.  The accident gets no 
reality from the matter, i.e., the accident produced in the patient gets no reality from the 
patient.  Hence, Avicenna is arguing (on Aquinas’s gloss) that because the accident does 
not come from the agent in the sense that the agent loses the accident (the denial of the 
transference) and because the patient doesn’t contribute the accident (the affirmation of 
the no-reality-from-patient thesis), the accident is created.   
 Aquinas rejects Avicenna’s conclusion in (9) in part because while Aquinas 
agrees that only God can create, he also argues that created substances can produce 
substantial and accidental forms.146  Therefore, the created substances that produce the 
forms do not create them.  Leibniz would agree with Aquinas that only God could create.  
But Leibniz would also agree with Avicenna that the denial of transference and the 
affirmation of no-reality-from-patient thesis commit to an accident’s being created when 
produced.  
Of course, the argument differs in important details from the argument I’m 
attributing to Leibniz.  For example, Leibniz did not utilize a form/matter distinction in 
the way many Aristotelian scholastics did.   However, for the purposes of this chapter, I 
need not develop the argument further.  I draw attention to it only to note that the reasons 
                                                
146 Aquinas writes, “Moreover, God alone can create.  Hence, if forms are created, they will be the work of 
God alone, so that all nature’s work, the purposes of which is the form, will be useless.”  Ibid. 
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I argue are lurking behind Leibniz’s repeated statements of the transference condition 
have a notable historical precedent in an influential medieval Aristotelian.  Further, there 
is textual evidence that Leibniz was aware of Avicenna’s argument.  In a section of the 
Theodicy where he criticizes eduction, Leibniz writes, “Some have thought that forms 
were sent from heaven, and even created expressly, when bodies were produced.”147  
While Leibniz doesn’t specify who thought forms were created as opposed to educed, the 
most likely candidate is Avicenna, as the view is distinctive to Avicenna as an alternative 
to eduction with respect to the production of substantial forms.148    
 
§3 A Weakened Transference Condition 
Having developed an argument for (P1) in §2 that is consistent with denying that divine 
transeunt causation requires transference, and having argued as well why the argument is 
plausibly given to Leibniz, I now draw attention to two weaknesses with the argument.  
The first problem is that the argument for (P1) does not take into account the Aristotelian 
act/potency distinction operative in most scholastic accounts of causation, such as the 
eduction account and Bacon’s multiplication of species account.  Such scholastics would 
argue that Leibniz’s transference condition is the absurd implication of any metaphysic 
that did not take into account the act/potency distinction.  A key passage in the Theodicy 
will show that Leibniz was in fact aware of the role the act/potency distinction played in 
scholastic accounts of causation, and sheds light on why he rejected the possibility of 
creaturely transeunt causation.   
                                                
147 (G VI.150-51: T 88). 
148 I address in more depth Leibniz’s criticisms of eduction in §3. 
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However, the first problem leads to a second.  In several passages in the Theodicy 
where Leibniz criticized both the act/potency distinction central to scholastic accounts of 
causation, and in a passage criticizing one of Bayle’s arguments for occasionalism, 
Leibniz himself gives reasons that in turn weaken the transference condition.  For reasons 
that will soon be apparent, I conclude in this final part of the chapter that Leibniz only 
has reasons for the transference condition to be a condition of creaturely transeunt 
causation when the accident produced is a non-modal accident.     
3.1  The act/potency Distinction and the transference condition 
The argument for the transference condition would not have persuaded Aristotelian 
scholastics who utilized the Aristotelian distinction between act and potency.  Such 
philosophers argued that efficient causal agents transeuntly produce accidents in patients 
not by handing over their own being or actuality, nor by creating the accident.  Rather, 
the agent produces the accident in the patient by reducing the potency for the accident in 
the patient to act or by educing the accident from the potentiality of the patient.   For 
example, in a passage we’ve already seen, Aquinas writes: 
Rather, by the power of the heat which is in the heating body, a numerically 
different heat is made actual in the heated body, a heat which was previously in it 
in potency.  For a natural agent does not hand over its own form to another 
subject, but it reduces the passive subject from potency to act.149  
 
In On the Multiplication of Species, Bacon addresses the question of how species—the 
first effects of natural agents in his metaphysics—are produced.  He immediately rejects a 
transference account (in which the agent emits species) on the grounds that it would 
                                                
149 SCG IIIa, 69 
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entail the corruption of the agent.150  He also rejects an account where the species are 
created ex nihilo.  Instead: 
Since the generation of a species occurs in none of the aforementioned ways, it is 
apparent that it must occur in a fifth way, namely, by true alteration and bringing 
forth out of the active potentiality of the recipient matter.151   
 
Leibniz’s transference condition prima facie does not take into account the act/potency 
distinction and its role in causation, where the agent is said to draw out the effect 
produced from the potentiality of the matter.  Instead, rather than by being educed from 
the patient’s potentiality, the underlying assumptions of the transference condition entail 
that the accident produced was already actual and its being produced in the patient 
consisted simply in its being transferred from the agent to the patient.   
In the Theodicy, Leibniz shows that he is aware but critical of the act/potency 
distinction’s role in scholastic causal accounts, especially the eduction model.  In a 
section discussing the causal origin of substantial forms, Leibniz writes, “Now 
philosophers have troubled themselves exceedingly on the question of the origin of 
substantial forms. For to say that the compound of form and matter is produced and that 
the form is only comproduced means nothing.”152  Aquinas, amongst many other 
scholastics, is a likely target in this passage as Aquinas responded to Averroes’s 
argument against the possibility of creatures producing substantial forms with a very 
similar line of reasoning: 
                                                
150 Bacon writes, “Acting does not destroy and corrupt an agent, but perfects it, since . . . a thing is perfect 
when it is able to produce a like thing.”  See RB 45. 
151 Bacon also writes, “But a species is the effect of a natural agent and is naturally produced; therefore, the 
species must be generated out of the potentiality of matter.”  See RB 47. 
152 (G VI.150-51: T 88). 
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Now that which is made is said to become according to the way in which it is 
because its being is the term of its making: so that properly speaking it is the 
composite that is made per se.  Whereas the form properly speaking is not made 
but is that whereby a thing is made, that is to say it is by acquiring the form that a 
thing is said to be made.153   
 
Aquinas’s claim that substantial forms are not made (or as Leibniz writes, produced) is a 
crucial component of his eduction model of causation.  Aware of this, Leibniz has equally 
harsh words for eduction, writing, “The common opinion was that forms were derived 
from the potency of matter, this being called Eduction. That also meant in fact nothing . . 
.”.154  Instead of an explanation of causation, Leibniz claims that transeunt causal 
accounts that rely on some notion of the effect being derived from potency is a pseudo-
explanation.  However, Leibniz finds one exception: 
. . . [B]ut it was explained in a sense by a comparison with shapes: for that of a 
statue is produced only by removal of the superfluous marble. This comparison 
might be valid if form consisted in a mere limitation, as in the case of shape.155  
 
The only way Leibniz can make sense of a form being educed from the potentiality of 
matter is in the way a statue is chipped away from a block of marble.  However, this is 
restricted to a very narrow class of effects and a far cry from the scope of what 
scholastics thought were produced by creatures.  Scholastics such as Aquinas argued that 
substantial forms of living beings are educed from the potentiality of matter as well as 
many different kinds of accidents such as real qualities.  Further, the ‘eduction’ of the 
shape of a statue from a block of marble is in one sense a removal of the being of the 
                                                
153 QDP III, 8, respondeo. Aquinas also writes, “. . . that which is made is not the form but the composite, 
which is made from matter and not out of nothing. See Ibid. 
154 (G VI.150-51: T 88). 
155 Ibid. 
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excess marble rather than an addition of being found in many scholastic accounts, such as 
when the substantial form of a living organism is educed in some secondary matter.   
3.2  The transference condition and modifications 
Although Leibniz’s scathing remarks would not have persuaded scholastics such as 
Aquinas and Bacon, they at least shed light on what he thought about the role of the 
act/potency distinction in explaining creaturely transeunt causation.  In short, Leibniz 
thought that the act/potency distinction did not explain such causation.   This highlights a 
deep tension between Leibniz’s approach to metaphysics, on the one hand, and the 
scholastics’, on the other.   
In this final section of the chapter, however, I draw attention to a more troubling 
tension that lies not between Leibniz’s account and others but within his own account.  
This problem, I shall argue, weakens the transference condition, ultimately entailing that 
it only applies to non-modal accidents.  That is, Leibniz himself gives reasons that count 
against the original transference condition.  The original transference condition applied to 
the transeunt production of any kind of accident, which was formulated thus: 
For any created substance s1 and any created substance s2 and any accident A, s1 
 efficiently causes A to inhere in s2 only if s1 transfers A from s1 to s2. 
 
I shall argue that Leibniz only has the resources to defend a more restrictive version of 
the transference condition, one that applies only to the production of non-modal accidents 
(e.g., real qualities): 
For any created substance s1 and any created substance s2 and any non-modal 




In the same passage where Leibniz argued that the act/potency distinction ultimately 
explained nothing in accounts of creaturely causation, Leibniz writes: “Eduction is not 
inexplicable with accidental forms, since they are only modifications of the substance, 
and their origin may be explained by eduction, that is, by variation of limitations, in the 
same way as the origin of shapes.”156  While Leibniz dismisses the eduction account of 
substantial forms (as explaining nothing), he allows that the production of accidents may 
be explained by eduction.   However, he does so with two important caveats.  First, the 
accidents are modifications.  Second, the eduction of those modifications is really just the 
variation of limitations, where the varying of limitations is importantly analogous to a 
change of shape (such as the shape of a statue carved out of some marble).   
In a later chapter in the Theodicy, Leibniz makes a similar claim that seems to 
challenge the very conclusion of the transference argument.  Responding to Bayle, who 
argued that if created substances could produce accidents, they would create them, 
Leibniz writes: 
As for the so-called creation of the accidents, who does not see that one needs no 
creative power in order to change place or shape, to form a square or a column, or 
some other parade-ground figure, by the movement of the soldiers who are 
drilling; or again to fashion a statue by removing a few pieces from a block of 
marble; or to make some figure in relief, by changing, decreasing or increasing a 
piece of wax? The production of modifications has never been called creation, 
and it is an abuse of terms to scare the world thus. God produces substances from 
nothing, and the substances produce accidents by the changes of their limits.157  
 
Prima facie, this passage challenges the argument for the transference condition:  Leibniz 
seemingly denies that the production of accidents in other substances—such as blocks of 
                                                
156 (G VI.151-52: T 89). 
157 (G VI.351: T 395). 
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marble, wax and statues—is creation.  Of course, the argument for the transference 
condition is not only consistent with but further clarifies why Leibniz thought the 
immanent causation of accidents does not require transference or the power to create.  
But all the examples in the passage are examples of transeunt causation.  So Leibniz 
himself challenges the argument for his transference condition:  he denies that the 
transeunt causation of accidents is creation.   
However, there is reason to deny that the passage challenges the argument for the 
transference condition.  Leibniz’s Theodicy was a book written for a popular audience.  
Depending on his audience, Leibniz often concealed or at least omitted aspects of his 
deeper metaphysical views.158  His deeper metaphysics, expressed more in works such as 
the Monadology, held that bodies are only phenomenally real and also denied the 
possibility of creaturely transeunt causation.  What we would call a corporeal substance, 
such as a block of marble, would only be phenomenally real in the idealistic 
interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics, being reducible in some sense to an aggregates 
of a monads and their perceptions.159  When a body b1 produces an accident in a 
                                                
158 John Whipple points to two important distinctions Leibniz draws concerning the communication of his 
philosophical views: exoteric versus esoteric form and exoteric versus esoteric content.  Roughly, doing 
philosophy in an esoteric form is, according to Leibniz, the proper way to do strict philosophy and follows 
the geometric manner of demonstration.  This is in contrast to an exoteric form, which is philosophy written 
in a less rigorous and formal style but more accessible and popular level instead.  Philosophical writings 
with esoteric content express Leibniz’s deep metaphysical views, which may conflict strongly with either 
the general views of the population of the particular philosophical persuasions of Leibniz’s interlocutors.  
Leibniz’s writings that contain exoteric content are written either with a popular audience in mind; hence 
concealing in some manner Leibniz’s deeper views or the writings are tailored to the philosophical 
persuasions of Leibniz’s interlocutor.  For example, when dialoguing with Cartesians, Leibniz uses 
Cartesian technical terms even though at root, Leibniz’s philosophy is not Cartesian. John Whipple, 
"Leibniz's Exoteric Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), 





numerically distinct body b2, strictly speaking, immaterial monads are immanently 
causing changes in their perceptions.  For example, at t1 a monad s1 produces perceptions 
of a block of marble and at t2 the same monad produces perceptions of the marble with a 
chip of the top. 160 
Given that the examples in the Theodicy are examples of the transeunt causation 
of accidents in bodies and facts about bodies are reducible in some sense to facts about 
immaterial monads and their perceptions, at least on the idealistic interpretation held in 
this dissertation, this passage does not challenge the argument for the transference 
condition.  For the passage, ultimately, does not establish that one created substance can 
produce an accident in a different created substance without requiring transference or 
creative power.  Instead, when understood against the background of Leibniz’s 
monadological metaphysics, the passage can be taken to establish that the immanent 
production of accidents does not require creative power.  That is consistent with the 
argument for (P1).   
While the above argument would not persuade scholars who endorse the non-
idealistic interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics, there is a different problem arising 
from that passage and others that plagues both the non-idealistic and idealistic 
interpretations.  This problem will lead me ultimately to conclude that Leibniz had 
                                                
159 Of course, I’m taking a stance on an important debate in the recent scholarly literature on the ontological 
status of bodies in Leibniz’s metaphysics.  Specifically, I’m assuming the idealistic interpretation, in which 
there are no corporeal or bodily substances.  For those who disagree with the idealistic reading of Leibniz, 
my argument can be understood as the conditional with the antecedent “If Leibniz is an idealist” and the 
consequent being the argument I’ve just given.  For an overview of the arguments pro and con for whether 
or not Leibniz was an idealist, see Brandon C. Look, “Leibniz’s Metaphysics and Metametaphysics: 
Idealism, Realism, and the Nature of Substance,” Philosophy Compass 5, No. 11 (2010): 871-79. 
160 Thus, Leibniz’s argument in the passage from the Theodicy has what John Whipple calls exoteric 
content.  
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reasons to hold only that the creaturely transeunt causation of accidents requires either 
transference or creative power only when the accidents are not modifications but instead 
are non-modal accidents such as real qualities.   
Before denying that the production of accidents requires creative power, Leibniz 
quotes Bayle in full: 
'One of the absurdities', says M. Bayle (p. 779), 'that arise from the so-called 
distinction which is alleged to exist between substances and their accidents is that 
creatures, if they produce the accidents, would possess a power of creation and 
annihilation. Accordingly one could not perform the slightest action without 
creating an innumerable number of real beings (d’estres reels), and without 
reducing to nothingness an endless multitude of them. Merely by moving the 
tongue to cry out or to eat, one creates as many accidents as there are movements 
of the parts of the tongue, and one destroys as many accidents as there are parts of 
that which one eats, which lose their form, which become chyle, blood, etc.'  
 
Bayle argues that the production of accidents requires the power to create and annihilate, 
a power only available to an omnipotent being— God.  Leibniz, on the other hand, denies 
that the production of accidents requires omnipotence.  Note that Bayle writes, 
“Accordingly one could not perform the slightest action without creating an innumerable 
number of real beings”.  Here, Bayle assumes that accidents are real beings (d’estres 
reels), an assumption that is important, as I soon show.  Bayle’s argument, focusing on 
creation and bracketing annihilation, can be reconstructed as follows:   
(1) Accidents are real beings. 
(2) The production of real beings requires creative power. 
(3) So, the production of accidents requires creative power.   
 
Leibniz denies (3), as we have seen, and thus might reject either (1) or (2).  The evidence 
points strongly towards Leibniz’s denying (1).  In Leibniz’s response to the argument, he 
never explicitly denies (2).  In fact, an important thesis of his monadological metaphysics 
is that created substances can only begin to exist via creation by God and cease to exist 
 74 
via annihilation by God.  If any entities in Leibniz’s metaphysics count as real beings, 
substances do.  So Leibniz partially agrees with (2). 
Yet in Leibniz’s response to Bayle’s argument, Leibniz does not identify 
accidents with real beings.  Instead Leibniz identifies accidents with modifications and 
denies that the production of modifications requires creative power.  Leibniz writes, “The 
production of modifications has never been called creation”.   So Bayle can be 
understood as arguing that the production of accidents is creation because accidents are 
real beings.  Leibniz responds by arguing that a created substance’s producing accidents 
is not creation because accidents are modifications, not real beings.   
It’s important to get a grip on what philosophers meant in Leibniz’s time in 
claiming that modifications are not real beings.  This in turn will shed light on the 
significance of Leibniz’s response to Bayle’s argument.  Many notable philosophers 
during Leibniz’s era distinguished between two types of beings—res and 
modifications.161  Substances counted amongst the res.  Importantly, a subset of 
accidents— real qualities—counted amongst the res as well.  According to Suarez, a sign 
that an accident is a res rather than a modification was the supernatural possibility of the 
accident existing without inhering in a substance.  For example, the accidents of the bread 
and wine of the Eucharist could exist—miraculously—without inhering in the bread and 
wine. Accidents that were not real qualities were modifications of a substance.  A 
modification is an accident that cannot even supernaturally exist without inhering in a 
                                                
161 For a lengthy overview of how late medieval and early modern philosophers understood res and 
modifications, see Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes: 1274-1671 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 179-199 and 244-278. 
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substance.162  Leibniz’s response to Bayle’s argument can then be understood as follows.  
Bayle claims that the production of accidents—which are res—is creation.  Leibniz 
denies that the production of accidents is creation because accidents are not res.  Instead, 
accidents are modifications.   
In summary so far, Leibniz denies (3) by denying (1).  Leibniz does not deny (2), 
at least in responding to Bayle’s argument.  Further, Leibniz’s denial of (1) is consistent 
with affirming (2).  What does this imply for the argument for the transference condition?  
While Leibniz has reasons to affirm that the transeunt causation of res requires 
transference or creative power, Leibniz lacks similar reasons to affirm that the transeunt 
causation of modifications or limitations requires transference or creative power. Shortly 
before responding to Bayle’s argument, Leibniz writes in the Theodicy: 
God is the one principal cause of pure and absolute realities, or of perfections. 
Causae secundae agunt in virtute primae. But when one comprises limitations 
and privations under the term realities one may say that the second causes co-
operate in the production of that which is limited; otherwise God would be the 
cause of sin, and even the sole cause.163 
 
Leibniz argues that the term “realities” has not only pure and absolute realities or 
perfections (which are the same thing) in its extension, but also limitations and 
privations.  Recall that the transference argument frequently invokes the term “reality.” It 
                                                
162 For an excellent overview on the theological significance of early modern philosophers’ rejection of real 
qualities, see Stephen Menn, “The Greatest Stumbling Block: Descartes’ Denial of Real Qualites,” in Roger 
Ariew and Marjorie Grene, ed., Descartes and his Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections, and Replies 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 182-207. 
163 (G VI.349-50: T 392).  Tad Schmaltz has recently argued that Leibniz’s specific claim in this passage in 
the Theodicy, that God is the principle (presumably efficient) cause of pure and absolute 
realities/perfections, is consistent with holding that creatures are secondary efficient causes of pure and 
absolute realities/perfections.  As I argue in Chapters 3 and 4, there are plenty of reasons to deny that 
Leibniz thought that created substances produce pure and absolute realities/perfections.  Instead, the effects 
of secondary causation are limitations.  See Tad M. Schmaltz, “Moral Evil and Divine Concurrence in the 
Theodicy,” in Larry M. Jorgenson and Samuel Newlands, ed. New Essays on Leibniz’s Theodicy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 135-152. 
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is important to see how well the transference argument succeeds given what falls under 
the extension of “realities” in Leibniz’s metaphysics.    I will argue that the transference 
argument succeeds only when the accident produced is a non-modal accident such as a 
real quality, which would count as pure or absolute realities in Leibniz’s metaphysics.  
The argument does not succeed, however, when the effect is a modification, which we 
shall soon see is a limitation.  This points to an important weakness in Leibniz’s 
argument, as Leibniz denies the existence of non-modal accidents in his ontology and 
instead argues that all accidents are modifications.  This means that Leibniz’s 
transference argument, I shall argue, does not succeed in establishing that the creaturely 
transeunt causation of modifications—the only type of accident in Leibniz’s ontology—
requires transference.  Instead, it only succeeds in establishing that the transeunt 
causation of non-modal accidents that Leibniz does not even posit in his ontology—such 
as real qualities—requires transference.    
Let’s first look at why the transference argument does not succeed when the effect 
produced is not an absolute reality but instead a limitation or privation.   Here, we enter 
into a topic that is still generating a lot of scholarship, as many of Leibniz’s comments 
about limitations and privations are usually made in the context of discussions about 
Divine concurrence and whether evil is traceable to God.  Prima facie, if A is a limitation 
or a privation, then it is far from obvious why s1’s transeuntly causing A to inhere in s2 
requires that s1 transfer A from itself.  It’s also far from obvious why s1’s transeuntly 
causing A without transferring A would require that s1 create A where s1’s creating A 
requires omnipotence.   The reason is that s2’s gaining A is not a net gain in absolute or 
positive reality.   
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 To see why, let’s first look at why the transference argument does not apply to 
modifications or limitations.  In a 1703 letter to De Volder, Leibniz claims that 
modifications are limitations and clarifies what he means by that:   
. . . a modification is a varying limitation, and modes merely limit things but do 
not increase them and hence cannot contain any absolute perfection which is not 
in the thing itself which they modify.  Otherwise, in fact, these accidents must be 
thought of in the manner of substances, namely, something which stands per se.164  
  
Leibniz here claims that modifications are limitations.  As Leibniz also argues elsewhere 
that all accidents are modifications, all accidents are also limitations.165  A limitation has 
no absolute perfection or reality of its own, so a modification has no absolute perfection 
or reality of its own.  The passage also indicates that substances are absolute or positive 
realities in Leibniz’s metaphysics.  Leibniz argues that if modifications were not 
limitations, but instead contained absolute perfection that was not the absolute perfection 
of the substance being modified, then modifications, like substances, would be things per 
se.   
In chapter 3, I address in much greater depth why modifications could not be 
transferred as that is ultimately relevant to Leibniz’s positive account of causation.  Here, 
however, I argue that Leibniz has no reasons to argue that the production of 
modifications requires omnipotence if the modification is not transferred.  For the 
production of a modification is not the production of new absolute or positive reality.  
There is no net gain in positive reality when a new modification comes into being in a 
substance.  Instead, the production of a modification is a re-arrangement of previously 
                                                
164 (G II.257: L 532). 
165 In a 1715 letter to Des Bosses, Leibniz wrote, “Whatever is not a modification can be called a 
substance.” See (G II.503-4: L 614).  I address in at length in Chapter 4 Leibniz’s reasons for arguing that 
all accidents are modifications.   
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existing absolute or positive reality.  As we saw earlier, Leibniz claimed that substances 
produce accidents by the changes of their limits.  Leibniz also claims, as we’ve seen, that 
a substance’s changing its limits is analogous to a body changing shape.  Further, Leibniz 
claims in his letter to De Volder that a modification is not an increase in a substance or 
that a modification does not increase the absolute reality of a substance.  Given this 
understanding of accidents as modifications or limitations, where such modifications are 
analogous to re-arrangements of the absolute reality of their substances, I’m hard-pressed 
to see why a substance would need to be omnipotent to produce such an accident in a 
distinct substance.  That is, I’m hard-pressed to see why a substance would have to be 
omnipotent to re-arrange the reality of some numerically distinct substance.          
 Perhaps one could offer a similar argument to the transference argument when it 
comes to privations— that the transeunt causation of privation requires omnipotence.  If 
s1 produces a privation in s2, then s1 has caused s2 to lack a reality that s2 previously had.  
Leibniz could respond (in agreement with Bayle) that s1’s production of the privation was 
ultimately an annihilation of a previously existing reality.  But this argument also cuts 
against the immanent causation of privations.  For if a substance immanently causes A to 
inhere in itself and A is a privation—that is, A is a lack of a reality that s1 previously 
possessed—then the substance is the cause of an annihilation of some of its reality, which 
is again a power only available to God.   
There is a way to make sense of the immanent causation of privations without 
requiring the omnipotence of the created substance.  If the privation immanently caused 
is a privation of absolute or positive reality, then Leibniz would argue that such causation 
is a case of annihilation requiring omnipotence.  But if the privation is a privation of a 
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limitation or modification, such causation would not require omnipotence.  However, if a 
substance’s immanently causing the privation of a modification or limitation does not 
require omnipotence, I’m again hard pressed to find a reason why the transeunt causation 
of a limitation or modification would require omnipotence.   
The argument for the transference condition does succeed, at least, if the accident 
produced is non-modal accident or res, such as a real quality.  First, non-modal accidents 
such as real qualities, which Leibniz denies exist, would count as absolute realities in 
Leibniz’s metaphysics rather than limitations, if such accidents existed.  The reason is 
that such non-modal accidents or real qualities were widely held to be able to exist, at 
least supernaturally, without inhering in a substance.  This was important for the Catholic 
belief in transubstantiation, where the accidents of the bread and wine exist without 
inhering in a substance when the bread and wine is transubstantiated into the body and 
blood of Christ.166  This leads to a plausible inference:  If an accident can exist (even 
supernaturally) without inhering in a substance, then the accident has some absolute 
perfection of its own, rather than the absolute perfection of the substance the accident 
inheres in.  As we’ll see in Chapter 3, one reason modifications—which are not res—
could not be transferred is because they cannot exist without inhering in a substance— 
unlike such non-modal accidents or real qualities.   
Given that non-modal accidents are res and so are absolute realities, Leibniz can 
argue that they would have to be transferred or created (requiring omnipotence) if 
                                                
166 I address Leibniz’s views on Transubstantiation in Appendix B. 
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transeuntly caused.167  That is, the transference argument does apply to non-modal 
accidents and the transference condition is a condition of the production of non-modal 
accidents.  The reason is that an accident that is a res or real quality is an accident that 
can exist—at least supernaturally—without inhering in a substance.  If a created 
substance s1 transeuntly causes a real quality A in a different created substance s2, then s1 
has produced an entity that inheres in s2 but can exist apart from s2, apart from s1, and any 
other created substance.  An accident that can exist apart from any created substance is 
surely more than a mere re-arrangement of the absolute perfection of a substance the 
accident inheres in.  So there is a net gain in the absolute reality of a substance when the 
substance gains an accident that is a res.   
From here, the argument for the transference condition runs through as it did in 
§2.  If s1 transeuntly causes an accident A which is a res to inhere in a different substance 
s2 and s1 does not transfer A to s2, then if s1’s transeunt causing of A in s2 satisfies the no-
reality-from-patient-principle, once again there is a net gain in absolute reality rather than 
a mere re-arrangement of s2’s reality (if A were a modification).  Therefore, A would have 
to be created.  To avoid that implication, one would have to invoke the transference 
condition and hold that A originally belonged to s1 but no longer belongs to s1 upon its 
inhering in s2.  But again, Leibniz does not posit the existence of accidents which are res.  
Instead, all accidents are modifications.  So the argument for the transference condition 
doesn’t succeed in establishing that the transeunt causation of modifications—the only 
type of accident Leibniz posits—requires that they be transferred or created by a 
                                                
167 The success of the argument also hinges on Leibniz’s rejection of the act/potency distinction as being 
explanatory. 
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substance with omnipotence.  This is a significant weakness with Leibniz’s transference 
condition.      
The argument, while weakened, is not a failure.  Plenty of philosophers during 
Leibniz’s time did posit non-modal accidents so Leibniz can be seen as presenting a 
challenge to the transeunt causation of such accidents.  Perhaps these are the accidents 
Leibniz had in mind in his repeated statements of the transference condition.  Further, 
textual evidence suggests that Leibniz thought that creaturely transeunt causation would 
have to consist in the transference of real beings.  Recall some of the various candidates 
Leibniz suggests for transference, such as material particles and monads (substances).  
Leibniz—as I’ve just argued—is likely correct that real beings—in the sense of beings 
that are pure or absolute or positive realities--are the only types of things that could be 
transferred.   But given that many (if not all) accidents are limitations, which of course 
cannot be transferred (reasons which I explore in greater depth in Chapter 3), why could 
not one created substance produce a limitation in another?  To put the question slightly 
differently: why must the effect of creaturely transeunt causation be a res?  To my 
knowledge, Leibniz never answers that question.  So I conclude that Leibniz has good 
reasons to hold that the transeunt causation of res requires transference, or else the res 
would be created.  But Leibniz lacks similar good reasons to hold that such causation of 











In this chapter, I evaluate Leibniz’s support for the second premise of the Transference 
argument, which I expressed thus: 
(P1)  Creaturely transeunt causation is possible only if the transference of   
  accidents is possible. 
(P2)  The transference of accidents is not possible. 
(C)    So, creaturely transeunt causation is not possible. 
 
As will be evident throughout this chapter, Leibniz provides ample support for (P2) 
throughout his career, making (P2) much easier to defend than (P1).  Additionally, the 
second premise enjoys much support throughout the history of philosophy, especially by 
defenders of creaturely transeunt causation who vehemently denied the transference 
condition.   
There are two parts to this chapter.  In §1, I present an overview of the idealistic 
interpretation of Leibniz’s ontology that I assume in this dissertation, in which what 
exists, strictly speaking, are simple substances and their accidents.  In §2, I argue that 
nothing in Leibniz’s ontology could be transferred from agent to patient.  I devote the 
bulk of this chapter to addressing why accidents could not be transferred.  I first draw 
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attention to several constraints Leibniz places on accidents that forbid them from being 
transferred.  I then argue that accidents have those constraints because, according to 
Leibniz, all accidents are modifications and all modifications are limitations.  Finally, I 
look at reasons why substances could not be transferred from agents to patients.     
 
§1 Leibniz’s Substance-Accident Ontology  
While I am primarily concerned with Leibniz’s transference argument insofar as it 
concerns the production and transference of accidents, I will argue in this chapter for the 
stronger thesis that nothing in Leibniz’s ontology could be transferred from agent to 
patient in creaturely transeunt causation.  On the idealistic interpretation of Leibniz’s 
metaphysics assumed in this dissertation, strictly speaking there are only simple 
substances and their accidents.  Everything else is reducible in some sense to these simple 
substances and accidents.  Many facts or statements about bodies, while true, are reduced 
to facts or statements about monads and their accidents.168   
We can find the mature Leibniz stating this ontology in various passages.  For 
example, in a 1715 letter to Des Bosses, Leibniz wrote, “Whatever is not a modification 
can be called a substance.”169  Here, Leibniz seems to state that the world consists in two 
and only two types of entities— substances and modifications.  I write “seems” because 
one might argue that Leibniz is merely making a semantic claim:  If x is not a 
modification then x can be called a substance.  However, Leibniz’s argument in the 
                                                
168 The specifics of the reduction of bodies to monads and their accidents goes well beyond the scope of 
this dissertation.  For a more detailed treatment of Leibnizian reduction, see J.A. Cover, “Non-Basic Time 
and Reductive Strategies,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 28 (1997): 289-318.   
169 (G II.503-4: L 614). 
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remainder of the passage strongly indicates that Leibniz is not merely making a semantic 
claim, instead he is making a metaphysical claim.  Leibniz considers whether there could 
be a third kind of entity that is neither a modification nor a substance, and rejects that 
there could be such a third entity.170  I take this to show that Leibniz’s ontology is an 
ontology of substances and accidents, where accidents are modifications.  That is, what 
exists are substances and their modifications.  As I argue later, all accidents are 
modifications for Leibniz, so an ontology of substances and accidents amounts to the 
same thing.   
 Other texts support my contention that Leibniz’s ontology is an ontology of 
substances and their modifications.  For example, in the fictional dialogue between 
Philarete and Ariste, speaking for Leibniz, Philarete claims, “My friend [Leibniz], whose 
opinion I have just related, gives enough evidence that he leans in this direction, since he 
reduces everything to monads, or to simple substances and their modifications. . .”.171  
Similarly, Leibniz writes: 
As a result, a monad, in itself and at a moment, can be distinguished from another 
only by its [a] internal qualities and [b] actions, which can be nothing but its [a’] 
perceptions (that is, the representation of the composite, or what is external, in the 
simple) and its [b’] appetitions (that is, its tendencies to go from one perception to 
another) which are the principles of change.  For the simplicity of substance does 
not prevent a [a’’ and b’’] multiplicity of modifications.172   
 
                                                
170 Leibniz writes:  “We may ask whether there can be a thing which is neither a modification nor a source 
of modifications – such as the Scholastics think of as accidents, which, they say, are in a subject naturally 
but not essentially, since they can be without a subject by the absolute power of God.  But I do not yet see 
how such a thing can be explained if it is different from my substantial chain, which is truly in the subject, 
though not as an accident but as what the Scholastics call a substantial form, or as a source of modifications 
– if you like, after the manner of an echo.”  Ibid. 
171 (G VI.590: AG 265). 
172 (G VI.598: AG 207). 
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Here, Leibniz identifies [a] with [a’], [b] with [b’], but then identifies [a], [a’], [b], and 
[b’] with a multiplicity of modifications [a’’ and b’’].  Given the prior text where Leibniz 
claims that everything is reducible to simple substances (monads) and their modifications 
and that [a] and [b] exhaust the modifications of simple substances, I once again conclude 
that Leibniz’s ontology is an ontology of substances and their modifications.   
 I’ve used the terms “modification” and “accident” interchangeably in describing 
Leibniz’s ontology.  I do so because according to Leibniz, all accidents are modifications.  
In several places in Leibniz’s corpus, Leibniz argues that there are no accidents that are 
not modifications, such as real qualities— accidents that can exist without inhering in a 
substance.  For example, in an earlier 1712 letter to Des Bosses, Leibniz writes: 
Let us come now to the real accidents which are in this unifying thing as their 
subject.  You will agree, I believe, that some of them are only modifications, 
which disappear when it is removed.  But you ask whether there are not certain 
accidents which are more than modifications.  Such accidents seem, however, to 
be entirely superfluous, and whatever is in such a substance other than a 
modification seems to pertain to the substantial thing itself.173    
 
Leibniz in this passage is addressing a question Des Bosses asked, mainly, whether there 
are accidents that are more than modifications.  In other words, are there accidents that 
are not modifications, such as real qualities?  Leibniz’s gives a negative answer.  
According to Leibniz, anything that is not a modification pertains to the substantial thing 
itself—in other words, is itself a substance.174   In the remainder of the first 1705 letter to 
Des Bosses I quoted at the beginning of this section, Leibniz makes a similar claim: 
                                                
173 (G II.458: L 606). 
174 In this particular passage, the substantial thing is the vinculum substantiale, a special type of substance 
Leibniz proposed in his correspondence with Des Bosses as a way to show what would be needed for 
metaphysics to be compatible with transubstantiation.  The vinculum substantiale is a substance-like entity 
that bonds other substances, such as the monads which makeup the bread and wine during the Eucharist.  I 
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. . . we may ask whether there can be a thing which is neither a modification nor a 
source of modifications—such as the Scholastics think of as accidents, which, 
they say, are in a subject naturally but not essentially, since they can be without a 
subject by the absolute power of God.  But I do not yet see how such a thing can 
be explained if it is different from my substantial chain, which is truly in the 
subject, though not as an accident but as what the Scholastics call a substantial 
form, or as a source of modifications—if you like, after the manner of an echo.175   
 
Once again, Leibniz denies that there is anything not a modification or a substance.  
Anything that is not a modification is a substantial form.  That is tantamount to claiming 
that it is a substance.176  Therefore, all accidents, for Leibniz, are modifications.177 
 
§2 Why nothing in Leibniz’s Ontology can be Transferred 
2.1  Why accidents cannot be transferred. 
I turn now to two different but related reasons why accidents/modifications in Leibniz’s 
metaphysics could not be transferred from an efficient causal agent to patient.  As a 
starting point, both reasons can be found in Leibniz’s 1692 “Critical Thoughts on the 
General Part of the Principles of Descartes”: 
I do not know whether the definition of substance as that which needs for its 
existence only the concurrence of God fits any created substance known to us, 
unless we interpret it in some unusual sense.  For not only do we need other 
substances; we need our own accidents even much more.  Therefore, since 
substance and accident depend on each other, other marks are necessary for 
distinguishing a substance from an accident.  Among them may be this one: That 
a substance needs some accident but often does not need a determinate one but is 
content, when this accident is removed, with the substitution of another.  An 
                                                
argue in Appendix B that Leibniz in fact did not seriously posit the vinculum substantiale in the final 
analysis.    
175 Ibid. 
176 Elsewhere Leibniz denies that substances are composed of substantial forms and prime matter, thus I 
assume, in this dissertation, that substantial forms just are substances.  For an extended discussion of this 
thesis, see Cover & Hawthorne, Substance & Individuation in Leibniz, 214-226 
177 In Chapter 4, I reconstruct and assess Leibniz’s argument for the thesis that all accidents are 
modifications.   
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accident, however, needs not only some substance in general but that very one in 
which it inheres, so that it cannot change it.178   
 
In this passage, Leibniz claims that while substances and accidents depend on each other, 
the dependence is not of the same type.  Substances need some accident or other while 
accidents need the very substance they inhere in.  The former claim was a common view 
among many scholastics and modern philosophers.  For example, Peter John Olivi argued 
that “. . .subjects cannot, without contradiction, be put into existence with some such 
accident, although they could without this or that one.”179  More pertinent to this section 
of the chapter are two constraints Leibniz places on accidents in the passage.  The first 
constraint I express thus: 
Dependence of Accidents on Substances: Necessarily, for any accident A, A 
exists only if there is some substance s such that A inheres in s.   
 
Most philosophers would have agreed that dependence of accidents on substances is a 
constraint on accidents with certain qualifications.180  With respect to real qualities, many 
Catholic philosophers were committed to a less restrictive constraint: 
Natural Dependence of Accidents on Substances: For any accident A, A 
naturally exists only if there is some substance s such that A inheres in s. 
 
Catholics needing to explain transubstantiation would have been committed to the natural 
dependence of accidents on substances and in fact committed to denying the Dependency 
of Accidents on Substances.  In transubstantiation, the real qualities of the bread and wine 
can supernaturally exist without inhering in a substance.  So the natural dependence of 
                                                
178 (G IV.364: L 389-90). 
179 Quoted in Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 248-9. 
180 The constraint traces back at least as far as Aristotle, where in chapter 2 of his Categories, Aristotle 
wrote, “Some [things] are in a subject but are not said of any subject.  (By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in 
something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.)”  See Aristotle, Categories, 1a20-
25. 
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accidents on substances is a constraint on what is naturally or physically possible while 
allowing for the supernatural or logical possibility of an accident existing without 
inhering in a substance.181  Leibniz, being Lutheran, was not burdened with the need to 
accommodate transubstantiation in his metaphysics of accidents.182   Hence, Leibniz 
could affirm the dependence of accidents on substances, a much stronger constraint on 
what is logically possible.   
 The second constraint found in the passage can be expressed thus: 
The Ownership Thesis of Accidents:  Necessarily, for any accident A and any 
substance s, if A inheres in s then there is not some substance s’ such that s’ is not 
identical to s and A inheres in s’.183 
 
The ownership thesis of accidents, as formulated, has an important diachronic 
implication:  An accident A cannot inhere in a substance s at a time t and a different 
substance s’ at a different time t’.  Leibniz primarily utilizes the diachronic implication 
against the possibility of accidents being transferred from agent to patient.  There are 
numerous passages in support of the diachronic implication of the ownership thesis of 
accidents, many of which we saw in Chapter 2, including this passage in the 
Monadology: 
Accidents cannot be detached, nor can they go about outside of substances, as the 
sensible species of the Scholastics once did.  Thus, neither substance nor accident 
can enter a monad from without.184   
 
                                                
181 For two recent and extended treatments of metaphysical issues arising from transubstantiation, see 
Jeffrey E. Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism and Material 
Objects, 235-241 and Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 185-190. 
182 I defend this claim at length in Appendix B..   
183 I note that the Ownership Thesis of Accidents does not entail that a substance s is essentially related to 
its accident A in such a way that A cannot cease to inhere in s.  Instead, when A ceases to inhere in s, A 
ceases to exist (which is entailed by the Dependency of Accidents on Substances), while s can still exist. 
184 (G VI.607-8: AG 214). 
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Leibniz is clear: an accident cannot be detached from one substance and then enter a 
different substance.  Leibniz also writes in a letter to Clarke: 
If space is the property or affection of the substance which is in space, the same 
space will be sometimes the affection of one body, sometimes of another body, 
sometimes of an immaterial substance, and sometimes perhaps of God himself, 
when it is void of all other substance, material, or immaterial.  But this is a 
strange property or affection, which passes from one subject to another.  Thus 
subjects will leave off their accidents like clothes, that other subjects may put 
them on.  At this rate how shall we distinguish accidents and substances?185   
 
Again, Leibniz dismisses the notion that an accident could switch substances.  He also 
hints at a reason via a rhetorical question:  If accidents could change substances—contra 
the ownership thesis of accidents —then what would distinguish accidents from 
substances?  The answer to the rhetorical question is “Nothing”.  One distinction then 
between substances and accidents is that substances can change accidents over time while 
accidents cannot change substances over time.186   
 The diachronic implication of ownership thesis of accidents enjoys wide support 
in the history of philosophy, as we saw in Chapter 2, especially by defenders of 
creaturely transeunt causation.187  Even when transubstantiation complicates matters, the 
diachronic implication of ownership thesis of accidents is still a constraint on accidents.  
For example, according to Aquinas, when the bread is transubstantiated into the body of 
Christ, the accident of the bread’s quantity continues to exist without inhering in a 
substance, thus violating the dependency of accidents on substances.  The remaining 
                                                
185 (G VII.398: L 702). 
186 I explore later in this chapter and in Chapter 4 what features of accidents and substances make it the 
case that accidents cannot switch substances while substances can change accidents.   
187 For example, Aquinas writes, “Accidents are not transferred from subject to subject, so that numerically 
one and the same accident inheres first in one subject and later in another. For an accident is individuated 
by its subject. Hence, it impossible for numerically one and the same accident to inhere in one subject at 
one time and in another subject at another time.”  See ST 1.77.1 
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bready accidents inhere in the quantity.188  While it seems that the accidents have 
switched substances—first inhering in the bread and later inhering in the quantity, in fact 
they have not.  Rather, the remaining accidents switch from inhering in the bread (a 
substance) to inhering in the quantity (an accident), thus not violating the ownership 
thesis of accidents.  So transubstantiation is just a further violation of the dependency of 
accidents on substances, as the all the bread’s accidents exist while not inhering in a 
substance.189   
 The diachronic implication of the ownership thesis of accidents is all that is 
needed to argue that accidents could not be transferred from an agent substance to a 
patient substance.  If a created substance s1 transeuntly causes A to inhere in a different 
created substance s2, then presumably A first inhered in s1 and later inhered in s2, 
violating the ownership thesis.  Further, if there is a temporal gap in which A exists 
without inhering in s1 or s2, then s1’s causing A to inhere in s2 violates the dependency of 
accidents on substances.   
 The diachronic implication of ownership thesis of accidents suffices to show that 
accidents cannot be transferred from one substance to another.  There is a second and 
third implication of the ownership thesis of accidents — a synchronic and an inter-
worldly implication.  In what follows, I present these two further implications, which in 
turn provide an opportunity to explore Leibniz’s reasons for endorsing the dependency of 
accidents on substances and the ownership thesis of accidents.  Going into further depth 
                                                
188 Aquinas writes, “It is necessary to say that the other accidents that remain in this sacrament inhere, as in 
a subject, in the dimensive quantities of the bread and wine that remain. One reason for this is the 
following: it seems clear to the senses that something exists having size and color and which is affected by 
the other accidents. Nor are the senses deceived in this regard.”  See ST 3.77.2 
189 See Brower, Ibid. 
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with respect to Leibniz’s reasons for both the dependency thesis and the ownership thesis 
will pay dividends in later chapters, as the dependency and ownership theses are 
constraints on accidents—which are always the effects of Leibnizian creaturely immanent 
causation.  Gaining a greater understanding of why the dependency and ownership theses 
are constraints on accidents then yields a better understanding of Leibnizian accidents.  
This will assist us in the chapters ahead as I address Leibniz’s positive account of 
creaturely immanent causation and change.   
 The second implication of the ownership thesis is that it rules out an accident 
inhering in more than one substance at the same time.  This is the synchronic implication 
of the ownership thesis of accidents:  If A inheres in s at t then there is not some 
substance s’ such that s’ is not identical to s and A inheres in s’ at t.  Leibniz affirms the 
synchronic implication of the ownership thesis as well.  For example: 
It cannot be said that both of them [substances], L and M together, are the subject 
of such an accident; for if so, we should have an accident in two subjects, with 
one leg in one and the other in the other, which is contrary to the notion of 
accidents.190   
 
Thus, unlike substances— which can have more than one accident at the same time, 
accidents can only ever inhere in one substance at some time.  As with the diachronic 
implication, many of Leibniz’s predecessors agreed with the synchronic implication of 
ownership thesis.  For example, Aquinas writes, “One should reply to the second 
argument that some people said, as Avicenna notes, that numerically the same relation is 
                                                
190 (G VII.401: L 704).  Elsewhere, Leibniz writes, “If someone maintains that the same wisdom in number 
or the same heat in number is in two subjects at once, the fact that one says that the wisdom of one fails, 
whereas the wisdom of the other still subsists, can refute this.”  See A.VI.4a, 991. 
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in both extremes.  But that cannot be, since one accident is not in two subjects.”191  In 
many passages Leibniz affirms both the synchronic and diachronic implications of the 
ownership thesis of accidents, suggesting that he regards them as implications of the 
same constraint.  For example, Leibniz writes, “For two different subjects, as A and B, 
cannot have precisely the same individual affection, it being impossible that the same 
individual accident should be in two subjects or pass from one subject to another.”192   
 Both the synchronic and diachronic implications of the ownership thesis of 
accidents, at least as I have presented them, are intra-worldly.  The implications restrict 
an accident from inhering in more than one substance at the same time in the same world 
or in different substances at different times in the same world.  It’s worth addressing 
whether Leibniz thought there was an inter-worldly constraint on accidents.  That is, if A 
inheres in s in world W, could A inhere in a different substance s’ in a different world 
W’?193   
There are strong reasons to believe that Leibniz gave a negative answer to the 
question.  Further, Leibniz’s reasons for denying that A could inhere in s in W and that A 
could inhere in s’ in W’ also shed light on why Leibniz affirmed the dependency of 
accidents on substances and the diachronic and synchronic versions of the ownership 
thesis of accidents.  The reason Leibniz affirmed an inter-worldly ownership thesis is 
because, as argued above, is related to the fact that for Leibniz, all accidents are 
modifications.  In a letter to Des Bosses, Leibniz writes, “But a modification is connected 
                                                
191 Sent I, d. 27, q. 1, art. 1, ad 2 
192 (G VII.401: L 704). 
193 Of course, the question assumes transworld identity between accidents.   
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essentially to that whose modification it is.”194  If a modification M is essentially 
connected to the substance s that M modifies, then it is plausible to hold that there are no 
worlds where M modifies a different substance s’.  Leibniz’s claims that modifications 
are essentially connected to their substances and thus his affirmation of inter-worldly 
implications of the ownership thesis, like the diachronic and synchronic implications, had 
historical precedent.  Suarez frequently characterized modes as accidents that are 
essentially connected to their substances— a feature of modes that distinguished them 
from non-modal accidents.  For example, Suarez writes: 
…this mode so necessarily includes conjunction with the thing of which it is a 
mode that it is unable by any power whatsoever to exist apart from that thing.195   
 
…for the very essence of a mode demands that it cannot exist unless actually 
united to the thing it modifies.196   
 
So Leibniz was assuming a standard position on modes tracing back at least to Suarez, 
with the difference being that Leibniz held that all accidents are modes, contra Suarez.   
What is it about the nature of modifications that entails the dependency of 
accidents on substances and the ownership thesis of accidents?  Leibniz offers some 
guidance.   Immediately after stating that modifications are essentially connected their 
substances, Leibniz clarifies with an example, “So there can be no modification without a 
subject; for example, no sitting without a sitter.”  It is absurd to posit the existence of a 
token accident of sitting without the sitter.  However, all accidents, for Leibniz, are like 
the Socrates’ shape when sitting— modifications whose nature it is to modify their 
                                                
194 (G II.503-4: L 614) 
195 Francisco Suarez, On the Various Kinds of Distinctions, trans. Cyril Vollert, SJ (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 2007), 32. 
196 Ibid., 46-7. 
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subjects in some way.  Leibniz’s example of sitting to support his contention that 
modifications are essentially connected to their substances also had precedent in Suarez.  
Again Suarez writes: 
For what is purely a mode not only cannot be separated from anything of which it 
is the mode, but this individual mode cannot be separated from this individual 
thing; for example, this position of sitting cannot be separated from this sitter.197   
 
Socrates’ shape when sitting, for Suarez, not only needs to modify some substance, it 
needs to modify the very substance it modifies.  I note that Suarez and Leibniz both use 
the example of sitting as if it were sufficient to establish that modes are essentially 
connected to what they modify. Given that they usually did not elaborate further, they 
likely assumed that it would be obvious to anyone else that modifications such as sitting 
and other figures are essentially connected to what they modify.   
Given that, in the case of Leibniz, all accidents are like figure in their being 
essentially connected to what they modify, it’s worth exploring what feature(s) of 
modifications support their essential connection to their substances.  In what follows, I 
shall argue that there is a feature of a shape modifying a substance that Leibniz believes 
entails that the modification is essentially connected to what it modifies.  This feature, 
Leibniz argues, is found in all modifications and therefore all accidents.   I do not offer 
on Leibniz’s behalf a tight deductive proof for the claim that modifications are essentially 
connected to what they modify, from the feature.  As noted above, Leibniz would have 
assumed that his audience would take the fact that accidents are modifications as being 
sufficient for their essential connection to their substances.  However, the feature of 
                                                
197 Ibid., 46. 
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modifications—as Leibniz understands them—will shed further light on that thesis as 
well as the dependency of accidents on substances.   
The feature, I argue, is that modifications are limitations.    Leibniz writes, “. . .a 
modification is a varying limitation, and modes merely limit things but do not increase 
them and hence cannot contain any absolute perfection which is not in the thing itself 
which they modify.”198  Leibniz claimed throughout his corpus that modifications are 
limitations.  Very early in his career, in his 1676 “Two Notations for Discussion with 
Spinoza,” Leibniz wrote, “Indeed there can be no active modifications of that which is 
merely passive in essence, since modifications limit rather than increase or add.”199  As 
we saw in Chapter 2, Leibniz claims that a created substance changes its accidents by 
changing its limits.   
Leibniz’s frequent example of shapes as modifications can clarify, somewhat, 
how modifications are limitations.  One example, especially, is found in the Theodicy.  
Leibniz claims that shapes are mere limitations, using the example of a sculptor.200  When 
a sculptor sculpts a statue from a block marble, the sculptor “adds” a shape to the marble.  
However, the sculptor “adds” a shape to the marble by removing chunks from the block 
of marble.  The “addition” of the shape, then, is added by limiting the block of marble.  
                                                
198 (G II.257: L 532). 
199 L 169. 
200 Leibniz writes, “The common opinion was that forms were derived from the potency of matter, this 
being called Eduction.  That also meant in fact nothing, but it was explained in a sense by a comparison 
with shapes: for that of a statue is produced only by removal of the superfluous marble.  This comparison 
might be valid if form consisted in a mere limitation, as in the case of shape.”  He also writes, “But 
traduction and eduction are equally inexplicable when it is a question of finding the origin of the soul.  It is 
not the same with accidental forms, since they are only modifications of the substance, and their origin may 
be explained by eduction, that is, by variation of limitations, in the same way as the origin of shapes.  But it 
is quite another matter when we are concerned with the origin of a substance, whose beginning and 
destruction are equally difficult to explain.”  See (G VI.150-2: T 88-89).   
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The shape is then a limitation on the block of marble— a terminus or boundary on the 
marble’s extension.   
A limitation—such as shape—cannot exist without limiting something.  Thus, that 
modifications are limitations entails the dependency of accidents on substances.  Further, 
Leibniz has plausible reasons to hold that a token limitation—such as the token shape of 
a block of marble—could only be a limitation of the thing it limits.  While two blocks of 
marble could have two distinct token shapes of the same type, they could not switch the 
same shape tokens.  Plato could switch from standing to sitting while Socrates switches 
from sitting to standing.  Plato, however, could not acquire Socrates’ token accident of 
sitting.201   
2.2 Why substances cannot be transferred. 
As we saw in chapter 2, Leibniz denied that several different kinds of entities could be 
transferred— e.g., physical atoms, sensible species, substances, and accidents.202  We’ve 
seen why accidents could not be transferred and can also rule out physical atoms and 
sensible species being transferred, given Leibniz’s idealistic ontology.  This leaves 
substances.  I note that while the focus of this dissertation is largely on the creaturely 
causation of accidents, which I’ve dealt with at length up until this point and will 
continue to address in later chapters, it’s worth briefly seeing why substances could not 
be transferred, as they are one of the only two types of entities that strictly speaking, exist 
                                                
201 Of course, the thesis that all accidents are modifications and all modifications are limitations raises a 
number of puzzles.  For example, on the idealistic reading of Leibniz that I assume in this dissertation holds 
that all accidents inhering in substances are perceptions.  Perceptions, however, have content.  It’s not 
obvious how to explain how a perception with content is a mere limitation, unlike a modification such as 
shape.  I do not address these topics in this dissertation. 
202 See (G IV.498-9: L 460), (G II.251: AG 176), and (G VI.607: AG 213-14). 
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in Leibniz’s idealistic ontology.203  This argument will require much less space to 
develop.  To address this, it’s helpful to briefly consider an amended version of the initial 
characterization of transference I offered in chapter 2 which is not restricted to only 
accidents being transferred but entities of any type: 
For any created substance s1 and any created substance s2 and any entity E, s1 
 transfers E to s2 only if: 
 
(vi) s1 is not identical to s2; 
(vii) If A belongs to s1 then E does not belong to s2; 
(viii) If A belongs to s2 then E does not belong to s1; 
(ix) E first belongs to s1; 
(x) E second belongs to s2. 
 
Assuming that E is a substance, E could not belong to s1 by inhering in it.204  Thus, we 
need some other way of understanding how E—a substance—could belong to s1.  The 
most likely candidate is E’s being a part of s1.  Leibniz would of course reject this second 
way as well, for he argued that created substances are simple and therefore lack parts.205  
Yet if s1 were to transfer a substance to s2, so that the substance transferred to s2 belongs 
to s2 after belonging to s1, then if the substance transferred did not inhere in s1, prima 
facie the only other way for the substance to belong to s1 would be for that substance to 
be a part of s1. 
 
                                                
203 Leibniz writes, “Whatever is not a modification can be called a substance.”  See (G II.503-4: L 614). 
204 Leibniz would argue that it’s a category mistake to hold that a substance can inhere in another 
substance, as substances are what are inhered in, rather than what inhere. Evidence for why Leibniz would 
claim this can be found in his numerous passages dismissing the existence of real qualities—accidents that 
can exist without inhering in a substance, for Leibniz claims that such accidents would in fact be substances 
instead.  See, for example, (G VII.398: L 702). 
205  A classic statement of this doctrine can be found in Leibniz’s Monadology, where he writes, “The 
monad, which we shall discuss here, is nothing but a simple substance that enters into composites—simple, 
that is, without parts.”   See (G VI.607: AG 213).  I address in great depth Leibniz’s mereology and his 
metaphysics of simple substances in chapter 4.   
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 However, let us bracket the issue, for now, of whether or not a created substance 
could have parts.  If Leibniz could argue that even if substances had parts, substances 
could not be transferred from agent to patient in transeunt causation, he would have an 
even stronger case against transference.  Suppose that s1 causes an accident A to inhere in 
s2 by transferring some entity E to s2, where E is a third substance s3.  How could s1’s 
transference of s3 to s2 cause A to inhere in s2?  Perhaps s3 just is A.  In this case, when s2 
receives s3, s3 itself changes from being the substance s3 to the accident A inhering in s2.  
Leibniz has strong reasons to reject this option.  In addition to puzzles about how a 
substance could become an accident, this option blurs the distinction between substances 
and accidents.  For example, rather than s3 being an accident inhering in s2, given that s3 
was a substance prior to its reception by s2, why couldn’t s2 be s3’s accident instead 
where s3 remains a substance?206 
Perhaps instead, when s1 transfers s3 to s2, s3 itself produces A in s2.  However, if 
that were the case, then s3’s producing A in s2 would just be another case of creaturely 
transeunt causation, in which case s3 must transfer something to s2.   Then the question 
reemerges:  how does what s3 transfers to s2 cause A to inhere in s2?  This option then 
leads to a vicious infinite regress.  For if what s3 transfers to s2 causes A to inhere in s2, 
then whatever it is that s3 transferred to s2 and caused A to inhere in s2 must itself transfer 
something from itself to s2, and so on ad infinitum.   
 
                                                
206 While Leibniz, to my knowledge, never gives this exact objection, it is consistent with a number of 
criticisms Leibniz has against accidents, which while inhering in substances, can exist apart from 
substances.  If such accidents existed, Leibniz argued that there would be no way in principle to distinguish 
them from substances.   This objection takes that criticism a step further and argues that there would also be 
no way to distinguish a substance from an accident.   
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 Another option is that E = s1.  When s1 produces A in s2, s1 does so by transferring 
itself to s2.207  This option has at least one advantage.  There are no worries about s1 being 
composed of other substances (e.g., s3) or having parts. This option is still not plausible.  
For it faces the problems of explaining how a substance can become an accident and once 
again explaining the distinction between substances and accidents.  That is, why is it that 
s1 becomes an accident inhering in s2 rather than s2 becoming an accident that inheres in 
s1?  
 That’s the least of the difficulties.  No longer bracketing Leibniz’s mereological 
views, Leibniz would argue that if s1 were truly a substance and s2 were truly a substance, 
then s1’s causing A to belong to s2 by s1 transferring itself would result in s1 and s2 being 
an unum per aggregrans, rather than s1 or s2 being an unum per se with s1 or s2 modifying 
it.208  For Leibniz not only denies that substances could have other substances as parts, he 
also denies that substances have any parts.209  If substances had parts, then they would 
not be substances.  Instead they would be aggregates.  If substances cannot have parts, a 
fortiori, substances cannot have other substances as parts.   
 With these considerations in mind, I conclude that substances cannot play the role 
of E in transference.  Given that in Leibniz’s ontology, what exists are either substances 
                                                
207 For example, take a piece of wood acquiring the property of being white from some white paint that was 
applied to it.  The board gets the property of whiteness from the paint but the paint does not lose the 
whiteness the board gained.  In cases then where E = s1, s1 does not lose the accident it gives to the patient 
substance.  This example comes from Rieber, “Causation as Property Acquisition,” 56.     
208 According to Leibniz, an aggregate of substances has unity only in the mind and is not a genuine 
substance.  He writes, “I therefore believed that I would be allowed to distinguish beings by aggregation 
from substances, since these beings have their unity in our mind only, a unity founded on the relations or 
modes of true substances.  If a machine is one substance, a circle of men holding hands will also be one 
substance, and so will an army, and finally, so will every multitude of substances.”  See (G II.96-7: AG 86).  
See also AG 167. 
209 I explore this in great depth in chapter 4.  
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or accidents, nothing in Leibniz’s ontology could play the role of E.  Therefore, 
transference cannot occur.  Thus we have Leibniz’s support for the second premise of the 



























As we saw in Chapter 3, Leibniz maintained throughout his career that all accidents are 
modifications, a thesis which played a crucial role in his defense of the second premise of 
the Transference argument.  Equally, if not more important, the thesis that all accidents 
are modifications also plays a crucial role in Leibniz’s positive account of creaturely 
intra-substantial or immanent causation, as accidents are the effects of such causation.210   
In this Chapter, I examine in greater depth Leibniz’s reasons for holding that 
accidents are modifications, reasoning that sheds light on the nature of modifications, 
their substances, and change.  To accomplish this, I do three tasks, with a section of this 
chapter devoted to each of the three tasks.  In §1, I reconstruct Leibniz’s argument in his 
short 1688 essay “De Realitate Accidentium” (DRA), the writing where Leibniz goes to 
his greatest lengths to argue against the existence of non-modal accidents.211  While less 
well known than his other writings, Leibniz draws upon principles that he defended 
throughout his career for the argument in DRA.  Further, as I show, Leibniz’s reasoning 
in DRA impacted his later metaphysical views.   
After reconstructing the argument in DRA, I address an important issue with it in 
§2.  While Leibniz’s arguments in DRA prima facie support the conclusion that accidents 
                                                
210 In Chapter 5, I argue that substances are the efficient causal agents in creaturely immanent causation.   
211 A VI, 4A, 994-996. 
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are modifications, he gives a surprisingly non-committal or agnostic answer as to whether 
there are any accidents at all at the end of the essay.  I argue that Leibniz hesitated to 
posit even modal accidents because he worried that the problems he raised with non-
modal accidents apply to modifications as well.  Specifically, Leibniz’s arguments 
against non-modal accidents hinge on the assumption that such accidents are parts of 
substances, which is inconsistent with Leibniz’s views on the simplicity of substances.212  
However, Leibniz also worried that the arguments of DRA entail that modifications, if 
they existed, would be parts of substances.  Not much later, Leibniz changed his mind 
and posited modal accidents in his ontology, without, however, ever explicitly addressing 
how such accidents could be in a substance without being a part of it.  Drawing from 
Leibniz’s later mereological and geometrical writings and his understanding of 
modifications as limitations, I argue that Leibniz had the resources to posit simple 
substances, which have a multitude of modifications at a time and change such 
modifications over time.  I also show that non-modal accidents, such as real qualities, 
would have to be parts of their substances, if they existed, given Leibniz’s mereological 
theses.  In arguing for this, I fill one scholarly void in this chapter by applying Leibniz’s 
developed mereological theses to not only showing how substances can have a multitude  
 
                                                
212 Evidence that Leibniz thought that substances must be simple can be found earlier than his “De Realitate 
Accidentium”, which if dated accurately was written in 1688.  For example, in a 1686 letter to Arnauld, 
Leibniz argued that substances must be thoroughly indivisible and naturally indestructible.  Earlier, in his 
chapter 9 of his Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz writes, “It also follows that a substance cannot begin 
except by creation, nor come to an end except by annihilation; and because one substance can’t be 
destroyed by being split up, or brought into existence by the assembling of parts, in the natural course of 
events the number of substances remains the same, although substances are often transformed.”See AG 42 
and (G II.76: AG 79). 
 103 
of modes at a time and over time, but why simple substances cannot have non-modal 
accidents, such as real qualities.  
 
§1 Leibniz’s “De Realitate Accidentium” 
Leibniz begins “De Realitate Accidentium” (DRA) with the statement, “It is worth 
considering whether accidents have a reality that is more than modal, and in what that 
[reality] consists.”213  The statement proposes two questions: 
(Q1)  Do accidents have a reality that is more than modal? 
(Q2)  If Q1 has an affirmative answer, in what does that reality consist? 
 
Q1 can be understood to simply ask if there are non-modal accidents.214  What Leibniz 
means in asking Q2 will become obvious as I reconstruct his argument.  In the remainder 
of the essay, Leibniz considers the consequences of an affirmative answer to Q1 by 
exploring the possible answers to Q2.   
 Call the thesis that accidents have a reality that is simply modal the “Merely-
Modal-Reality” thesis.  Leibniz’s argument in DRA is an indirect proof for the Merely-
Modal-Reality thesis.  He begins the argument by assuming the falsity of the Merely-
Modal-Reality thesis and thereby assuming an affirmative answer to Q1, which supplies 
us with the first premise: 
(1) Suppose that the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is false. 
                                                
213 Consideratu dignum est, utrum accidentia realitatem aliquam plus quam modalem, habeant, et in qua illa 
consistat.  A VI, 4A, 994. 
214 I note that a negative answer to Q1, the way it is worded, is consistent with both accidents having a 
merely modal reality and also with a variant of nominalism in which accidents have no reality at all.  
However, given that Leibniz asks “Do accidents have a reality that is more than modal?” rather than “Do 
accidents have any reality at all?”, I argue that it is fair to interpret Leibniz as intending Q1 to have only 
two answers:  Either accidents have a reality that is more than modal or accidents have a merely modal 
reality.  That Leibniz intended Q1 to have only these two answers will become evident as I reconstruct 
Leibniz’s argument.  I am grateful to Michael Jacovides for pressing me on this.        
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If one denies the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis, Leibniz argues there are two options:  
Either the accidental reality is part of the reality of the substance or the accidental reality 
is not part of the reality of the substance.215  With respect to the second option, the 
accidental reality is instead a new reality added to the substance.  The second premise can 
then be expressed thus: 
(2) If the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is false, then (A) the accidental reality is 
part of the reality of the substance or (B) the accidental reality is not part of 
the reality of the substance but something additional to it. 
 
Leibniz first considers (A) and argues against it.  If the accidental reality is a part of the 
reality of the substance, then when a substance changes accidents, the substance thereby 
loses and gains different parts (accidental realities).  However, if the substance loses and 
gains parts, Leibniz argues that the whole substance perishes.  Leibniz here assumes a 
variant of mereological essentialism, arguing that if some whole W which has part p at t 
loses p and gains a different part p’ at t’, W at t is identical in name only to W at t’.  
Leibniz writes: 
If it is part of the reality of the substance, it follows that the substance itself 
perishes in accidental change, or it becomes a new thing, and myself yesterday 
exists not yet, but another although very similar to me, so that the ship which is 
repaired, or the republic, or the river, are the same in name, are not really [the 
same].  (Emphasis added)216 
 
Leibniz supports this variant of mereological essentialism by appeal to the absurdities 
raised by the Ship of Theseus problem:  
                                                
215 Leibniz writes, “And at least if we posit the accidental reality, whether their reality is part of the reality 
of the substance, or if it adds to the substance a new reality (Et quidem si accidentia ponimus realia, aut 
realitas earum pars est realitatis substantiae, aut addit substantiae realitatem novam).”  Ibid. 
216 Si pars est realitatis substantiae, sequitur substantiam ipsam in mutationibus accidentalibus interire, seu 
rem aliam fieri, et me heri nondum fuisse, sed alium mihi licet valde similem, uti navis quae reparatur, aut 
resplublica, aut fluvius, nomine idem sunt, revera non sunt.  Ibid. 
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For with a part destroyed, truly the same thing does not remain, even if thus far it 
is denominated the same thing by a more important surviving part, otherwise it is 
able to take place, so that with all of the parts little by little destroyed, which now 
belong to, yet it is finally said to be the same thing, just as the ship of Theseus.217     
  
If the mere change of accidents causes a substance to perish—which would be entailed by 
Leibniz’s mereological essentialism and (A), then as all created substances continually 
change accidents, Leibniz argues that there would be no created substances: 
If, however it is admitted that the substance perishes and comes into existence by 
change (Which is the thought of the duke of Buckingham in the ingenious writing 
about true religion the Schediasmate218) they in reality remove all changeable 
substance.219 
 
Leibniz gets to this further conclusion rather quickly, writing: 
For since the changes of things are perpetual, so that nothing remains in the same 
state through the smallest intervals of time, it follows that no changeable 
substance ever exists and actually endures a minimum time, for any moment 
whatever it is born and perishes, neither is it said to properly exist, nor to act, 
neither is it able to produce anything or to endure since nothing is brought about 
unless enduring for some time.220 
 
I understand Leibniz’s reasoning thus:  First, substances can cease to exist—as they 
would if they lost one of their parts given Leibniz’s mereological essentialism—only if 
the substances first existed.  Substances can exist, however, only if they exist for some 
                                                
217 Nam parte sublata res vere eadem res non manet, etsi a potiore parte superstite adhuc eadem 
denominetur, alioqui fieri posset, ut sublatis paulatim partibus omnibus, quae nunc insunt, tamen aliquando 
res eadem dicatur, ut navis Thesei.  Ibid. 
218 Here, Leibniz makes reference to the book A short Discourse upon the Reasonableness of Men’s having 
a Religion or Worship of God, by George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham.  For more information, see 
Mugnai, 515.  
219 Si qui autem substantiam fatentur interire et nasci mutationibus (quae fuit sententia ducis Buckinghamii 
in Schediasmate ingenioso pro religionis veritate scripto) revera tollunt omnem substantiam mutabilem. 
220 Cum enim perpetuae sint rerum mutationes, ut nihil per minimum temporis spatium in eodem statu 
permaneat, sequitur nullam unquam substantiam mutabilem existere et vel minimum durare, quod enim 
quovis momento nascitur et perit, nec existere proprie dicendum est, nec agere, aut efficere aliquid aut pati 
potest cum nihil nisi aliquo tempore durante efficiatur. 
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duration of time.  I take Leibniz to rule out the possibility of a substance existing for only 
an instant, instead affirming what I’ll call the No-Momentary-Substance thesis:   
For any created substance s and any time t, if s exists at t then there is at least one 
time t’ such that t’ is not identical to t and for any time t* between t and t’, s exists 
at t*.221  
 
Additionally, Leibniz draws upon the thesis that created substances continually change— 
that no created substance ever remains in the same state.222  We’ll call this the Perpetual-
Change thesis:   
For any created substance s and any time t and any time t’, if s exists at t and s 
exists at t’ and t is not identical to t’, then for any state of a substance C, if C is a 
state of s at t then it is not the case that C is a state of s at t’.223    
 
Now Leibniz has all he needs to argue against (A).  Recall that on (A), the reality of 
accidents is part of the reality of created substances.  Given (A) and Leibniz’s 
mereological essentialism, any time a substance changes accidents, the substance ceases 
to exist.  But on Perpetual-Change thesis, substances continually change accidents.  So no 
substance exists for more than an instant from (A), Leibniz’s mereological essentialism, 
and the Perpetual-Change thesis.  Any created substance s that exists at a time t with 
accidents A1, A2, A3, . . ., An must change its state by changing at least one of its accidents, 
                                                
221 I find Leibniz endorsing a very similar constraint, if not the same constraint, later in his career.  In the 
Theodicy, Leibniz writes, “If the created substance is a successive being, like movement; if it does not 
endure beyond a moment, and does not remain the same (during some stated portion of time) any more than 
its accidents; if it does not operate any more than a mathematical figure or a number: why shall one not say, 
with Spinoza, that God is the only substance, and that creatures are only accidents or modifications?”  See 
(G VI.350-51: T 393). 
222 That created substances continually change is a non-negotiable metaphysical thesis that Leibniz defends 
throughout his career.  For example, in the Monadology, Leibniz writes, “I also take it for granted that 
every created being, and consequently the created monad as well, is subject to change, and even that this 
change is continual in each thing.”  See (G VI.608: AG 214) 
223 I note that while the Perpetual-Change thesis is a thesis about the states of a substance, it entails that the 
accidents of a substance continually change.  States consist—in some manner—of a substance’s accidents.  
In fact, a state of a substance just is the sum total of that substance’s accidents at a time.  Supposing a 
mereological essentialism about states, when a substance s in state C1 loses an accident A1 and gains an 
accident A2, s changes from state C1 to state C2. 
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as the Perpetual-Change thesis requires.  But when a substance s loses at least one of its 
accidents, s ceases to exist.  However, recall that on No-Momentary-Substance thesis, a 
substance cannot exist for only an instant.  As (A), Leibniz’s mereological essentialism, 
and Perpetual-Change thesis entail that no substance exists for more than an instant but 
the No-Momentary-Substance thesis requires that substances exist for more than an 
instant, no created substances would exist.   With the added premise that created 
substances do exist, Leibniz has all he needs for the third premise of his argument for the 
Merely-Modal-Reality thesis: 
(3) It is not the case that (A) the accidental reality is part of the reality of the 
substance. 
 
A Spinozist might agree with Leibniz’s reasoning up until the point that affirms the 
existence of created substances.  The Spinozist instead might take the argument as an 
argument against the existence of created substances and offer substance monism as a 
solution instead.  What we think are created substances are instead accidents of the one 
divine substance.  Leibniz anticipates such a response but argues that such a substance 
monist solution only pushes the problem back a step: 
Truly, nor do they thus avoid [the problem], so that in this way the changes which 
created substances undergo (naturally enduring) are forced to be brought over into 
God, and thus neither shall God himself endure, but shall continuously perish and 
be born.224 
 
The Spinozist then has the same difficulty of explaining how accidents are related to 
God, in which case the substance monist solution is not a solution.   
                                                
224 Verum nec sic [effugiunt], quin hoc modo mutationes quas ademere substantiis creatis (quippe sublatis), 
in deum transferre cogantur, atque ita nec deus ipse durabit, sed continue interibit et nascetur. 
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Someone might further object that there is a different way to understand (A):  
Substances consist in a substantial permanent part that persists through change and an 
accidental part that perishes with change.  On this understanding, all that is required for a 
substance to persist through change is the persistence of substance’s permanent part.  
This alternative understanding of (A) has to reject Leibniz’s mereological essentialism 
which holds that all the parts of a whole are necessary for the existence of the whole.  
Instead, only the essential parts are necessary.  When a substance changes accidents, it 
only loses an accidental part.  With no change to the essential permanent part, the 
substance persists.   
Leibniz claims that this alternative understanding of (A) is tantamount to arguing 
(B):  The accidental reality is not part of the reality of the substance. He writes, 
“Therefore, if someone wants a permanent part of the reality and a changeable part, they 
happen in their opinion, those who prefer to add to the substantial reality something from 
accidents.”225  So Leibniz next considers (B), offering at least three reasons to reject it as 
well.   
Leibniz gives the first two reasons when he writes, “For it will be able to be asked 
why those added realities are said to belong to the substance as it were in a subject, and 
why it is not considered as a thing per se, even though not enduring.”226  Here, I take 
Leibniz to argue that if (B), then it is difficult to explain how an accident could be an 
accident of the substance that the accident allegedly belongs to and also difficult to 
                                                
225 Itaque si qui partem realitatis permanentem, partem mutabilem volunt, incidunt in eorum opinionem, qui 
substantiali realitati addi aliquid ab accidentibus volunt. 
226 Quaeri enim poterit cur illa realitas superaddita dicatur inesse substantiae tanquam subiecto, et cur non 
consideretur ut res per se, licet non-permanens. 
 109 
explain how the accident is an accident at all.  I’ll start with the first difficulty.  On (B), a 
substantial permanent part is one part PS of a whole W and an accidental part is a 
different part PA of W.  Leibniz doesn’t elaborate but I think some sense can be made of 
his objection. What we have are two distinct parts, PS and PA, of a greater whole W.  But 
then it doesn’t make sense to say that PA inheres in or is an accident of PS any more than 
one spatial part of an object, such as the left half of a sphere, is an accident that inheres in 
a distinct non-overlapping spatial part of the same object, such as the right half of a 
sphere.   
Second, it is difficult to explain how such an accident is an accident at all, rather 
than a thing per se— a substance.  The second difficulty entails the first.  If the accident 
is not an accident, then surely the accident cannot be the accident of a substance.  Rather 
than there being an accident that belongs to a substance, there are two substances.  It’s 
worth noting that the “accident” would be, according to Leibniz, a non-enduring thing per 
se.  If the thing per se is a substance, then Leibniz has all the more reason to reject (B), as 
(B) also entails non-enduring substances, which Leibniz adamantly denied in his 
argument against (A).   
 The third difficulty with (B) is expressed in the following passage: 
But if that inherence seems to really affect the reality of the substance, so that it 
exists somehow in close union by some real it exists, it is not apparent, how the 
accidental [reality] is able to perish, without change in the substantial reality it 
[the accidental reality] originates from.  Therefore, it itself will be divided again 
into a perishing and permanent part, contrary to hypothesis.227 
 
                                                
227 Quodsi inhaesio illa videtur realiter afficere realitatem substantialem, ut in connexione aliqua reali 
consistat, non apparet, quomodo accidentalis posit interire, quin oriatur mutatio in realitate substantiali, 
ergo rursus ipsa dividenda erit in partem pereuntem, et permanentem, contra hypothesin. 
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I understand Leibniz to reason as follows:  The accident is related, using the term 
“related” loosely, to the substance via inherence.  On (B), this inherence would be what 
relates the accidental part with the substantial permanent part.  But by inhering in the 
substantial permanent part, the accident’s union with the substance would have to 
somehow affect the reality of the substantial permanent part.  Otherwise, the accident 
would not be the substance’s accident.  However, according to Leibniz, the substantial 
permanent part would then have to perish when the accident ceases to exist. Thus (B) 
doesn’t avoid the problem raised by (A).  If the substance is to avoid perishing, 
something would have to persist.  Given that something has to persist, the substantial part 
would itself have to be divided into a substantial and accidental part, call them 
substantial2 and accidental2.  Accidental2 would be what is affected by the first accidental 
part while accidental2 inheres in substantial2.  While Leibniz doesn’t state it, the 
argument suggests an infinite regress.  The same problem would apply to substantial2 and 
accidental2, requiring that substantial2 be divided into a substantial and accidental part, 
call them substantial3 and accidental3, ad infinitum.   
     With these three difficulties with (B), Leibniz argues: 
(4) It is not the case that (B) the accidental reality is not part of the reality of the 
substance.   
 
And now Leibniz has all he needs to conclude: 
(5) Therefore, the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is true. 
However, Leibniz doesn’t conclude DRA with the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis and 
therefore a negative answer to Q1— the position that accidental reality is merely modal.  
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In fact, Leibniz never actually gets to the conclusion (5).  Instead, Leibniz surprisingly 
concludes DRA with a non-committal or agnostic answer to Q1: 
I say therefore that substances change, or at diverse times their attributes are 
unlike; for this has no doubt, whether however in change there is something real 
that perishes and is born; and whether there are diverse realities in a substance, 
which are the foundations of diverse predicates, it is not necessary to ask, and if 
asked, it is difficult to decide.228 
 
Notice that in the above passage, Leibniz denies that two questions need to be answered: 
(Q3)  Is there something real in substances that perishes and is born when a 
 substance changes? 
(Q4)  Are there diverse realities in a substance, which are the foundations of 
 diverse predicates? 
 
Leibniz ends the passage claiming that it is difficult to decide the answer to these 
questions.  The reason it is difficult to decide is understandable, given the complications 
that Leibniz raised throughout DRA, as we’ve seen.  What’s surprising, however, is 
Leibniz’s response.  It’s fair to wonder why Leibniz does not instead give a negative 
response to Q3 and Q4 given difficulties he raised in DRA.  Speculating about Leibniz’s 
motivations is not the main goal of this Chapter, but perhaps Leibniz held out hope that 
he could eventually arrive at an account of accidental change that avoided the difficulties 
he raised in DRA.229  In fact, the later Leibniz did think he had an account or a skeleton 
of an account of accidental reality, as I shall argue soon.   
                                                
228 Dicam igitur substantiam mutari, seu diversis temporibus diversa eius esse attributa; hoc enim 
dubitationem non habet, an autem mutatione aliqua realitas intereat, et oriatur; et an diversae sint realitates 
in substantia, quae sint fundamenta diversorum praedicatorum, quaeri necesse non est, et, si quaeratur 
difficile est diiudicatu. 
229 Some scholars might interpret Leibniz as concluding the argument with a variant of nominalism, in 
which accidents have no reality or there are no accidents.  However, I argue that Leibniz concludes the 
argument instead with an agnosticism about the reality of accidents.  Leibniz never claims in DRA that 
accidents have no reality.  Instead, Leibniz claims that it not necessary to answer that question and difficult 
to decie if one attempts to answer the question.  This agnosticism is consistent with the variant of 
nominalism that denies that accidents have any reality, but Leibniz’s agnostic conclusion does not entail it.   
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 Before I present that account, it’s worth clarifying Q3 and Q4 some more, and 
relating them back to Q1 and Q2.  I suspect that an affirmative answer to Q3 entails an 
affirmative answer to Q4 and vice versa.  That is, if there is something real that perishes 
and is born when a substance changes, then there are different realities in substances that 
are the foundations of diverse predicates.230  If there are different realities in substances 
that are the foundations of diverse predicates, then given that substances continually 
change, there is something real, which is born and perishes when a substance changes.  
Further, once one gives an affirmative answer to Q3 and Q4, then it would be mighty 
helpful to address Q2: Just what are those diverse realities that perish and are born and 
are the foundations of diverse predicates?  In other words, what is the nature of those 
realities? 
 
§2 Leibniz’s Changing Stance on the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis 
Leibniz’s arguments in DRA strongly suggest that a negative answer to (Q1) “Do 
accidents have a reality that is more than modal?” entails a negative answer to (Q3) “Is 
there something real in substances that perishes and is born when a substance changes?” 
and (Q4) “Are there diverse realities in a substance, which are the foundations of diverse 
predicates?”   Negative answers to Q1, Q3, and Q4 further entail that one can’t address 
what kind of reality accidents have (Q2).   
The not much later Leibniz disagreed.  In his 1692 “Critical Thoughts on the 
General Part of the Principles of Descartes”, Leibniz writes: 
                                                
230 Presumably Leibniz is talking about diverse predicates over time in the same subject.   
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To deny a real distinction between modes is an unnecessary change in the 
accepted use of words.  For until now modes have been considered as things  
 
[original language] and have been held to different in reality, as a spherical figure 
of wax differs from a square one.  Certainly, the transformation of one figure into 
the other is a true change, and it has therefore a real foundation.231   
 
While Leibniz is writing about modes as opposed to non-modal accidents, he claims that 
a change of modes has a real foundation.  Thus, Leibniz here doesn’t assume that a 
negative answer to Q1—the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis—entails a negative answer to 
Q4.  If a body changes shape from F to G, Leibniz claims that that is a true change with a 
real foundation.  If there is a real foundation to changing modes, then as I argued above, 
there is also a real foundation to diverse predications. Take the following two statements, 
where t’ and t are different times: 
(S1)  The body B is cube-shaped at t. 
(S2)  The body B is sphere-shaped at t’. 
 
S1 and S2 have the same grammatical subject—“B” designating a body B—but contrary 
predicates.  The Leibniz of DRA, as we saw, denied that one needs to address whether or 
not there are different realities in B that are the foundations of the diverse predicates of 
statements such as S1 and S2.  However, the not much later Leibniz now affirms that B’s 
changing shape has a real foundation.  As I argued above, Leibniz is then committed to 
the different predicates of S1 and S2 having a real foundation.  If Q3 and Q4 are inter-
entailing, as I argued above, then Leibniz is further committed to there being different 
realities in B that perish and are born.  So Leibniz once again must address all the 
complications raised in DRA.  
                                                
231 (G IV.365: L 390).  Emphasis added. 
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2.1 Different Types of Realities 
I argue that Leibniz did have a solution in mind.  Several years later, in his Theodicy, 
Leibniz makes a three-fold distinction between different types of realities: 
God is the one principal cause of pure and absolute realities, or of perfections. 
Causae secundae agunt in virtute primae. But when one comprises limitations 
and privations under the term realities one may say that the second causes co-
operate in the production of that which is limited; otherwise God would be the 
cause of sin, and even the sole cause.232   
 
Leibniz claims above that there are three types of realities:  (i) pure and absolute realities, 
or perfections; (ii) limitations; and (iii) privations.  For the purposes of this chapter, I’ll 
focus on absolute realities and limitations, bracketing discussion of privations.233  For the 
sake of the discussion at hand, I’ll also call the realities picked out in (i) “Absolute-
Realities” and the realities picked out in (ii) “Limitations” or “Limited-Realities”.  In 
what follows, it’s worth briefly working through Q1-Q4 given this three-fold distinction 
Leibniz has introduced in his Theodicy.   
For review, Q1 asks, “Do accidents have a reality that is more than modal?”  As I 
argued in Chapters 2 and 3, all accidents for Leibniz are modifications.  So the answer to 
Q1 is still “No”.  Thus, Leibniz maintains, throughout his career, that the Merely-Modal-
Reality thesis is true.  However, as we’ve seen, this doesn’t prevent Leibniz from 
answering Q3 and Q4 positively later in his career, contra his conclusion in DRA.  One 
reason is that, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, modifications are limitations.  Given that  
                                                
232 (G VI.347-48: T 392). 
233 I will focus on limitations in what follows, noting that recent scholars argue that privations are a type of 
limitation for Leibniz.  For example, see Samuel Newlands, “Leibniz on Privations, Limitations, and the 
Metaphysics of Evil,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 52, No. 2 (2014): 281-308. 
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limitations are realities, for Leibniz, Leibniz can answer Q3 and Q4, which provide him 
the workings of an answer to Q2.   
 Recall that Q3 asks, “Is there something real in substances that perishes and is 
born when a substance changes?”  Leibniz’s answer to Q3 is “Yes”.  What perishes and 
are born, however, are not absolute-realities.  Instead, what perishes and are born are 
limited-realities.  Accidents, which are modifications, which are limitations, are realities 
that come into and go out of existence.  So when a substance changes accidents, 
limitations are what come into and go out of existence. 
 Q4 asks, “Are there diverse realities in a substance, which are the foundations of 
diverse predicates?”  Leibniz’s answer again is “Yes”.  However, the foundations of 
diverse predicates are not absolute-realities.  Instead they are limited-realities.  Diverse 
limited-realities—different modifications/limitations—are the foundations of diverse 
predicates.     
Recall that Q2 asks “What is the nature of accidental realities?”  Leibniz has the 
beginnings of an answer:  Accidental realities are not absolute-realities.  Instead they are 
limited-realities— accidents are limitations on their substances.  This, however, still 
doesn’t provide much information as to the nature of accidents.  An example Leibniz 
often gives of a limitation is shape.234  A shape limits what is shaped.   Yet, as we saw 
above, when something changes shape, that is a true change according to Leibniz.  
                                                
234 For example, Leibniz writes, “I have often said, and I do not remember having deviated from the view, 
that unless there is some active principle in us, there cannot be derivative forces and actions in us, since 
everything accidental or changeable ought to be a modification of something essential or perpetual, nor can 
it contain anything more positive than that which it modifies, since every modification is only a limitation, 
shape a limitation of that which is varied, and derivative force a limitation of that which brings about the 
variation.”  See (G II.270: AG 180). 
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According to Leibniz, the distinction between shape s1 a body B has at t1 and shape s2 B 
has at t2 is neither a mere distinction of reason nor a modal distinction.  I note, however, 
that this still does not provide much by way of answer to the nature of accidental reality.  
For example, while it easy to grasp how an accident such as shape is a limitation of its 
substance, what about an accident such as a perception—with content—of an immaterial 
monad?   
2.2  The Arguments of DRA, Absolute-Realities and Limited-Realities 
For now, I shall set aside this issue and address, to my mind, the more pressing question I 
raised above as it directly relevant to the arguments Leibniz makes in DRA:  Does 
Leibniz’s distinction between absolute-realities and limitations allow him to avoid the 
problems he raised in his argument for the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis, specifically the 
problems with affirming either (A) the accidental reality is part of the reality of the 
substance or (B) the accidental reality is not part of the reality of the substance?  In what 
follows, I shall argue that Leibniz has a way to argue that the problems he raised with (A) 
and (B) are only problems if accidents are absolute-realities.  I shall do so by turning to 
Leibniz’s mereology.   
In what follows, I argue that the problems Leibniz found in DRA both with 
accidents that have a more than modal reality and accidents that have a merely modal 
reality stemmed from Leibniz worrying that either type of accident—as a reality that is 
born and perishes in change and serves as the foundations of diverse predicates—is a part 
of its substance.  I then argue that given Leibniz’s technical mereological views, the later 
Leibniz had a way to hold that accidents—as modifications and limitations—could be 
realities that born and perish in change and serve as the foundations of diverse predicates 
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without beings parts of their substances.  I argue that such modifications cannot be 
homogenous with their substances, where homogeneity is a necessary condition of 
parthood in Leibniz’s mereology.  To argue this, I examine Leibniz’s notion of 
homogeneity—a technical notion that has frequently been misunderstood by scholars, as I 
show.  After reconstructing Leibniz’s notion of homogeneity, I argue that modifications 
or limitations cannot be homogenous with what they modify.  I further argue that 
accidents that have more than modal reality (which would count as absolute-realities in 
Leibniz’s metaphysics) could be homogenous with their substances, and so parts of their 
substances. 
Before presenting my argument, it’s worth addressing just why I should even 
bother to offer an argument on Leibniz’s behalf.  Mainly, Leibniz assumed in DRA that 
the problematic disjunction (A) or (B) is entailed by the denial of the Merely-Modal-
Reality thesis.  Yet holding that accidents are absolute-realities is just to affirm the 
Merely-Modal-Reality thesis, which does not, according to Leibniz, entail (A) or (B).   
In response to the objection, Leibniz claimed that a substance’s changing 
accidents, even when the accidents are limited-realities, is a true change with a real 
foundation.  As I argued above, a true change’s having a real foundation entails that there 
are diverse realities in a substance that come to and cease to exist when the substance 
changes—  Q3 entails Q4 and vice versa.  The fact that Leibniz gave a non-committal 
answer to Q3 and Q4 at the end of DRA strongly suggests that he thought that any 
answer lead to difficult to solve puzzles.  The further fact that Leibniz claims this 
immediately after working out the implications of (A) and (B) is strong evidence that the 
problems Leibniz had in mind were the problems with (A) and (B).  So it’s worth 
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exploring whether or not Leibniz—in claiming that the realities that perish and are born 
and which are the real foundation of true changes are R2 realities—can avoid the 
problems he raised with (A) and (B).   
2.3  Leibniz’s Mereology and Accidents 
Leibniz’s mereological writings are the best place to address this challenge.  I’ll 
specifically focus on the account of parts and wholes Leibniz developed in his 1714 “The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics.”  Both (A) the accidental reality is part of the 
reality of the substance and (B) the accidental reality is not part of the reality of the 
substance assume that accidents are parts.  Option (A) holds that accidental reality is part 
of the reality of the substance.    
So, on option (A), substances are wholes that have accidents as parts.  Option (B), 
as Leibniz developed it in DRA, is the thesis that accidental realities are also a part of the 
substance, only the accidental part not identical to an essential substantial part that 
persists through change.  So, on (B), a substance is whole with at least two parts— the 
essential substantial part and the accidental part.   What’s important for my argument is 
that on both (A) and (B), the accidental reality is a part.  I’ll call the thesis that accidents 
are part of the substances they inhere in the thesis of Substantial-Composition:  For any 
accident A and any substance s, if A inheres in s then A is a part of s.  This leads to a 
premise: 
(P1)  If (A) or (B) then the Substantial-Composition thesis is true. 
The first premise of Leibniz’s argument in DRA held that the denial of the Merely-
Modal-Reality thesis entailed the disjunction (A) or (B).  However, as I’ve argued above, 
Leibniz now needs a reason to also argue that the affirmation of Merely-Modal-Reality 
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thesis does not entail the disjunction (A) or (B), where the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is 
understood now as the thesis that accidents are limited-realities.  That is, Leibniz needs to 
argue that it is not the case that the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails (A) or (B).  P1 
presents a necessary condition for the disjunction (A) or (B).  So if the Merely-Modal-
Reality thesis entails (A) or (B), then the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails Substantial-
Composition.  A reason to deny that the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails Substantial-
Composition would then be a handy way to deny that the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis 
entails (A) or (B).  In what follows, I argue that Leibniz actually has the resources to 
argue that if the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is true, then it is not the case that accidents 
are parts of substances.  That is, Leibniz can argue the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis 
entails that Substantial-Composition is false, which is a much stronger claim.  For the 
former claim is consistent with the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis being the case and 
Substantial-Composition being the case.  It only denies that the Merely-Modal-Reality 
thesis is sufficient for Substantial-Composition.  But if Leibniz can argue that the Merely-
Modal-Reality thesis entails the falsity of Substantial-Composition, which I shall argue 
he can, then a fortiori he can argue for weaker claim.   
 How might one address whether or not the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails 
Substantial-Composition or its negation?  That is how might one address whether or not a 
modification of a substance is a part of that substance?  Thankfully, Leibniz has precise 
criteria for when any x counts as a part of any y:  “An entity which is in something and is 
also homogeneous to it is called a part, and that which it is in is called a whole; or a part 
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is a homogenous ingredient of a whole.”235  Formalized, Leibniz’s criteria of part-hood 
can be expressed thus: 
For any x and any y, x is a part of y if and only if: 
(i) x is an ingredient of y; and 
(ii) x is homogeneous with y.236   
 
To argue that the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails the falsity of Substantial-
Composition, I must establish that modes of a substance are either not ingredients of a 
substance or not homogeneous with their substance.  However, to establish that, I need a 
definition of “ingredient” and “homogeneous”, which Leibniz also supplies.  I’ll start 
with ingredient.  Leibniz writes:  
We say that an entity is in [inesse] some locus, or is an ingredient of something, 
if, when we posit the latter, we must also be understood, by this very fact and 
immediately, without the necessity of any inference, to have posited the entity as 
well.  Thus when we posit any finite line, we also posit its end points as belonging 
to it.237   
 
Leibniz’s definition of an ingredient can then be expressed thus: 
For any x and any y, x is an ingredient of y if and only if for any person P, if P 
posits y, P immediately posits x.   
 
Leibniz’s example is the endpoints that are ingredients of a finite line.  One cannot posit a 
finite line without positing the endpoints.  While Leibniz’s examples are geometric, there 
is a sense in which a modification could be understood as ingredients of its substance.  In 
                                                
235 L 668. 
236 I should note that two further conditions could be added:  (iii) x is not identical to y and (iv) y is a 
whole.  Condition (iii) implies that the definition of a part is in fact a definition of a proper part.  I don’t 
encounter Leibniz ever developing the notion of an improper part in his mereological writings, so I’ll leave 
condition (iii) aside.  Condition (iv) I take to be entailed by (i), (ii), and (iii), given Leibniz’s mereological 
views.  That is, if x is a homogeneous ingredient of y and not identical with y, then y is a whole of which x 
is a part.      
237 L 667. 
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Chapter 3, we saw that Leibniz claims that a created substance must have some accident 
or other.238  On that understanding, the positing of a created substance requires the 
positing of some accident or other.  However, there are two complications with 
addressing whether or not accidents could be ingredients in addressing whether or not 
accidents are parts.  First, it is not clear if Leibniz’s criteria of ingredient-hood requires 
the positing of the very individual thing posited, or just some entity of the right type.  The 
latter option leads to a further complication.  Leibniz—as we saw in Chapter 3— also 
argues that accidents require substances.239  Thus, substances—in the sense suggested by 
the latter option—would be ingredients of accidents.  But surely substances could not be 
parts of accidents.  So it is not clear if accidents are ingredients of their substances and it 
is also not clear if accidents are not ingredients of their substances.   
In what follows I’ll assume that accidents are ingredients.240  However, I also 
argue that a more fruitful avenue for addressing whether or not accidents could be parts 
of substances lies in the second necessary condition of parthood— homogeneity.  Recall 
that the second necessary condition of parthood is that x be homogenous with y.  
Homogeneity is also a technical term for Leibniz.  Prima facie, one might take Leibniz to 
be adopting the notion of homogeneous parts and wholes that Aristotle articulated in the 
                                                
238 Leibniz writes, “I do not know whether the definition of substance as that which needs for its existence 
only the concurrence of God fits any created substance known to us, unless we interpret it in some unusual 
sense.  For not only do we need other substances; we need our own accidents even much more.  Therefore, 
since substance and accident depend on each other, other marks are necessary for distinguishing a 
substance from an accident.  Among them may be this one: That a substance needs some accident but often 
does not need a determinate one but is content, when this accident is removed, with the substitution of 
another.  An accident, however, needs not only some substance in general but that very one in which it 
inheres, so that it cannot change it.”  (G IV.365: L 390). 
239 Ibid. 
240 I note that I am not arguing that accidents are ingredients of their substances.  Instead, I’m assuming 
they are for the sake of argument so I can explore whether or not accidents are homogeneous with their 
substances.   
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Parts of Animals.241  Aristotle gives the example of blood, flesh, and bone as 
homogeneous wholes.  Any part of an animal’s blood is also blood, any part of an 
animal’s bone is bone, and any part of an animal’s flesh is also flesh, according to 
Aristotle.  This leads to the question of what feature of the part and whole make the part 
and whole homogeneous for Aristotle?  It can’t simply be any predicate.  For example, 
Socrates (a whole) and Socrates’ left hand (a part) could both have the predicate “exists 
in Athens before the birth of Christ” truly predicated of them, yet that doesn’t mean that 
Socrates’ left hand is homogeneous with Socrates in Aristotle’s usage of the term.  
Instead, the predicate must be a kind-term that indicates what kind of thing or stuff the 
part and wholes are.  For example, a gold brick and the left-half of a gold brick can both 
have the kind-term “gold” truly predicated of them.   
 Is this the conception of homogeneity that Leibniz has in mind?  In places, 
Leibniz makes claims that suggest he is adopting Aristotle’s usage.  For example, in his 
1690 “Comments on Michael Angelo Fardella,” Leibniz writes, “Further, although the 
aggregate of these substances constitutes body, they do not constitute it as parts, just as 
points are not parts of lines, since a part is always of the same sort as the whole.”242  
Leibniz here uses the term “sort”, which might be taken to mean what contemporary 
metaphysicans mean by the term “sortal”.  However, contemporary sortal predicates are 
count-nouns, such as horse, unicorn, book, etc.  But a proper part of a unicorn is not a 
unicorn.  Philosophers further deny that any sortal predicate that applies to some entity x 
                                                
241 See Aristotle, Parts of Animals, Book 1, Part 1, 640b18-22. 
242 See AG 105.  Emphasis added. 
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applies must also apply to a part of x.243  Instead, Leibniz’s usage of “sort” suggests 
something closer to Aristotle’s usage.  A part of a body is a body, a part of a line segment 
is a line segment, and so on.      
This has lead many scholars to take Leibniz to be adopting Aristotle’s usage of 
homogeneity, or at least write as if they take Leibniz to be adopting such usage.  For 
example, Robert Adams writes: 
A part of a line, on this view, must be homogeneous with the line, and therefore 
must be a line segment, and not a point.  See Aristotle Physics Book VI, CH. 1.  
Similarly, I suppose, a part of a phenomenon must be a phenomenon, and a part of 
an aggregate must be a subaggregate.  Specifically, a part of a body must be a 
body.  If a body is an aggregate of substances which are not aggregates, those 
substances will not be parts of the body, and the boy will not be composed of 
them if being ‘composed of’ means having as parts.244   
 
Pauline Phemister, commenting on Leibniz’s “Comments on Michael Angelo Fardella,” 
writes: 
To support this conclusion [points not parts of lines, souls not parts of matter, 
bodies are parts of matter], Leibniz appeals to the principle of the homogeneity of 
parts and wholes.  For anything to count as a part of a larger whole, it has to be of 
the same nature as the whole.  The converse, that those things which do not 
possess the same nature cannot stand in relation of part to whole, allows Leibniz 
to assert that those substances which are aggregated together as a body are not 
parts of those bodies.245 
 
                                                
243 See Richard E. Grandy, "Sortals", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/sortals/>. 
244 See Robert Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, 244.  Adams also writes, “The meaning of this 
passage turns on Leibniz’s conception of the parts of bodies.  The statement that ‘a part is always 
homogeneous with the whole’ is a key to this.  A body, according to the memo, is an aggregate.  Its 
homogeneous parts, therefore, are subaggregates (and thus still bodies) rather than the indivisible 
nonaggregates ‘of’ which it is an aggregate.  The latter we might call ‘elements’ as distinct from ‘parts’ of 
the corporeal aggregate (as I have suggested in Chapter 9, section 3.1), and I think nothing is said here to 
preclude their being (concrete) souls or, as I put it, ‘qualified monads.”  See Ibid, 276. 
245 See Pauline Phemester, Leibniz and the Natural World: Activity, Passivity and Corporeal Substances in 
Leibniz’s Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 98.  Phemester also writes, “Since mere aggregate 
bodies and corporeal substances are of essentially different natures, the homogeneity principle rules out 
corporeal substances as parts of bodies as effectively as it eliminated souls.”  See Ibid, 98-99. 
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And Benson Mates, commenting on whether or not component concepts are parts of 
complex concepts, writes: 
Thus, he [Leibniz] says, the parts of lines are not points, but other lines, although, 
in his use, points are ‘in’ lines.  On this definition it would appear that the 
component concepts of a complex concept are parts of it, assuming that all 
concepts are to be considered ‘homogeneous’.246   
 
There are, however, two problems with understanding Leibniz’s usage of homogeneity 
exactly in this Aristotelian way.  First, in other places Leibniz denies that there are 
homogeneous parts in Aristotle’s sense.  Instead, such homogeneous parts in fact turn out 
to be heterogeneous: 
The point is that people mistakenly take these bodies to be homogeneous or 
uniform, whereas really they are more mixed than they are thought to be.  When 
dealing with heterogeneous bodies, one is not surprised to find differences 
between individual samples: physicians know only too well how much human 
bodies differ in their balance and their constitution.  In short, as I have remarked 
earlier, we shall never be able to find species which are logically the lowest; and 
two real, i.e., complete, individuals belonging to a single species will never be 
perfectly alike.247   
 
I take Leibniz to argue for the claim that any apparent homogeneous whole W, upon 
closer inspection, would turn out to be a heterogeneous whole.  There are two reasons 
Leibniz argues this, both found in the above passage.  First, Leibniz’s reason stems in 
part from his denial that no two things are ever of the exact same species, a thesis Leibniz 
maintained throughout his career.  Granted, Leibniz usually applies the reasoning to 
                                                
246 See Benson Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 61. 
 
247 See (G V.284: NE 305).  Leibniz also writes, “I believe, however, that the four bodies they call 
elements, which they believe to be simple, as well as the salts, metals, and other bodies which they believe 
to be perfectly mixed, with their ingredients in fixed proportions, are not unum per se either – particularly 
since we should regard them as only apparently uniform and homogeneous, and even a homogeneous body 
would still be an aggregation.”  See (G.V.308: NE 328). 
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created substances.  No two monads are of the same species.  Instead, they are like 
Thomistic angels.  Perhaps Leibniz also applies this to corporeal substances as well (even 
if, on the idealistic interpretation I assume in this dissertation, Leibniz denies that there 
are corporeal substances):  No two bricks of gold are really of the same exact species or 
kind.  Second, Leibniz perhaps is advancing an assumption based on advances of the 
science of his time.  To appearances, every part of some portion of blood is also blood.  
So a portion of blood only has homogeneous parts.  Yet if one zooms in with a 
microscope, one will instead find heterogeneous parts.  So a portion of blood appears to 
be a homogeneous whole, but instead is a heterogeneous whole.   
Second, and more importantly, as is the case with many terms Leibniz uses, 
“homogeneity” is also a technical term with a precise meaning that differs in some 
respects from the Aristotelian notion of homogeneity.  Leibniz writes:   
Two entities are homogeneous to which two other entities can be assigned which 
are equal to them and similar to each other.  Given A and B; if L is taken equal to 
A, and M equal to B, and L and M are similar, we call A and B homogeneous.  
Hence I usually also say that homogeneous entities are those which can be made 
similar to each other by means of transformations, like curves and straight lines.  
That is, if A is transformed into its equal L, it can be made similar to B, or to its 
equal M into which B is assumed to have been transformed.248   
 
Leibniz seems to offer two definitions of homogeneity.  I’ll use the terms 




                                                
248 L 667. 
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The first definition can be expressed thus, using the same variables Leibniz used: 
For any A and any B, A is homogeneous1 with B if and only if:  There is at least 
one L and at least one M, such that: 
 
(i) L is similar to M;249 
(ii) L is equal to A; and 
(iii) M is equal to B. 
 
The second definition Leibniz presents in the same passage defines two entities x and y as 
homogeneous2 when they can be made similar to each other by means of transformations.  
Rather than offering two unrelated definitions, the text suggests that the two definitions 
are inter-entailing.  That is, if x is homogeneous1 with y if and only if x is homogeneous2 
with y.  If two entities satisfy conditions (i) - (iii) of homogeneity1, then those two entities 
can be made similar to each other by means of transformations.  Of course, stating the 
definitions and that they inter-entail is not the same thing as explaining why they do, so I 
now attempt to do just that.250 
First, to unmuddy what are some still murky waters, it’s helpful to also see how 
Leibniz defines the terms “similar” and “equal” in the definition of homogeneous1, as 
they are also technical notions for him. I’ll start with “equal”, which Leibniz defines 
when he writes, “Equals are things having the same quantity.”251  Leibniz elaborates what 
he means by “quantity” when he writes, “Quantity or magnitude is that in things which 
can be known only through their simultaneous compresence – or by their simultaneous 
perception.  Thus it is impossible for us to know what a foot or a yard is unless we 
                                                
249 For reasons that will become apparent soon, similarity is symmetric relation.  If x is similar to y, then y 
is similar to x.  Hence, I see no need to add the condition (iv) M is similar to L.  
250 Roy T. Cook finds a third definition in this very passage, only to argue that the third definition is 
consistent with and entailed by the first.  I’ll draw upon the first definition primarily.  See Roy T. Cook, 
“Monads and Mathematics: The Logic of Leibniz’s Mereology,” Studia Leibnitiana (2000): 9-12. 
251 L 667. 
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actually have something to serve as a measure which can be applied to successive objects 
after each other.”252   
What’s not clear from this passage is whether Leibniz thinks he is offering (i) 
simply a handy way to know whether some property F is a quantitative property or (ii) 
the definition of a quantitative property or (iii) a way to know the particular quantity—
i.e., the measure—of something.  The first sentence suggests (i) or (ii).  However, in the 
second sentence, Leibniz seems to assume (iii):  To know if some x is a foot long, one 
must have some other entity y that is a foot long that can be compared to x.  Fortunately, 
one doesn’t have to decide on which of (i) – (iii) applies to understand how quantity 
pertains to equality.  According to commentators, two objects are equal in quantity if and 
only if they are equal in size.253  This understanding of equality will suffice for now.      
Now onto Leibniz’s definition of “similarity”.  Leibniz writes, “Similars are 
things having the same quality.”254  Two objects o1 and o2 are similar if there is some 
quality token F1 of quality type F inhering in o1 and some quality token F2 of quality type 
F inhering in o2.  Leibniz also elaborates on what he means by “quality”, “Quality, on the 
other hand, is what can be known in things when they are observed singly, without 
requiring any compresence.  Such are the attributes which can be explained by a 
definition or through the various modes which they involve.”255   
Leibniz’s elaboration on what he means by “quality”, at least with respect to his 
definition of homogeneity, can be contrasted with what he means by “quantity”, shedding 
                                                
252 Ibid. 
253 See for example Cook, “Monads and Mathematics: The Logic of Leibniz’s Mereology,” 3-4.  
254 L 667. 
255 Ibid.  Leibniz used this definition of similarity as far back as 1679. See, for example, L 254-55. 
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light on both.  One can know that an object o1 has a particular quality F1 without 
requiring some other object o2 to compare with o1.  This is unlike knowing whether or not 
an object has a particular quantity, such as length.   While it’s not clear if Leibniz is 
offering this as a strict definition, once again for the purposes of my argument, it suffices. 
I note that some scholars argue that the quality of an object, in Leibniz’s developed 
mereological views, is the shape of the object-- two objects are similar when they are the 
same shape.256  However, I shall also consider a broader conception of qualitative 
similarity not limited to shape in what follows.   
To recap, given Leibniz’s definition of a part, a modification can be a part of a 
substance only if the modification is homogeneous with its substance.  A modification is 
homogeneous with its substance only if the modification can be transformed in such a 
way that it is similar to its substance.  To avoid both (A) the accidental reality is part of 
the reality of the substance and (B) the accidental reality is not part of the reality of the 
substance, Leibniz needs to a way to argue that a modification is not a part of its 
substance.  To do so, I shall argue that a modification cannot be homogeneous with its 
substance.  Once I have established that, I will have provided all Leibniz needs to defend 
the premise (P2) If the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is true, then Substantial-
Composition is false.   
In what follows, I shall argue that modifications cannot be parts of their 
substances on both the idealistic and non-idealistic interpretations of Leibniz, where by 
non-idealistic I mean the interpretation that holds that there are bodies and/or corporeal 
                                                
256 For example, see Graham Solomon, “Leibniz and Topological Equivalence,” Dialogue 32 (1993), 722. 
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substances in Leibniz’s ontology.  I’ll start with the non-idealistic interpretation and 
argue that modes cannot be homogeneous with the bodies they modify.  While I assume 
the falsity of the non-idealistic interpretation of Leibniz’s ontology in this project, 
starting with the non-idealistic is still beneficial for the following reason:  Leibniz’s stock 
example of a limitation, as we’ve seen, is the shape of a body.  If the shape of a body 
cannot be homogeneous with the body shaped and the reason the shape cannot be 
homogeneous is due to its being a limitation of that body, then ipso facto a modification 
of a substance—be it corporeal or non-corporeal—cannot be homogeneous with the 
substance modified.   For modifications, according to Leibniz, are limitations.   
One might still object to my even bothering to address whether modes could be 
homogeneous with bodies.  On the idealistic ontology I assume in this project, there are 
no corporeal substances or bodies.  Instead there are only immaterial monads and their 
accidents.  According to some scholars, Leibniz’s definition of homogeneity in his 
definition of parts is a geometrical definition applying to shaped entities of varying 
dimensions such as lines and spheres.  But monads are dimension-less.  So it’s a category 
mistake to claim that an accident of a monad is a part of a monad.  Nothing more needs to 
be argued.   
This objection is correct as far as it goes but it is still fruitful to run the argument 
through in greater depth as it sheds light on an important related issue.  Monads, 
according to Leibniz, are simple even though they are both synchronically and 
diachronically complex—  monads have a multitude of accidents at a time and they 
change accidents over time.  Many of Leibniz’s predecessors would have claimed that 
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such synchronic complexity is inconsistent with monadic simplicity.  If monads have 
accidents, then they are composite and therefore not simple.257   
Contemporary scholars have responded to this issue in one of two ways.  First, 
some scholars have resorted to arguing that Leibniz is ultimately committed to the 
position that monads are not really synchronically and diachronically complex.  That is, 
monads do not have a multitude of accidents at a time and they do not endure through 
change of accidents over time.258  This position, however, is in tension with Leibniz’s 
numerous arguments defending the reality of monadic change.259  Additionally, Leibniz 
argues in the Monadology that there can only be a plurality of monads if they differ in 
quality from each other.260  
Other scholars who have not been willing to jettison diachronic and synchronic 
complexity, have proposed a more promising solution. Accidents are not parts of monads.  
Instead, monads are simple entities that serve as parts of composite wholes consisting in 
the monad and accident.261  However, this solution runs into problems that Leibniz 
                                                
257 For example, Aquinas famously argued that God couldn’t have accidents because that would entail that 
God is not simple.  See SCG 1.23.3.  
258 John Whipple defends such a view in a number of articles.  See John Whipple, “The Structure of 
Leibnizian Simple Substances,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 379-410; “Leibniz 
on Divine Concurrence,” Philosophy Compass (2010): 865-879; and “Continual Creation and Finite 
Substance in Leibniz’s Metaphysics,” Journal of Philosophical Research 36 (2011): 1-30. 
259 Such as Leibniz’s Perpetual-Change thesis he appealed to in DRA that we saw earlier in this chapter. 
260  In the Monadology, Leibniz writes, “However, monads must have some qualities, otherwise, they 
would not even be beings.  And if simple substances did not differ at all in their qualities, there would be no 
way of perceiving any change in things, since what there is in a composite can only come from its simple 
ingredients; and if the monads had no qualities, they would be indiscernible from one another, since they 
also do not differ in quantity.”  See (G VI.608: AG 214). 
261 For example, Timothy Allan Hillman, in his own work on this topic, writes, “Now, accidents all by 
themselves need not compromise substantial simplicity.  After all, Aquinas and other Medieval 
philosophers had maintained that immaterial substances—for example, angels—were singular entities 
which, nonetheless, had accidents.  Whenever some accident inheres in an angel, the angel’s simplicity is 
not corrupted; instead, the simple substance is said to enter into a larger substantial composite of which it 
and the accident are constituent parts.  So, Leibniz need not fear that a monad’s possession of some mode 
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himself drew attention to in DRA above.  Mainly, if monads are simple parts of 
composite wholes, of which accidents are the other part, then Leibniz argues that it is 
difficult to explain how the accidents are accidents of the monad that inhere in the monad 
instead of entities that exist per se.  In what follows, I show how Leibniz can maintain 
that accidents are accidents of simple monads without being parts of monads or parts of a 
greater whole composed by the accident and monad.   
 A final reason to show that limitations/modifications are not parts of what they 
limit even in the case of immaterial monads is that some scholars interpret qualitative 
similarity in Leibniz’s definition of homogeneity to not be limited to shape.262  If these 
scholars are right then Leibniz’s definition of homogeneity may not be limited to 
applying to bodies are corporeal substances, for Leibniz argues that the accidents of 
monads are qualities.263  In what follows, I shall also offer reasons to hold that even if 
qualities are not limited to shapes, qualities could not be homogeneous with what the 
qualities are qualities of.   
2.3.1  Shapes not Homogenous with what they Shape 
I first argue that the shape of a body—a modification—is not homogeneous with 
its body, and therefore cannot be a part of its body.  Leibniz suggests one route to this 
thesis in his “Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics” when he writes, “It is clear 
from this that a boundary is not homogeneous with what it bounds, nor a section with 
                                                
or state affects its simplicity per se.”  See T. Allan Hillman, “Substantial Simplicity in Leibniz: Form, 
Predication, & Truthmakers,” The Review of Metaphysics 63 (2009): 120. 
262 For example, in his own work on Leibniz’s technical definition of homogeneity found in Leibniz’s 
“Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics,” Hartz writes, “Whatever is homogeneous must be of a certain 
kind K, ‘all the way down’ in its decomposition or ‘all the way up’ in its composition.”  See Glenn A. 
Hartz, Leibniz’s Final System: Monads, Matter and Animals (New York: Routledge, 2007), 69.   
263 See (G VI.608: AG 214).  Recall as well in Chapter 3 that qualities are modifications.  
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what it cuts.”264  Earlier in Leibniz’s career, Leibniz identified the boundary of a thing 
with its figure or shape.  In a 1669 letter to Jacob Thomasius, Leibniz wrote, “Here too 
everything agrees remarkably if we assume that form is nothing but figure.  For since 
figure is the boundary of a body, a boundary is needed to introduce figure into bodies.”265  
From these two passages, we have an argument:  Shape is what bounds a body, but a 
boundary cannot be homogeneous with what it bounds.  So a shape cannot be 
homogeneous with what it shapes.  Therefore, a shape cannot be a part of what it shapes.  
Given that shape is Leibniz’s stock example of a modification, at least one type of 
modification cannot be a part of what it modifies.   
 There are two problems, however, with this argument.  First, immediately 
preceding the passage above in his “Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics,” Leibniz 
writes, “A common boundary of two things is an entity which is in them when they do 
not have a part in common.  Insofar as these two things are understood to be parts of a 
single whole, their common boundary is called a section of the whole.”266  This passage 
leads to a tension with Leibniz’s Ownership Thesis of Accidents (OTA) that we saw in 
Chapter 3, if the shape of a body—a modification--is to be identified with the boundary 
of a body.267  Leibniz claims that two entities can have a common boundary.  However, 
recall that on OTA, no modification can modify more than one substance at the same 
                                                
264 L 668. 
265 (G I.18: L 95). 
266 L 668. 
267The Ownership Thesis of Accidents can be expressed thus: For any accident A and any substance s, if A 
inheres in s then there is not some substance s’ such that s’ is not identical to s and A inheres in s’.  See (G 
IV.365: L 390). 
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time— the synchronic implication of OTA.268  If a shape is a modification and a 
modification is a boundary, then Leibniz here is committed to holding that a modification 
can modify more than one entity at the same time.   
 There’s a second problem.  Leibniz gives the example of the endpoint of a line 
segment being an ingredient of the line segment but not homogeneous with it.269  Instead, 
a smaller line segment within the original line segment would be homogeneous.  
Commentators have point out that Leibniz generalizes this point, and further argues that a 
one-dimensional line that is an ingredient of a two-dimensional polygon is not 
homogeneous the two-dimensional polygon and that a two dimensional surface is an 
ingredient of but not homogeneous with the three dimensional object the surface is the 
surface of, and so on.270  For an entity to be homogeneous with another entity, however, 
both entities must have the same number of dimensions— a smaller line segment in a line 
segment is homogeneous with the larger line segment unlike the endpoint.  This leads to a 
necessary condition of homogeneity:  for any x and any y, x is homogeneous with y only 
if the number of x’s dimensions = the number of y’s dimensions.  However, the number 
of dimensions of the shape of a body is identical to the number of dimensions of the 
body.271  A sphere is three-dimensional and the shape of a sphere is three-dimensional.  
So the shape of a body—which is mode of its body—satisfies an important condition of 
                                                
268 See Chapter 3, section 2.2. 
269 L 667. 
270 See Hartz, Leibniz’s Final System: Monads, Matter and Animals, 69.   
271 Assuming that the later Leibniz did not identify shape with boundary.  If Leibniz did identify shape with 
boundary, then there are plausible reasons to suppose that the number of dimensions of a shape is equal to 
the number of dimensions of what is shaped minus one.  For discussion, see Achille Varzi, "Boundary", 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/boundary/>. 
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homogeneity.  Given that the shape of a body is also an ingredient of its body (on one 
understanding of ingredient I presented above), we’re not far from concluding that the 
shape is a part of its body.   
 This second problem seems also to apply to immaterial substances— monads.  
Monads are zero-dimensional entities.272  The modifications of monads—which on one 
understanding of ingredient are also ingredients of monads-- are also zero-dimensional.  
So again we’re not far from concluding—contra Leibniz’s claims—that the modification 
of a monad is homogeneous ingredient of a monad, and therefore a part of a monad.   
 However, this second problem rests on a confusion.  In fact, addressing the 
confusion paves the path to establishing that the shape of a body could not be 
homogeneous with its body, and further that the modification of a monad could not be 
homogeneous with its monad.   I’ll start with shapes.  If a shape were homogeneous with 
its body, then the shape would be similar (or could be transformed to be similar) to its 
body.  But what would it be for a shape to be similar to its body?  It would be for the 
shape to have the same shape as its body.   But that’s absurd.  We would be treating the 
shape as if it were a substance with a shape modifying or inhering in it, which we then 
compare to the shaped body.  Instead, the body has the shape it has because the shape 
modifies it and the shape only exists as modifying its body.   
A slightly different way to clarify the confusion of the second problem is as 
follows.  Homogeneity is symmetric.  If x is homogeneous with y then y is homogeneous 
with x.  So if a shape is homogeneous with its body then a body is homogeneous with its 
                                                
272 Monads, being non-extended, are zero-dimensional.  See (G VI.607: AG 213). 
 135 
shape.  If a body is homogeneous with its shape, then the body is similar to its shape or 
could be made similar to the shape via transformations.  Yet once again this is absurd for 
the same reason.  What would it be for a body to be similar to its shape?  It would be for 
the body to have the same shape as its shape.  But once again we are treating the shaped 
body as a distinct entity from the shape shaping the body, which we then compare.  The 
confusion then lies in supposing that two entities are being compared and then judged 
similar—the body and the body’s shape, as if one glances at the body and then glances at 
the body’s shape, and then judges the body to have the same shape as its shape.273   
Instead, while the shape of a body is an ingredient of its body (on one 
understanding of ingredienthood), it is not homogeneous with the body.  What would be 
both an ingredient of and homogeneous with a body B is a smaller body B’, such as B’s 
left half.  B’ could be transformed so that it is similar in shape to B.  The transformation 
would involve B’ changing from having one shape M modifying B’ to a different shape 
M’ similar to B’s shape.  Thus, commentators have correctly claimed that only a body 
could be a part of another body in Leibniz’s metaphysics, even if the route they took to 
the conclusion was not the route Leibniz takes.   
2.3.2  Limitations are not Homogenous with what they Limit 
Further, in addition to a shape not being homogeneous with what it shapes, 
Leibniz has grounds to argue that no modification can be homogeneous with what it 
modifies.  In fact, I shall argue that claiming that a limitation’s being homogeneous with 
what it limits leads to a regress.  Recall that modifications are limited-realities— 
                                                
273 Of course if they are really distinct they are two entities, but not two entities have the same shape in the 
same respect that would be needed for them both to be homogeneous with each other. 
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modifications are limitations.  This especially includes shape, Leibniz’s frequent example 
of a limitation.  A shape is a limitation of its body.  The confusion that lies then in 
claiming that a shape is homogeneous with its body lies can be made clearer when one 
takes into consideration that a shape is a limitation.  To claim a shape is homogeneous 
with its body would be to claim that the shape is limited in the same way that its body is 
limited.  The problem is, what limits the body is the body’s shape.   
Generalized, a limitation L is homogeneous with an entity x that L limits only if L 
is limited in the same way that x is limited.  But x is limited by L.   Assuming that L 
cannot be limited by L, if L were to be limited in the same way that x is limited, then L 
would have to be itself limited by a different limitation L’ that is similar to L (which 
limits M).  But then if L’ is similar to L, then L’ in turn would have to be limited by L’’, 
and so on ad infinitum.  To avoid the regress, one must deny that a limitation could be 
homogeneous with what it limits.  Given that modifications are limitations, no 
modification can be homogeneous with what it modifies.  Thus, no modification could be 
a part of what it modifies.  Leibniz now has the second premise of his argument he 
needed above: 
(P2)  If the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is true then Substantial-Composition is  
  false. 
 
In which case, Leibniz can conclude: 
(C)    If the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is true then it is not the case that (A) the  
 accidental reality is part of the reality of the substance and it is not the 
 case that (B) the accidental reality is not part of the reality of the 
 substance. 
 
Thus, affirming the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis does avoid the problems Leibniz raised 
with (A) and (B).  Leibniz in fact did have good reasons to avoid the non-committal 
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answers he originally gave to Q3 and Q4.  Further, Leibniz can give answers to Q3 and 
Q4 while also giving an affirmative answer to Q1. 
2.3.3  Absolute-Realities and Homogeneity 
One important issue remains to be addressed:  What reasons could Leibniz have 
for holding that an accident must be a part of its substance if the accident is an absolute-
reality?  Recall that Leibniz’s arguments against accidents being absolute-realities stem 
from the consequences of the disjunction (A) or (B).  Both (A) and (B) assume that 
accidents—if absolute-realities—are parts of their substances.  What Leibniz needs, then, 
is a reason to hold that if accidents are absolute-realities, then accidents are parts of their 
substances.  As we’ve seen, the two necessary conditions of Leibnizian part-hood are 
ingredient-hood and homogeneity.  So Leibniz needs a reason then to argue that if 
accidents are absolute-realities, then accidents are ingredients of and homogeneous with 
their substance.  As I just argued, on at least one understanding of ingredient-hood, 
modifications are ingredients of their substance.  However, as modifications are not 
homogeneous with their substance— as I also argued above, modifications are not parts 
of their substance.  What needs to be established, then, is that if accidents are absolute-
realities, then accidents are homogeneous with their substances.  
 Recall that if an accident that is an absolute-reality is to be homogeneous with its 
substance, then the accident must be similar to its substance or able to be transformed so 
that it would be similar to its substance.  As I noted above, there are two different 
conceptions of similarity—the strictly geometrical conception and a broader conception.  
On the strictly geometrical conception, x is similar to y only if x has the same 
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shape/figure as y.  On the broader conception of similarity, x is similar to y if x has the 
same type of quality as y.    
 I’ll start with the geometrical conception.  On the geometrical conception of 
homogeneity, the accident A—if it is to be homogeneous with its substance s—would 
have to be similarly shaped or capable of being similarly shaped to s.  Hence, A would 
have to be a smaller body in s.  So Leibniz now needs reasons to argue that if accidents 
are absolute-realities, then both the accidents and their substances are bodies.  I can’t find 
one.  Leibniz can argue that if A is a smaller body within s then A is a part of s.  Leibniz 
can also argue that if A is smaller body in s, then A is an absolute-reality.  But I find no 
reason why Leibniz could argue that if A is an absolute-reality then A is a body and s is a 
body.   
Fortunately, there’s a different route Leibniz can take with a broader 
understanding of similarity.  On the broader understanding of similarity, x is similar to y 
if and only if either (i) x has the same quality (type) as y or (ii) x is transformable so that 
it has the same quality (type) as y.  Take the following two passages conveying the same 
claim.  The first passage was written the same year as DRA: 
“It seems that something inheres in a subject, if and only if, its reality belongs to 
the reality of the subject.  That is to say, . . . A is in B, if all that is immediately 
required by A, is also immediately required by B.”274  
 
Leibniz claims here that if x inheres in y, then x’s reality belongs to y’s reality.  The 
second passage was written several decades later: 
. . . a modification is a varying limitation, and modes merely limit things but do 
not increase them and hence cannot contain any absolute perfection which is not 
                                                
274 A VI.iv.990. 
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in the thing itself which they modify.  Otherwise, in fact, these accidents must be 
thought of in the manner of substances, namely, something which stands per se.275   
 
The second passage utilizes Leibniz’s distinction between absolute and limited realities 
while the first does not.  However, the first passage but can be taken to apply to absolute-
realities.  That is, if x inheres in y, then x’s absolute reality belongs to y’s absolute reality.   
I note also that Leibniz makes a point at the end of the second passage strikingly similar 
to a point he makes in DRA:  If an accident contains absolute perfection not found in the 
substance the accident inheres in, then the accident is a substance—something which 
stands per se, and therefore not an accident.   
 On the broader understanding of similarity, for an accident, which is an absolute-
reality to be homogeneous with its substance, it would have to be something that can 
have qualities rather than what simply is a quality.  Here, the case is easy to make then.  
An entity that is an absolute-reality is something that has absolute perfection or positive 
reality of its own.  This is in contrast with a modification or limitation, which has no 
absolute perfection of positive reality of its own but instead is merely a limitation on an 
absolute reality.  So absolute-realities can have limitations.  Further, there are reasons to 
believe that Leibniz would require any created absolute-reality to have some limitations, 
otherwise the absolute-reality would be unlimited— something privy only to God.  On 
this broader understanding of similarity then, an accident that is an absolute-reality could 
be homogeneous with its substance by having similar limitations or capable of being 
transformed so that it has similar limitations.  Conjoined with the fact that the accidents 
are also ingredients (on one understanding of ingredient-hood), the accidents being 
                                                
275 (G II.257: L 532). 
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absolute-realities entails they are parts after all.  Hence, accidents being absolute-realities 
entails either (A) the accidental reality is part of the reality of the substance or (B) the 
accidental reality is not part of the reality of the substance, which is what Leibniz needed.   
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that in his “De Realitate Accidentium,” Leibniz hesitated to 
argue that accidents have even a modal reality because he worried that if accidents had 
any kind of reality, such accidents would be parts of their substances.  Thus, positing of 
any kind of reality to accidents then ran afoul of Leibniz’s views on the simplicity of 
substances.  However, the not later Leibniz argued that accidents have a modal reality.  I 
argued that the later Leibniz could affirm that accidents have a modal reality given his tri-
fold distinction between absolute-realities, limited-realities, and privations, where 
modifications are limited realities and his developed mereological views.  According to 
Leibniz, some x is a part of some whole y only if x is homogenous with y.  After a 
reconstruction of Leibniz’s technical notion of homogeneity, I argued that given that 
modifications are limitations, modifications cannot be homogenous with their substances.  
If accidents were absolute-realities such as real qualities, however, such accidents could 
be homogenous with their substances and therefore could be parts of their substances.  
Therefore, a major reason Leibniz argued all accidents are modifications and no accidents 










In Chapter 3, I argued that Leibniz’s views on the nature of accidents—specifically that 
accidents are modifications or limitations—led him to argue against the possibility of 
creaturely inter-substantial causation or creaturely causal interaction.  In Chapter 4, I 
argued that Leibniz held that accidents are modifications or limitations because of his 
views that created substances are mereologically simple while possessing a plurality of 
modifications, which they change over time.  In this chapter, I more closely examine the 
role accidents play in intra-substantial or immanent causation, by addressing an 
interpretative controversy concerning the causal relata in such causation.  Specifically, 
the controversy is over what, strictly speaking, causes a substance’s accidents— the 
substance itself or its accidents.   
A hallmark of Leibniz’s metaphysics is his thesis of creaturely spontaneity— the 
thesis that created substances are causally responsible for their accidents.276  Given 
                                                
276 Leibniz writes, “For why should God be unable to give substance, from the beginning, a nature or an 
internal force that can produce in it, in an orderly way (as would happen in a spiritual or formal automaton, 
but free in the case where it has a share of reason), everything that will happen to it, that is, all the 
appearances or expressions it will have, without the help of any created being?”  (G IV.483-4: AG 143-44).  
See also (G VI.295-6: T 300).  
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creaturely spontaneity, Leibniz denies that created substances ever causally interact, as 
we’ve seen.277  Any apparent causal interaction is then reducible—in some sense—to the 
immanent causal activity of created substances.  Furthermore, Leibniz argues that 
creaturely spontaneity entails the falsity of Occasionalism— the theory that only God is 
causally responsible for change.278  
While this much is clear, the details are murkier the closer one looks at Leibniz’s 
thesis of spontaneity, as Leibniz makes several conflicting claims about what, precisely, 
causes a substance’s accidents:  Either the substance itself causes its accidents or the 
substance’s earlier accidents or states cause its later accidents.  Leibniz’s differing 
answers have understandably divided scholars.  Several notable scholars endorse the view 
that strictly speaking, it is the substance itself that produces its accidents, a view I’ll call 
the “Efficacious-substance” interpretation.  Most scholars, however, take Leibniz’s 
claims that earlier accidents or states are the causes of later accidents or states to be his 
genuine account of spontaneity.   
                                                
277 I address in depth Leibniz’s reasons for denying creaturely causal interaction in chapters 2 and 3 and 
why the thesis of spontaneity rules out causal interaction in Appendix A. 
278 In “On Nature Itself,” Leibniz writes, “For who would call into doubt that the mind thinks and wills, that 
we elicit in ourselves many thoughts and volitions, and that there is spontaneity that belongs to us? If this 
were called into doubt, then not only would human liberty be denied and the cause of evil things be thrust 
into God, but it would also fly in the face of the testimony of our innermost experience and consciousness, 
testimony by which we ourselves sense that the things my opponents have transferred to God, without even 
a pretense of reason, are ours.  But if we were to attribute an inherent force to our mind, a force for 
producing immanent actions, or to put it another way, a force for acting immanently, then nothing forbids, 
in fact, it is reasonable to suppose that the same force would be found in other souls or forms, or, if you 
prefer, in the natures of substances—unless someone were to think that, in the natural world accessible to 
us, our minds alone are active, or that all power for acting immanently, and further, as I put it, all power for 
acting vitally is joined to an intellect, assertions that are neither confirmed by any rational arguments, nor 
can they be defended except by distorting the truth.”  See (G IV.510: AG 161). 
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Moreover, recent scholars argue that a specific type of accident—appetitions—is 
the genuine productive cause of a substance’s later accidents.  I call this the “Efficacious-
appetition” interpretation.  Appetitions in Leibniz’s metaphysics are principles of change, 
specifically tendencies or strivings for future perceptions.   So appetitions just seem to be 
the right kind of entity to produce later accidents.  Unlike the efficacious-substance 
interpretation, the efficacious-appetition interpretation is also compatible with Leibniz’s 
determinism and meets his strictures on explaining change— specifically his principles of 
intelligibility and sufficient reason.   
In this chapter, however, I argue that the efficacious-appetition succumbs to a 
serious objection originally raised by Locke and endorsed by Leibniz in his New Essays 
on Human Understanding— what I’ll call the “Multiplication of Agents” objection.  If 
appetitions are the efficient causes of a substance’s later accidents, then there a plurality 
of distinct efficient causal agents in created substances, a consequence that Leibniz 
rejects because it runs afoul of his views on substantial simplicity and unity.  The 
efficacious-substance interpretation overcomes this objection as it only posits one 
efficient causal agent— the substance.  
I further argue that the efficacious-substance account can be reconciled with 
Leibniz’s determinism and strictures on explanation.  Leibniz utilized a distinction found 
as early as Aquinas and developed at length by Suarez between two different kinds of 
efficient causes— the principle quod efficient cause/efficient causal agent and the 
principle quo efficient cause/power by which the agent acts.  Scholastics such as Suarez 
held that in most cases, substances are efficient causal agents yet they also had principled 
accounts of how substances could be efficient causal agents and yet act deterministically 
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or of necessity in some sense.  I argue that Leibniz had similar reasons to consistently 
affirm that substances are efficient causal agents—and so avoid the Multiplication of 
Agents objection—but also affirm that such substances deterministically produce their 
effects in a way that satisfies Leibniz’s strictures on explanation. I do so by arguing that 
while substances are the principle quod efficient causes of their accidents, appetitions are 
the principle quo efficient causes or the powers by which substances produce their 
accidents.  Appetitions can then explain the changes substances deterministically undergo 
without requiring Leibniz to posit a multiplicity of distinct efficient causal agents in each 
created substance. 
 
§1 Leibniz’s Prima Facie Inconsistent Views on the Efficient Cause of Accidents 
1.1 Creaturely Spontaneity 
Leibniz summarizes his thesis of spontaneity in his 1695 “A New System of Nature”: 
For why should God be unable to give substance, from the beginning, a nature or 
internal force that can produce in it, in an orderly way (as would happen in a 
spiritual or formal automaton, but free in the case where it has a share of reason), 
everything that will happen to it, that is, all the appearances or expressions it will 
have, without the help of any created being?279   
 
Similarly, in the Theodicy, Leibniz writes: 
But to say that the soul does not produce its thoughts, its sensations, its feelings of 
pain and of pleasure, that is something for which I see no reason.  In my system 
every simple substance (that is, every true substance) must be the true immediate 
cause of all its internal actions and passions; and, speaking with metaphysical 
rigor, it has none other than those which it produces.280   
 
                                                
279 (G IV.485: AG 144). 
280 (G VI.353-4: T 400). 
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Given the thesis of creaturely spontaneity, any accident of a created substance is 
produced by the substance as opposed to a distinct created substance or God alone 
(except, of course, in the case of miracles).  This much is clear, as we’ve seen in previous 
chapters and in the passages above.  Unfortunately, when one zooms in further and aims 
to understand in greater depth how accidents are produced by their substances, Leibniz 
gives several seemingly conflicting answers:  Sometimes he writes as if the substance 
itself is, strictly speaking, the cause of its accidents while in other passages he writes as if 
the substance’s earlier accidents or states produce its later accidents.     
1.2 The Efficacious-Substance Interpretation 
Let’s look at the former view first, in which substances themselves are what, strictly 
speaking, cause their accidents.  Support for this view—what I’ll call the “Efficacious-
Substance” account—is found in many passages throughout Leibniz’s career.  For 
example, in his New Essays on Human Understanding, Leibniz writes: 
As I have already said, anything which occurs in what is strictly a substance must 
be a case of ‘action’ in the metaphysically rigorous sense of something which 
occurs in the substance spontaneously, arising out of its own depths; for no 
created substance can have an influence upon any other, so that everything comes 
to a substance from itself (though ultimately from God).281  
 
In his Theodicy, Leibniz writes: 
Bayle asserts, for instance, that by purely philosophical meditations one can never 
attain to an established certainty that we are the efficient cause [la cause 
efficiente] of our volitions. But this is a point which I do not concede to him: for 
the establishment of this system demonstrates beyond a doubt that in the course of 
nature each substance is the sole cause of all its actions, and that it is free of all 
physical influence from every other substance, save the customary cooperation of 
God.282  
                                                
281 (G V.195: NE 210). 
282 (G VI.295-6: T 300). See also (G V.58: NE 65), PM 100, (G IV.483-4: AG 144), and (G IV.504-5: AG 
156). 
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And in On Nature Itself, Leibniz writes: 
To the extent that I have made the notion of action clear to myself, I believe that 
the widely received doctrine of philosophy, that actions pertain to supposita, 
follows from the notion and is grounded in it.  Furthermore, I believe that we 
must grasp the fact that this also holds reciprocally, so that not only is it the case 
that everything that acts is an individual substance, but also that every individual 
substance acts without interruption, including even body itself, in which one 
never finds absolute rest.283  
 
Passages like the ones above have lead many scholars, such as Bobro, Clatterbaugh, and 
Jorati to defend the efficacious-substance account.284  
1.3 The Efficacious-Accident Interpretation 
Yet in quite a few passages throughout his career, Leibniz writes as if the earlier 
accidents or states of a substance produce its later accidents or states.  Call this the 
“Efficacious-Accident” interpretation.  Notable scholars such as Robert Sleigh have 
endorsed this view and for understandable reasons, as in numerous passages, Leibniz 
does just seem to claim that earlier accidents or states of substances cause their later 
accidents or states.285  In a 1698 letter to Arnauld, Leibniz writes, “Every present state of 
a substance occurs to it spontaneously and is only a consequence of [une suite de] its 
preceding state.286 In a later letter written to Arnauld, Leibniz restates the same thesis, 
                                                
283 (G IV.509-10: AG 160). 
284 See Marc Bobro and Kenneth Clatterbaugh, “Unpacking the Monad, Leibniz's Theory of Causality,” 
The Monist, (1996) 79: 409–26 and Julia Jorati, “Leibniz on Causation –Part 1,” Philosophy Compass 
(2015) 10: 389-397.  
285 Sleigh writes, “Every non-initial, non-miraculous state of every created substance has as a real cause 
some preceding state of that very substance.”  See Robert C. Sleigh, Jr., “Leibniz on Malebranche on 
Causality,” p. 162.  Additionally, Kulstad endorsed this view in earlier works but as will become apparent, 
he has since endorsed a more nuanced interpretation of monadic-causation.  Kulstad writes, “I mean the 
view that created substances can be real causes, or, more specifically, that each state of a created substance 
arises causally from its preceding state.”   See Mark Kulstad, “Causation and Pre-established Harmony in 
the Early Development of Leibniz’s Philosophy,” in Causation and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Steven 
Nadler (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), p. 96. 
286 G II.47. 
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writing, “Everything occurs in each substance in consequence of [en consequence du] the 
first state that God gave it in creating it.287 In his 1695 “Clarification of the difficulties 
that Mr. Bayle found in the New System of the Union of the Soul and the Body,” Leibniz 
continues to affirm the same thesis, writing that “the present state of each substance is a 
natural result of its preceding state.288  
However, Leibniz divided accidents into two kinds:  perceptions and appetitions.  
Therefore, it’s worth further examining which of the two kinds of Leibnizian accidents 
are efficient causes on the efficacious-accident interpretation:  the substance’s 
perceptions, appetitions, or both?  In many passages, Leibniz writes as if perceptions are 
efficacious:289  
In fact, nothing can happen to us except thoughts and perceptions, and all our 
future thoughts and perceptions are merely consequences, though contingent, of 
our preceding thoughts and perceptions, in such a way that, if I were capable of 
considering distinctly everything that happens or appears to me at this time, I 
could see in it everything that will ever happen or appear to me.290   
 
every present perception leads to [que la suite de] a new perception.291  
 
subsequent [perceptions] are derived [derivantur] from preceding ones.292  
 
In an article arguing against the efficacious-perception interpretation, Bobro and 
Clatterbaugh have rightly pointed out that in the above passages, Leibniz does not use the 
language of efficient causation when describing how future states come from a 
                                                
287 G II.91. 
288 G IV.521.  
289 Nicolas Jolley endorses the view that perceptions are efficacious.  He writes, “Although Leibniz may 
say that it is substances which produce their states, this is only a loose way of speaking; in strictness, it is 
perceptual states which causally produce other perceptual states of the same substance.”  See Nicholas 
Jolley, “Causality and Creation in Leibniz,” The Monist (1998) 81, no. 4, 605. 
290 Leibniz writes this in chapter 14 of his Discourse on Metaphysics.  See (G IV.439-40: AG 47). 
291 (G VI.356-7: T 403). 
292 A 1709 letter to Des Bosses.  See G II.372 
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substance’s earlier states.293  Instead, Leibniz uses logical terms, such as “consequences” 
and “derived”.  However, in other passages, Leibniz does use causal language: 
But this expression which the soul has of the future in advance, although obscure 
and confused, is the true cause (cause veritable) of what will happen to it and of 
the clearer perception it will have afterwards, when the obscurity is lifted, since 
the future state is a result of the preceding one.294  (Emphasis added) 
 
Notice that Leibniz claims that a soul’s expression—which just is a perception—is the 
true cause of its later perception.  In other passages, Leibniz uses not only causal 
language but efficient causal language: 
The representation of the present state of the universe in the soul … will produce 
(produira) in it the representation of the following state of the same universe, just 
as the objects in the preceding state actually produce (produit) the following state 
of the world. In the soul the representations of these causes are the causes of the 
representations of these effects.295 (Emphasis added) 
 
The present state of body is born from the preceding state through the laws of 
efficient causes; the present state of the soul is born form its preceding state 
through the laws of final causes.  The one is the place of the series of motion, the 
other of the series of appetites; the one is passed form cause to effect, the other 
from end to means.  And in fact, it may be said that the representation of the end 
in the soul is the efficient cause of the representation in the same soul of the 
means.296    
 
Recently, however, scholars such as Rutherford, Carlin, and Bolton have argued that a 
substance’s appetitions are the efficient causes of a substance’s later accidents.297  Their 
reasons, which I soon present in greater depth, are that appetitions—being more akin to 
                                                
293 See Bobro and Clatterbaugh, “Unpacking the Monad, Leibniz's Theory of Causality,” 415. 
294 (G II.91: AG 82). 
295 G IV.532-3. 
296 Quoted in Carlin, 226 
297 See Martha Brand Bolton, “Change in the Monad,” in Eric Watkins, ed. The Divine Order, the Human 
Order, and the Order of Nature: Historical Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 178; 
Laurence Carlin, “Leibniz on Final Causes,” Journal of the History of Philosophy (2006) 44: 231; and 
Donald Rutherford, “Laws and Powers in Leibniz,” The Divine Order, the Human Order, and the Order of 
Nature: Historical Perspectives. Ed. Eric Watkins. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 167 and 
“Leibniz on Spontaneity.” Leibniz: Nature and Freedom. Eds. Donald Rutherford, and Jan A. Cover, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 167. 
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causal powers—are better suited to cause accidents than perceptions.  This interpretation, 
which I’ll call the “Efficacious-appetition” interpretation, finds support in the following 
passages from Leibniz’s “Principles of Nature and Grace Based on Reason” and 
Monadology: 
As a result, a monad, in itself and at a moment, can be distinguished from another 
only by its internal qualities and actions, which can be nothing but its perceptions 
(that is, the representation of the composite, or what is external, in the simple) and 
its appetitions (that is, its tendencies to go from one perception to another), which 
are the principles of change.298   
 
The action of the internal principle which brings about the change or passage 
from one perception to another can be called appetition; it is true that the appetite 
cannot always completely reach the whole perception toward which it tends, but it 
always obtains something of it, and reaches new perceptions.299   
 
As this brief survey should have made obvious by now, appealing to texts alone won’t 
settle this debate, as there is ample textual support for all three interpretations:  the 
efficacious-perception, efficacious-appetition, and efficacious-substance view.  Other 
considerations are needed if this debate is to be resolved.  While I defend a variant of the 
efficacious-substance interpretation in this paper, I defend one that incorporates the 
specific strengths of the efficacious-appetition view, so it’s worth seeing just what those 
strengths are.  Before I do so, however, I need to address two preliminary issues.   
1.4 Why not both Efficacious-substance and Efficacious-Accidents? 
Someone might respond that if Leibniz claims that both substances and their accidents 
are efficacious, then Leibniz must have meant that both are efficacious.  That is, it is true 
that created substances are efficient causes and it is also true that accidents are efficient 
                                                
298 (G VI.598: AG 207). 
299 (G VI.609: AG 215). 
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causes.  In fact, such a view had historical precedent, for many scholastics held that both 
substances and accidents are efficacious.  For example, on Suarez’s metaphysics, it is not 
just substances that are efficacious, but res, which are efficacious.300  The category of res, 
however, is not limited to substances but also includes certain kinds of accidents such as 
real qualities.301   
However, two reasons count against appealing to scholastic affirmations of the 
efficacy of both substances and accidents in attempting to make sense of Leibniz’s own 
claims.  First, Scholastics were pushed to affirm the causal efficacy of accidents because 
of their commitment to transubstantation, where the wine and bread at a Eucharistic mass 
undergo a substantial change into the blood and body of Christ.  When the wine and 
bread become the blood and body of Christ, the accidents of the wine and bread continue 
to exist without inhering in the substance of the wine and bread (as it no longer exists) 
and also without inhering in Christ’s body and blood.  Such accidents are efficacious 
because they can be seen, felt, and tasted by the recipients of communion.302  Leibniz, 
however, was a Lutheran who ultimately did not affirm transubstantiation, and so would 
not have that as a reason for affirming the efficacy of both substances and accidents.303  
Second, the accidents, at least on Suarez’s view, which are efficacious are real 
qualities.  A sign of an accident’s being a real quality is its separability from its 
substance—such as the accident of redness in wine, which can exist apart from the wine 
                                                
300 See DM 18.4.3 and 18.4.7.  Stephan Schmid points this out in his recent work on Suarez on efficient 
causality.  See Stephan Schmid, “Efficient Causality: The Metaphysics of Production,” in Jakob Leth Fink 
ed. Suarez on Aristotelian Causality (Brill, 2015), 104-105. 
301 I explore at length Leibniz’s own views on whether accidents are real qualities in Chapter 4.   
302 See DM 18.3.13 
303 I address Leibniz’s views on transubstantiation in the appendix to chapter 3.  
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in which it originally inhered upon transubstantiation.304  Leibniz, however, is adamant 
that such real qualities do not exist.305  Instead, all accidents, for Leibniz, are modes that 
are inseparable from their substances.306  Leibniz argued that if real qualities did exist, 
they would not be accidents at all but rather substances (and so not accidents).307   
A second issue concerning the response that both substances and accidents are 
efficacious concerns the precise contribution each would make in the production of a new 
accident.  From the get go, one can rule out both the substance and accident being 
sufficient for the newly produced accident, as this would result in the future substances of 
accidents being causally overdetermined.  While Leibniz never explicitly rules out the 
possibility of causal overdetermination, surely he would reject widespread and systematic 
overdetermination, where every non-initial accident of a substance has more than one 
sufficient cause— substances and their earlier accidents.308   
Perhaps Leibniz meant that substances and accidents are each partial causes of the 
future accidents of substances.  This account avoids the problems with holding that 
                                                
304 See Ibid.  For Suarez’s full treatment of the distinction between separable real qualities and inseperable 
modes, see Suarez, On the Various Kinds of Distictions, Cyril Vollert, SJ trans.  (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 2007). 
305 Leibniz writes, “Let us come now to the real accidents which are in this unifying thing as their subject.  
You will agree, I believe, that some of them are only modifications, which disappear when it is removed.  
But you ask whether there are not certain accidents which are more than modifications.  Such accidents 
seem, however, to be entirely superfluous, and whatever is in such a substance other than a modification 
seems to pertain to the substantial thing itself.”  See (G II.458: L 606) 
306 Concerning the inseparability of accidents from their substances, Leibniz writes, “An accident, however, 
needs not only some substance in general but that very one in which it inheres, so that it cannot change it.  
See (G IV.364: L 390). 
307 Leibniz writes, “. . . we may ask whether there can be a thing which is neither a modification nor a 
source of modifications—such as the Scholastics think of as accidents, which, they say, are in a subject 
naturally but not essentially, since they can be without a subject by the absolute power of God.  But I do not 
yet see how such a thing can be explained if it is different from my substantial chain, which is truly in the 
subject, though not as an accident but as what the Scholastics call a substantial form, or as a source of 
modifications—if you like, after the manner of an echo.”  See (G II.504: L 614). 
308 In the Appendix A, I argue that Leibniz has reasons to reject even non-widespread and non-systematic 
overdetermination.    
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substances and accidents are each sufficient causes, but has its own difficulties.  Mainly, 
if substances and accidents are partial causes, what do substances and accidents 
contribute in the production of new accidents?  Unfortunately, looking to Leibniz yields 
very little by way of an answer.  For now, I shall assume that it is not the case that both 
substances and accidents are efficient causes of a substance’s later accidents in a univocal 
sense of efficient cause.  Later, however, I argue for a nuanced interpretation of the 
efficacious-substance interpretation in which appetitions are efficacious, but not in the 
same sense in which substances are efficacious.   
1.5 Against the Efficacious-Perception Interpretation 
While I ultimately argue for a nuanced interpretation of the efficacious-substance 
interpretation of Leibniz that incorporates elements of the efficacious-appetition view, 
it’s worth briefly addressing why, in spite of numerous passages where Leibniz seems to 
claim that perceptions are efficacious, it is not the case that perceptions are genuinely 
efficacious.  As we’ve seen, Leibniz posits two types of accidents in his ontology— 
perceptions and appetitions.309   These two types of accidents could, with some caveats, 
be understood in contemporary parlance as categorical properties and dispositional 
properties where perceptions are categorical properties and appetitions are dispositional 
                                                
309 Leibniz writes, “As a result, a monad, in itself and at a moment, can be distinguished from another only 
by its internal qualities and actions, which can be nothing but its perceptions (that is, the representation of 
the composite, or what is external, in the simple) and its appetitions (that is, its tendencies to go from one 
perception to another) which are the principles of change.  For the simplicity of substance does not prevent 
a multiplicity of modifications.”  See (G VI.598: AG 207). 
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properties.310  If perceptions, however, are the genuine efficient cause of later accidents, 
then Leibniz has categorical properties serving as genuine efficient causes.   
I find two problems with such a view, however.  First, as mentioned above and 
what I develop in much greater depth soon, there are plausible reasons to hold that 
appetitions—which are a lot like causal powers—are efficacious.  If both appetitions and 
perceptions are efficacious in the same sense, then we are lead back to the difficulties we 
faced in supposing that both substances and accidents are efficacious in the same sense.  
If both appetitions and perceptions are efficacious in the same sense, then they are either 
both sufficient causes or partial causes of a substance’s later accidents.  If they are both 
sufficient causes, then the same difficulties with overdetermination arise—mainly that 
such a picture results in systematic and widespread overdetermination.  If they are both 
partial causes, then a detailed account—which is lacking in Leibniz’s corpus—is needed 
as to what each distinctly contribute.  
  Second, let’s assume for the moment that only perceptions are efficacious.  
According to Leibniz, appetitions are “tendencies from one perception to another”311 and 
perceptions are representational entities.312  Thus, with some caveats that I address later 
in this paper, perceptions are akin to categorical properties while appetitions are more 
like dispositional properties.  However, if perceptions are solely efficacious, Leibniz has 
a scenario where categorical properties—perceptions—do all the causal work.  Earlier 
                                                
310 I address the differences between appetitions and normal Aristotelian powers or dispositions later in this 
chapter. 
311 (G VI.598: AG 207). 
312 In the 14th chapter of his Monadology, Leibniz writes, “The passing state, which involves and represents 
a multitude in the unity or in the simple substance is nothing other than what one calls perception. . .” (G 
VI.608: AG 214).  See also (G VI.598: AG 207), G II.311, G III.622, G VII.529, and 566. 
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perceptions produce later perceptions.   I find two problems with this scenario.  First, the 
efficacious-perception view leaves little work for appetitions.  If perceptions are solely 
efficacious, then it is not clear what role appetitions play in Leibniz’s metaphysics.  The 
appetitions would be superfluous.  Second, this picture is at odds with Leibniz’s causal 
views at large, as Leibniz is a full-fledged realist about causal powers.313  However, on 
the efficacious-perception interpretation, categorical properties—perceptions—do all the 
causal work, including producing appetitions—which are akin to dispositional properties 
or powers.  Such a picture--which would turn Leibniz into a Humean--is further at odds 
with texts where Leibniz claims that appetitions produce perceptions.  Hence, I’ll assume 
for the remainder of this paper that while perceptions count amongst the causal relata as 
effects, they do so as effects, not causes.  Instead, I shall focus on the efficacious-
substance and efficacious-appetition view.    
 
§2 The Argument for the Efficacious-Appetition Interpretation 
This leaves the efficacious-substance interpretation and the efficacious-appetition 
interpretation.  While I defend the efficacious-substance interpretation, I present the 
motivations for the efficacious-appetition interpretation first, as the efficacious-substance 
account I defend is one that incorporates the strengths of efficacious-appetition 
interpretation.  Donald Rutherford gives the strongest and lengthiest argument for the 
efficacious-appetition interpretation against the efficacious-substance interpretation, 
which I turn to now.  Rutherford’s argument consists in two moves.  First, Rutherford 
                                                
313 Indeed, the essence of substance consists in an active force or entelechia, which is responsible for 
change.  See, for example (G IV.478-9: AG 139), and (G IV.504-16: AG 155-67). 
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argues that the efficacious-substance interpretation cannot be reconciled with Leibniz’s 
determinism and his strictures on the explanation of monadic change— Leibniz’s 
requirement that change be intelligible.  Second, Rutherford argues that the efficacious-
appetition interpretation does meet Leibniz’s strictures for explaining monadic change, 
and thus is the true interpretation.   
2.1 Rutherford on the Efficacious-substance Interpretation, Determinism and 
Intelligibility 
Recall that on the efficacious-substance interpretation, substances—not their earlier 
accidents—are the efficient causes of their later accidents.  A substance s changes from 
being in state N to state N+1 because s—the efficient causal agent—produced the 
accidents which makeup N and then produced the accidents which makeup N+1.  
However, Leibniz is also determinist who held that a substance s is determined to be in 
state N+1 given its immediate predecessor state N.   For example, in his Monadology, 
Leibniz states that “every present state of a simple substance is naturally a consequence 
of its preceding state.”314    
Additionally, Leibniz has strict requirements for the intelligibility of monadic 
change.315  There has to be an intelligible reason why a monad changes from N at t to 
N+1 at t+1 where by “intelligible”, Leibniz means that the explanation for the 
                                                
314 (G VI.610: AG 216). 
315 Leibniz writes, “Whenever we find some quality in a subject, we ought to believe that if we understood 
the nature of both the subject and the quality we would conceive how the quality could arise from it.  So 
within the order of nature (miracles apart) it is not at God’s arbitrary discretion to attach this or that quality 
haphazardly to substances.  He will never give them any that are not natural to them, that is, that cannot 
arise from their nature as explicable modifications.”  A.VI.vi.66. 
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substance’s change from N to N+1 is found within the substance’s own nature and is 
understandable by finite substances.316   
 While Rutherford doesn’t bring it up, a further stricture on explanation can be 
drawn from Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR).  While Leibniz gives several 
formulations of PSR throughout his career, I have in mind the version in which any 
explanation must involve contrastive reasons.  For example, Leibniz writes: 
And that of sufficient reason, by virtue of which we consider that we can find no 
true or existent fact, no true assertion, without there being a sufficient reason why 
it is thus and not otherwise, although most of the time these reasons cannot be 
known to us.”317  
 
According to Leibniz, for any state N of a substance s, there is a sufficient reason why s is 
in state N as opposed to a different state N’.  Further, if s changes from N to N+1, there is 
a sufficient reason why N+1 rather than N’+1 is a consequence of N.  In what follows, I 
will focus primarily on Leibniz’s determinism and principle of intelligibility, since that is 
what Rutherford focuses on in his argument.318  Later, however, I will argue that my 
nuanced interpretation of the efficacious-substance account can be reconciled with PSR.   
According to Rutherford, the efficacious-substance interpretation cannot be 
reconciled with Leibniz’s determinism nor his requirements for intelligibility.  Claiming 
                                                
316 The principle of intelligibility is wielded by Leibniz against a number of targets.  For example, Leibniz 
argues that the principle of intelligibility rules out occult qualities such as mental properties in material 
substances and Newtonian gravitation, as such qualities are not explainable by their substance’s nature.  
Leibniz also utilizes it against occasional accounts of creaturely change.  If God is the sole efficient cause 
of any accident that comes to inhere in a created substance, then the explanation for the accident is not 
found in the creature but rather in God’s will.  Thus, if Occasionalism is true, then no change is 
intelligible—a consequence Leibniz insists is false, in which case Occasionalism is also false.   
317 (G VI.612: AG 217).  See also (G VI.602: AG 209-10) and (G VI.127: T 44). 
318 In an earlier paper, Rutherford distinguishes between the principle of intelligibility and PSR.  However, 
the version of PSR that Rutherford distinguishes from the principle of intelligibility is not the contrastive 
version I address above.  Instead, it’s the axiom that “nothing happens without a reason.”  See Donald P. 
Rutherford, “Leibniz’s Principle of Intelligibility,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 9, no. 1 (1992): 35. 
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that a substance s is in state N at t because s produced all the accidents that makeup N 
does not explain why s produced the accidents that make up N. Claiming that s changes 
from N to N+1 because s efficiently caused all the accidents that makeup N and later 
produced all the accidents that makeup N+1 also does not explain why s first produced 
the accidents that make up N and then produced the accidents that make up N+1. 
Rutherford draws attention to an unpublished passage in support of his argument, 
where Leibniz writes, “Saying that the soul’s God-given force is the only source 
[principe] of its particular actions is not sufficient to give the explanation for those 
actions.”319  The force referred to in this passage is the substance’s primary active force, 
which just is the substance’s nature or substance itself.320  Thus, the efficacious-substance 
interpretation, it seems, runs afoul of Leibniz’s principle of intelligiblity.  As Rutherford 
writes: 
The concern is that there is nothing in the concept of an ‘active power,’ or even 
one that is more entelechia than dunamis, that would allow us to understand why 
that power should give rise to one succession of states rather than another.  
Arguably, we have here the same sort of violation of the principle of intelligibility 
that Leibniz elsewhere inveighs against it.321   
 
2.2 Why the Law-of-the-Series does not help the Efficacious-Substance Interpretation 
Defenders of the efficacious-substance interpretation might appeal to the substance’s law-
of-the-series as providing an explanation of monadic change that meets Leibniz’s own 
strictures on explanation and is consistent with Leibniz’s determinism.  The substance’s 
law of the series is tantamount to the substance’s essence or substantial form.322  As 
                                                
319 G IV.542.   See also WF 100.  Quoted in Rutherford, “Laws and Powers in Leibniz,” 162. 
320 See Rutherford, “Leibniz on Spontaneity,” 163.   
321 Rutherford, “Laws and Powers in Leibniz,” 162. 
322 As Rutherford notes, the law of the series is identified with the individual nature of the substance.  See 
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Rutherford writes, “Here, what is important about the law of the series is that it involves, 
in some unspecified sense, a complete history of a substance’s states.”323  Given that the 
law-of-the-series involves somehow a complete history of a substance’s states, we might 
then have an explanation for why a substance changes from state N to state N+1— it is 
because N+1 follows N in the substance’s law of the series.  This also provides an 
explanation for s changes from N to N+1 rather than N’+1—it is because N+1 follows N 
in the substance s’s law of the series.  Further, given that the law-of-the-series is 
identified with the nature of a substance, which involves active power, one might be 
further tempted to give the law-of-the-series a causal role.  A substance s just is its law of 
the series, and s changes from N to N+1 because s produces all the accidents that makeup 
N+1.  The reason s changes from N to N+1 instead of from N to N’+1 is because N+1 
follows N in s’s law of the series.  Thus, the law-of-the-series plays both the efficient 
causal role and the role of explainer or determiner with respect to monadic change.  
Rutherford writes: 
There is no doubt that Leibniz invests the law of the series with a causal aspect.  
Insofar as this law is identified with the individual nature of a substance, and that 
nature involves an active power that is the spontaneous source of all of a 
substance’s states, the law of the series can be seen as ‘determining’ the 
succession of those states.324   
 
However, according to Rutherford, this just pushes the problem back a step.  For we still 
do not have an explanation for why N+1 must follow from N in a substance’s law of the 
series instead of N’+1 following from N.  Rutherford writes: 
                                                
Ibid., 164.  Rutherford is not recognizing that Leibniz identifies the law of the series with the individual 
nature of the substance or the substance itself.  See Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, Substance and 
Individuation in Leibniz, 219-226. 
323 Rutherford, “Laws and Powers in Leibniz,” 164. 
324 Ibid., 163-64. 
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The law of the series is said to contain this information, but it provides (so far as 
we can understand it) no explanation of that order.  It encapsulates a complete 
history of all that a substance will do, but it does not render intelligible, as an 
instance of natural change, the transition from one state of the substance to 
another.325  
 
 Rutherford continues: 
Knowing a substance’s law of the series (which only God can know), one would 
know all the states of the substance, in the order in which they occur.  What one 
wouldn’t know, however, is why if a given substance is in state Sn, it will 
thereafter, as a matter of natural necessity, be in state Sn+1.  Such an explanation 
requires a generality that is missing in the law of the series, each example of 
which pertains uniquely to a single substance.  It must explain why if any 
substance is in a state Sn, characterized in suitable theoretical terms, it will 
thereafter, given the laws of nature, be determined to be in state Sn+1.326  
 
2.3 Rutherford on the Efficacious-Appetitions, Determinism, and Intelligibility 
Rutherford’s second move is to argue that in explaining monadic change, the efficacious-
appetition account succeeds where the efficacious-substance account fails.  In support of 
both appetitions being explainers of monadic change and their efficacy, Rutherford first 
draws attention to some key passages such as the following in Leibniz’s “Principles of 
Nature and Grace” which we’ve seen already but is worth repeating: 
A monad, in itself and at a moment, can be distinguished from another only by its 
internal qualities and actions, which can be nothing but its perceptions (that is, the 
representation of the composite, or what is external, in the simple) and its 
appetitions (that is, its tendencies to go from one perception to another) which are 
the principles of change.327  
 
That appetitions are tendencies and principles of change is strong evidence in favor of the 
efficacious-appetition interpretation, according to Rutherford.  Additionally support 
comes from passages where Leibniz claims that appetitions are forces—specifically 
                                                
325 Ibid., 165. 
326 Ibid. 
327 (G VI.598: AG 207). 
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derivative forces which modify the monad’s primitive force.328  More importantly, 
however, especially considering that there are also many passages in support of the 
efficacious-substance account, the efficacious-appetition account avoids the issues that 
plagued the efficacious-substance account.  Specifically, Rutherford argues the 
efficacious-appetition account makes sense of how monadic change can be deterministic 
and also meets Leibniz’s strictures on explanation.  
Rutherford first draws attention to a definition of change that Leibniz offered 
throughout his career, where change is defined as “nothing but a complex of two states 
which are immediate and opposite to each other, together with a force or reason for the 
change, which reason itself is a quality.”329  It’s worth unpacking this definition.  A 
monad’s change involves two states— N and N+1.  N and N+1 are ordered as prior and 
posterior and the reason for N’s being prior to N+1 and N+1 following N is due to a 
quality of N which is a force or reason for N+1.  That force, Rutherford points out, just is 
the appetitions in N.330  Such appetitions are forces or reasons for change— specifically 
appetitions for future states, namely, perceptions.  Thus, the ordering is not arbitrary.  
N+1 does not follow N merely because N+1 follows N in the monad’s law of the series.  
Instead, N+1 follows from N because N has appetitions for the accidents that make up 
N+1.  This explanation also explains why N+1 follows N in the monad’s law of the series 
rather than N’+1— it is because the appetitions which makeup N are appetitions for the 
accidents of N+1 rather than N’+1.   
                                                
328 Rutherford, “Laws and Powers in Leibniz,” 166.  See also (G II.562: L 533), (G II.270: L 537), and (G 
II.200-1: NE 216). 
329 Ibid., 167, quoting C 9/MP 134. 
330 Ibid., 167. 
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So, according to Rutherford, the efficacious-appetition account meets Leibniz’s 
intelligibility requirements.  When a substance s changes from N to N+1, the explanation 
for the change from N to N+1 comes from s’s own nature.  Specifically, s’s nature as 
modified.331  The substance in state N has the appetitions—which are modifications or 
accidents of itself—for the accidents of N+1 and those accidents produce N+1.  
Therefore, the reason for the substance’s change from N to N+1 is the substance’s nature 
rather than some other created substance or merely God’s will.  That the substance’s state 
N has appetitions for N+1 and so produce the accidents of N+1 rather than N’+1 also 
makes sense of how such change is deterministic and in line with Leibniz’s principle of 
sufficient reason.  
According to Rutherford, s changes from N to N+1 because the appetitions in N 
are appetitions for the accidents of N+1 and so efficiently cause the accidents which 
makeup N+1.332   Therefore, it is the appetititions, rather than the substance, which are 
genuinely efficacious.  Rutherford has provided a powerful argument for the efficacious-
appetition interpretation that incorporates the strengths of the efficacious-substance 
account while also presenting a strong case against the efficacious-substance 
interpretation.   
 
                                                
331 Rutherford writes, “Changes in the states of a monad are explained in terms of its own nature—
however, crucially, it is that nature as modified.  While all the states of a substance depend ontologically on 
the primitive active force produced by God, since they exist only as modifications of primitive force, 
changes in the substance are explained by appeal to prior states that determine the existence of new states.”  
See Ibid., 166-67. 
332 Rutherford writes, “Monadic states themselves (or the appetitive forces associated with those states) are 
causally efficacious in the production of new states, which in turn are productive of new states, and so on.”  
Ibid. 
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§3 Leibnizian Substance Causation 
However, I argue that the efficacious-substance interpretation can be formulated in a way 
that incorporates the strengths of the efficacious-appetition interpretation.  In fact, such 
an understanding will prove to be necessary for Leibniz himself, I soon show, raises a 
fatal objection to the efficacious-appetition account— at least as it has been developed by 
recent defenders such as Rutherford, et al.  I shall argue that substances are the efficient 
causal agents but the substances appetitions still explain why a substance changes from N 
to N+1.  I do so by drawing upon a widely held scholastic distinction that is found as 
early as Aquinas and developed at length by Suarez between the principle quod efficient 
cause and a principle quo efficient cause.  The principle quod cause is the efficient causal 
agent and the principle quo cause is the efficient causal power by which the efficient 
causal agent acts.  I shall argue that substances, for Leibniz, are the principal quod cause 
and their appetitions are the principle quo causes.  This will make sense of texts where 
Leibniz says substances—specifically their primary active forces—are principles of 
change and other texts where Leibniz says that their appetitions are principles of change.   
On this formulation of the Efficacious-substance account, if one asks “Is it the 
substance or the appetition that efficiently causes a substance’s later accidents?” the 
answer is “Yes”.  If one asks “Is it the substance or the appetition which is a principle of 
change?” the answer is also yes.  One would have to further specify whether they mean 
the principle quod or principle quo cause to get an answer of only the substance or only 
its accidents.  A lot of the debate in the secondary literature has hinged on the assumption 
that any time Leibniz says that substances, perceptions, states, or appetitions cause later 
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states, Leibniz always means that they are efficient causes in the same sense— the 
principal quod or efficient causal agent.      
3.1 Suarez on the Efficient Principle Cause Quod and Quo 
Scholastics often distinguished between the agent in efficient causation and the power by 
which the agent acts when efficiently causing some effect.  This distinction traces back at 
least as far as Aquinas, who in the Summa Theologica writes, “In every action two things 
are to be considered, the ‘suppositum’ acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for 
instance, fire heats through heat.”333  Suarez utilized this distinction throughout his 
Disputation Metaphysica, especially disputations 17-22 on efficient causation.  
According to Suarez, both the agent which efficiently causes some effect and the power 
by which the agent causes the effect are efficient causal principles.  The agent is the 
principle quod or suppositum of the act and the power by which the agent acts is the 
principle quo.  Suarez writes that, “. . . a suppositum is said to act immediately as a 
principle quod when it acts through a power inherent in itself in such a way that the 
action proceeds immediately from that power as a principle quo.”334   
 As notable Suarez scholars have pointed out, both the agent and the power by 
which the agent acts are efficient causal principles for Suarez.  Freddoso writes, “Suarez 
distinguishes an efficient principle ut quod, that is, the substance which exercises a power 
                                                
333 ST 1a q36 a1.  This distinction appears throughout the Summa.  For example, Aquinas writes, “Now 
actions belong to supposits and wholes and, properly speaking, not to parts and forms or powers, for we do 
not say properly that the hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing hot, but fire by 
heat, although such expressions may be employed metaphorically.”  For example, see ST 2a2ae, q58, a2c. 
334 DM 22.1.19.  Suarez also writes, “. . . there is one sort of principal cause which operates and another 
sort which is a principal principal of operating—they are commonly called, respectively, a principal cause 
quod and a principal cause quo.”  See DM 17.2.7.  Suarez also writes, “For the principle quod is the 
suppositum, just as in other actions.”  See DM 18.2.1. 
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and to which the resulting acting is ultimately attributed, from an efficient principle ut 
quo, that is, the power or faculty by which such a substance operates.”335  In a recent 
article on Suarez’s account of efficient causation, Schmid explains the implications of 
this distinction in even greater depth: 
But what sorts of things are causes if they are not events?  In treating this 
question, we have to be careful since asking ‘what are efficient causes?’ is 
ambiguous.  Taken in one way, Suarez explains, this question addresses the 
principle-quod (or ‘the principle cause which operates’), that is, the thing or 
suppositum from which a certain action arises.  Taken in another way, the 
question refers to the principle-quo (or the principal principle of the operation’), 
that is, the principle by virtue of which a certain agent performs its action.336  
 
This distinction can help clear much confusion that may arise in a first time reader of 
Suarez’s disputations on efficient causation, where in quite a few sections Suarez 
develops accounts of how various non-substances—such as the substantial form or a 
substance’s powers—are efficient causal principles.  As Freddoso writes, “I mention this 
[the distinction] in part because several of the questions concerning efficient causality 
that Suarez deals with in Disputations 17-19 center around the principle ut quo, and it is 
important to understand from the beginning that Suarez takes the principle ut quo to fall 
under his general characterization of an efficient causal principle.”337   
 
 
                                                
 
335 Freddoso clarifies this in his lengthy exposition of Suarez’s account of efficient causation in the 
introduction to his translation of Suarez’s DM 20-22.  See Suarez, On Creation, Conservation, and 
Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20-22, xxix-xxx. 
336 And in agreement with what I’ve written so far, Schmid continues, “The principle-quo of an action is 
nothing but the power by means of which a suppositum can perform a particular action.”  See Schmid, 
“Efficient Causality: The Metaphysics of Production,” 103-4. 
337 See Suarez, On Creation, Conservation, and Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20-22, xxix-xxx. 
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3.2 Why the distinction applies to Leibniz 
I argue that the distinction applies to Leibniz.   That is, substances are the agent or 
principle quod efficient cause of accidents for Leibniz and powers are the principle quo 
efficient cause of accidents.  Specifically, appetitions are the principle quo efficient 
causes or powers by which the substance acts.   
3.2.1 Appetitions are powers 
As scholars who defend the efficacious appetition account, such as Kulstad, Carlin, 
Bolton, and Rutherford, have argued, appetitions just are powers.338  Leibniz claims 
several times in his mature writings that appetitions are tendencies.  For example, Leibniz 
writes to Samuel Masson in 1716: 
But the tendency of which I speak is of another nature; it is internal to the soul, 
which is not a point.  It is the progress of one thought to another, and since 
thoughts (though in a soul not composed of parts) represent things composed of 
parts, it is only in this sense that these perceptions are called composite, as are 
their tendencies or appetites—that is, they contain a multitude of modifications 
and relations all at once.”339   
 
Earlier, in his “Principles of Nature and Grace”, Leibniz claims as well that appetitions 
are tendencies from one perception to another.340  
Leibniz identifies also appetitions as derivative forces, which entails that 
appetitions are powers.  In the New Essays, Leibniz writes, “There are other efforts, 
arising from insensible perceptions, which we are not aware of; I prefer to call these 
‘appetitions, rather than volitions, for one describes as ‘voluntary’ only actions one can 
be aware of and can reflect upon when they arise from some consideration of good and 
                                                
338 See Bolton, 119, Carlin, 228, Kulstad, 133-34, Rutherford, “Leibniz on Spontaneity in Leibniz: Nature 
and Freedom,” 163. 
339 (G VI.627: AG 228). 
340 (G VI.598: L 636). 
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bad; though there are also appetitions of which one can be aware.”341  So appetitions are 
efforts.  Not much earlier in the New Essays, Leibniz identifies efforts with derivative 
force, writing, “Force would divide into ‘entelechy’ and ‘effort’; for although Aristotle 
takes ‘entelechy’ to generally that it comprises all action and effort, it seems to me more 
suitable to apply it to primary acting forces, and ‘effort’ to derivative ones.”342  In 
Leibniz’s 1695 “A Specimen of Dynamics,” however, Leibniz claims that derivative 
forces are powers.  Specifically, Leibniz argues that there are two types of active force, 
primitive and derivative active forces.  Both kinds of active forces, however, “might not 
inappropriately be called power”, as Leibniz claims.343  
3.2.2 Substances and Appetitions are Principles of Change 
Leibniz also claims that both substances and their appetitions are principles of change.  
The second thesis is explicitly stated in a famous passage in his “Principles of Nature and 
Grace” that we’ve already seen but is worth repeating: 
It follows that one monad by itself and at a single moment cannot be distinguished 
from another except by its internal qualities and actions, and these can only be its 
perceptions—that is to say, the representations of the compound, or of that which 
is without, in the simple – and its appetitions—that is to say, its tendencies from 
one perception to another – which are the principles of change.344  (Emphasis 
added) 
 
The first thesis requires a bit more work to develop but is still well supported.  In the 
Theodicy, Leibniz identifies the soul with Entelechy and he identifies the Entelechy as the 
active principle, writing, “Moreover, it is true that the soul is the Entelechy or the active 
principle, whereas the corporeal alone or the mere material contains only the passive.  
                                                
341 (G V.158-9: NE 173). 
342 (G V.155-6: NE 169-70). 
343 AG 219. 
344 (G VI.598: L 636). 
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Consequently the principle of action is in the soul, as I have explained more than once in 
the Leipzig Journal.”345  Leibniz also identifies the entelechy with the monad.346  So the 
monad or created substance just is the entelechy or active principle.  Which just is to say 
that the created substance is a principle of change.   
 It’s worth noting that Leibniz uses the term “principle” roughly in the same way 
that Suarez and Aquinas use it, a usage which traces back to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 
where a principle plays a metaphysical role as a beginning or origin rather than the 
contemporary usage as rule or axiom.  Aquinas writes that “the word ‘principle’ signifies 
only that whence another proceeds: since anything whence proceeds in any way we call a 
principle; and conversely.”347  While Suarez has a broad notion of principle that 
designates the first element in any ordering, he has a narrower usage that is closer to 
Aquinas’s in which the principle is not merely the first element in an ordering but also is 
a thing from which another follows via some sort of connection.348  Given that the 
principle under discussion is an active principle or principle of change, I submit that 
Leibniz’s usage here closely follows Aquinas’s and Suarez’s.349  
                                                
345 (G VI.89-90: T 69). 
346 (G II.193-4: L 521-22). 
347 ST 1 q33 a1 
348 Suarez writes, “Therefore, ‘principle’ of the thing’ can be used either only on account of an order and 
whatever connection or on account of some intrinsic disposition towards.”  (DM 12.1.4)  Freddoso, 
commenting on Suarez’s account of principle, writes, ““The term ‘principle’, he tells us, can be used in a 
wide sense to designate the first element in any sort of ordering, real or merely conceptual, and in this sense 
it is obviously more inclusive than the term ‘cause’.  However, ‘principle’ is used most properly in a 
narrower metaphysical sense to designate ‘that which truly and directly communicates (influens) some sort 
of being (esse) to that of which it is the principle,’ or, in other words, that on which a real entity depends in 
some way for its existence.”  (Freddoso, xxv-xxvi)  
349 A principe may either be a source, foundation, or rule of acting.  Petit Robert; dictionnaire de la langue 
francaise, ed. A. Rey and J. Rey-Debove, 3rd Ed, (Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert 2003). 
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3.2.3 Substances are Principle Quod Causes and the Appetitions are Principle Quo 
Causes 
So as we’ve seen, Leibniz claims that substances are efficient causes in numerous 
passages but in other passages Leibniz claims that appetitions—which are modifications 
of substances—are also efficient causes.  We’ve also seen that both substances and 
appetitions are principles of change.  However, given that appetitions are powers, 
appetitions are best understood as principle quo efficient causes and substances are the 
principle quod efficient causes.  In other words, substances are the efficient causal agents 
that produce their accidents by means of their powers or appetitions.   
Support for substances being the principle quod or agent or suppositum which 
acts can be found in several important passages.  For example, in “On Nature Itself”, 
Leibniz writes, “To the extent that I have made the notion of action clear to myself, I 
believe that the widely received doctrine of philosophy, that actions pertain to supposita, 
follows from the notion and is grounded in it.”350  Here, Leibniz explicitly endorses the 
thesis we’ve seen Aquinas and Suarez defend as above, that substances or supposita act.  
Relatedly, in Leibniz’s fifth letter to Clarke, Leibniz writes, “Properly speaking, motives 
do not act on the mind as weights do on a balance, but it is rather the mind that acts by 
virtue of the motives, which are its dispositions to act.”351  The mind acts in virtue of its 
motives, where such motives are a species of appetitions.  Here, Leibniz is again using 
the language of principle quo efficient causes.    
                                                
350 (G IV.509: AG 160). 
351 (G VII.392: L 698). 
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The strongest support for this thesis that substances are principle quod causes and 
appetitions are principle quo causes, however, is found in a telling section of the New 
Essays on Human Understanding.  As Theophilus, Leibniz writes, “Faculties or qualities 
do not act; rather, substances act through faculties.”352  The context of this passage is key, 
for Leibniz is responding—as the character of Theophilus—to an argument in Locke’s An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding against the thesis that powers are efficient 
causal agents.  I’ll call this the Multiplication of Agents Objection.   Locke writes: 
But the fault has been, that Faculties have been spoken of, and represented, as so 
many distinct agents.  For it being asked, what is was that digested the meat in our 
stomachs?  It was a ready, and very satisfactory answer, to say, that it was the 
digestive faculty.  What was it that made any thing come out of the body?  The 
explusive faculty.  What moved?  The motive faculty: and so in the mind, the 
intellectual faculty, or the understanding, understood; and the elective faculty, or 
the will, willed or commanded: which is in short to say, that the ability to digest, 
digested; and the ability to move, moved; and the ability to understand, 
understood.  For faculty, ability, and power, I think are but different names of the 
same things: which ways of speaking, when put into more intelligible words, will, 
I think, amount to thus much; that digestion is performed by something that is 
able to digest, motion by something able to move; and understanding by 
something able to understand….”353  (2.21.20)  
 
In what follows, I’ll focus on Philalethes’s version, as Philalethes is Leibniz’s voice for 
Locke in Leibniz’s New Essays on Human Understanding: 
The ordinary way of speaking is, that the understanding and will are two faculties 
of the same soul; a word proper enough, if it be used as all words should be, not to 
breed any confusion in men’s thoughts,’ as I suspect has happened in this matter 
of the soul.  And when we are told that ‘the will is superior faculty of the soul; 
that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior faculties; that it follows the 
dictates of the understanding, may be understood in a clear and distinct sense’, yet 
                                                
352 Ce ne sont pas les facultes ou qualites, qui agissent, mais les Substances par les facultes.  (G V.160: NE 
174). 
353 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford Unviersity Press, 1975), 
243-44. 
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I am afraid that they have misled many people into a confused idea of so many 
agents acting separately in us.354   
 
Leibniz, writing as Theophilus, responds: 
The question of whether there is a real distinction between the soul and its 
faculties, and whether one faculty is really distinct from another, has long 
exercised the Scholastics.  The realists have said Yes, the nominalists No; and the 
same question has been debated concerning the reality of various other abstract 
beings which must stand or fall with faculties.  But I do not think that we need 
here plunge into the brambles in an attempt to settle this question, despite the fact 
that Episcopius, I remember, attached such importance to it that he thought that if 
the faculties of the soul were real beings then human freedom would be untenable.  
However, even if they were real, distinct beings, it would still be extravagant to 
speak of them as real agents.  Faculties or qualities do not act; rather, substances 
act through faculties.”355   
 
From Leibniz’s response, Leibniz can be taken to understanding Locke as arguing for the 
following conditional, which I’ll call the “Multiplication of Agents” Objection: 
If (A) there is a real distinction between the soul and its faculties (powers), then 
(B) there would be a plurality of agents acting separately in us.356   
 
Leibniz denies the consequent (B), as evinced by his last sentence in which he claims that 
faculties do not act.  His strategy, however, is not to deny (A).  While he takes no stance 
on the truth of (A) in this passage, in fact he argues for (A) elsewhere—  Leibniz claims 
that a substance is really distinct from its accidents.357  Given that appetitions count 
                                                
354 (G V.160: NE 174). 
355 Ibid. 
356 Leibniz identifies faculties with powers in several passages in his New Essays.  At NE 379, Leibniz 
offers a line of reasoning that supports the thesis that appetitions are faculties, writing, “Primary powers are 
what make up the substances themselves; derivative powers, or ‘faculties’ if you like, are merely ‘ways of 
being’ – and they must be derived from substances. . .” As appetitions are derivative forces and derivative 
forces are powers, appetitions can be called ‘faculties’.  At NE 169-70, Leibniz argues that “The active 
power can be called ‘faculty’. . .”  As I argued earlier, appetitions are derivative active powers.   
357 In his Theodicy, Leibniz writes, “It is true that God is the only one whose action is pure and without 
admixture of what is termed ‘to suffer’: but that does not preclude the creature’s participation in actions, 
since the action of the creature is a modification of the substance, flowing naturally from it and containing a 
variation not only in the perfections that God has communicated to the creature, but also in the limitations 
that the creature, being what it is, brings with it. Thus we see that there is an actual (distinction réelle) 
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amongst a substance’s accidents, Leibniz is committed to a substance being really distinct 
from its appetitions, and so a substance is really distinct from its derivative powers.358  So 
Leibniz needs instead to deny that (A) entails (B), which is just what he does.  It doesn’t 
follow, Leibniz argues, that if a soul (or substance) is really distinct from its powers, then 
those powers are agents.  Instead, substances are the agents which act or cause through 
their powers.  Here, Leibniz just is utilizing the principle quod/quo distinction, or the 
distinction between agents and the powers by which agents act, in arguing that (A) does 
not entail (B). 
Leibniz’s response to the Multiplication of Agents Objection spells trouble for the 
efficacious-appetition account, if appetitions are efficient causal agents on that account.  
For if individual appetitions are efficient causal agents, then given that there is a plurality 
of appetitions inhering in a substance in any state the substance is in, there is a 
multiplication of agents in a substance in any state it is in.  It is no surprise why Leibniz 
would deny (B), for the simplicity and unity of created substances is a crucial aspect of 
his monadological metaphysics.359  Holding that there are in fact a plurality of efficient 
causal agents that are responsible for monadic change would seriously threaten such 
simplicity and unity.   
Those who endorse the efficacious-appetition account, however, can avoid the 
Multiplication of Agents Objection if appetitions are understood as principle quo efficient 
causes rather than principle quod efficient causes.  However, the efficacious-substance 
                                                
distinction between the substance and its 
modifications.”  (G VI.121: T 32). 
358 Ibid. 
359 I address mereological issues that arise in Leibniz affirming a plurality of accidents in simple substances 
in Chapter 4.   
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account—where substances are the principle quod efficient causes or the efficient causal 
agents—is consistent with the efficacious-appetition account once appetitions are 
understood as principle quo efficient causes.    
3.3 The Efficacious-Substance Interpretation and Determinism, Intelligibility, and 
PSR 
The principle quod/quo distinction helps the efficacious-appetition account avoid the 
Multiplication of Agents objection and also shows that in fact the efficacious-substance 
account is consistent with the efficacious-appetition account, when understood in a 
certain way— substances are principle quod efficient causes and appetitions are principle 
quo efficient causes.  It still remains to be seen whether affirming that substances are 
principle quod efficient causes and appetitions are principle quo efficient causes is 
consistent with Leibniz’s determinism and able to meet his strictures on explanation— 
Leibniz’s principle of intelligibility and his principle of sufficient reason.  I argue that it 
is consistent and that it can meet his strictures.   
Recall that Leibniz defines change as “nothing but a complex of two states which 
are immediate and opposite to each other, together with a force or reason for the change, 
which reason itself is a quality.”  There is nothing in this definition that requires the force 
or reason for the change—the appetition in the case of monadic change—to be the 
efficient causal agent.  Instead, this definition is consistent with the monad being the 
agent.  A substance S in state N is the efficient causal agent that produces state N+1 and 
does so through its appetitions in N, which constitute its force or reason for N+1.  In 
other words, the powers by which the substance produces N+1.   
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This account is consistent with Leibniz’s determinism as well.  A substance in 
state N can only act through the powers it has in state N, where such powers are its 
appetitions for future perceptions.  A substance in state N will not produce the 
perceptions which make up N+1 unless it has appetitions for the perceptions which make 
up N+1.  This is so because appetitions are appetitions for particular, specific 
perceptions, rather than random perceptions.  It’s worth noting a similarity between 
scholastic powers and Leibnizian appetitions.  Fire produces heat in its patients through 
fires active powers, rather than coldness or wetness, because fire’s powers are powers for 
heat.  That is, fire is determined to certain kinds of effects because of its powers.   
This account is also consistent with Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason.  The 
reason s changes from N to N+1 instead of N’+1 is because s had the appetitions for the 
perceptions of N+1 instead of N’+1.   That is, s at N had the powers to produce the 
accidents which makeup N+1, as opposed to N’+1.  Finally, this account also is 
consistent with Leibniz’s requirement that change be intelligible.  A substance’s changing 
from N to N+1 is still explained by the substance’s nature.  Further, in agreement with 
Rutherford, it’s the substance’s nature as modified.  For a substance s’s appetitions when 
s is in state N are modifications of s.  This does not require that such appetitions are the 
efficient causal agents that produce the accidents which makeup N+1, however.  Instead, 
it’s worth repeating that the appetitions are the powers by which s causes N+1.   
3.3.1 Scholastic Substance Causation and Determinism 
In further support of my argument that Leibnizian substances, rather than their accidents, 
can be principle quod efficient causes while deterministically producing their effects, 
scholastics such as Suarez also held that—with the exception of the free actions of 
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intelligent substances—substances which were principle quod efficient causes acted 
necessarily in some sense.  For a digression, I take a closer look at scholastic accounts of 
how effects could be necessitated by their causes when their principle quod causes are 
substances.  I’ll focus primarily on Suarez’s account but note that his account was just a 
more developed version of a broadly scholastic-Aristotelian account.  
Before I do so, however, there are five caveats.  First, as mentioned earlier, 
Suarez is not strictly a substance-causal theorist but rather a res causal theorist.  That is, 
any res—be it a substance or a real quality—could be a principle quod efficient cause.  
Given that Leibniz denied real qualities, I’ll focus only cases where the substance rather 
than a real quality is a principle quod efficient cause.  The second caveat is that when the 
effect is due to a free action of an intelligent substance, the cause does not act necessarily.  
However, in all other natural efficient causation, such as fire heating water, the causes act 
necessarily.  Thus, I’ll further restrict my focus to cases where the substances are non-
intelligent.360  A third caveat, related to the second, is that Scholastics such as Suarez 
restricted causes that always act necessarily to corporeal substances— substances which 
do not exist, speaking strictly, in Leibniz’s ontology.    
A fourth caveat is that the standard scholastic cases of efficient causes that act 
necessarily are cases of transeunt efficient causation between distinct created 
substances.361  Leibniz, of course, denies any transeunt efficient causation between 
                                                
360 Suarez writes, “For the present, we are asserting merely that every faculty which altogether lacks the use 
of reason exercises its operations by natural necessity.”  DM 19.1.12 
361 Jeff Brower has argued that according to scholastics, any deterministic immanent causation would in 
fact be formal causation and they would thus argue that all monadic change is also due to formal causation.  
This might be troublesome for my account if a substance s’s formally causing some accident A entailed that 
s did not efficiently cause A.  However, as Robert Pasnau has shown, many scholastics also held that formal 
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created substances and instead holds that all creaturely efficient causation is immanent 
causation within a substance.  The fourth caveat points to a fifth.  The principle quod 
causes—substances—which act of necessity in scholastic cases have powers which often 
need an external excitation for the substance to act.  Leibnizian powers, in contrast, act 
unless impeded.362  In spite of these five caveats, the scholastic account of principle quod 
efficient causes that act necessarily and are also substances provides Leibniz with ample 
reasons to also affirm deterministic substance causation.  The reasons hinge mainly on 
the principle quod/quo distinction and God’s concurrence.  I’ll first explain the scholastic 
account and then show it sheds light on how, with some important revisions, Leibnizian 
substance causation can also be deterministic.   
Suarez’s DM 19.1 is dedicated to efficient causes that act necessarily.  Suarez 
writes, “among created causes there are many that operate necessarily once all the things 
they require for operating are present.”363  For much of DM 19.1, Suarez articulates just 
what he takes those requirements to be, ultimately concluding that there are nine: 
For any agent substance sA and any accident A, sA efficiently causes A if and only if: 
(i) sA has the full and sufficient power to act;364   
(ii) There is a patient substance sP such that sP is susceptible and sufficient close 
to sA;365   
(iii) Any medium between sA and sP is suitable for and susceptible to sA’s 
action;366   
                                                
causes efficiently cause accidents.  See Robert Pasnau, “Form, Substance, and Mechanism,” Philosophical 
Review 113, no. 1 (2004): 31-88.  On this understanding, Leibnizian immanent efficient causes are also 
formal causes, but their being formal causes does not entail that they are not efficient causes.  For a recent 
paper arguing that all secondary causation is formal but not efficient causation, see Sukjai Lee, “Leibniz on 
Divine Concurrence,” Philosophical Review 113, no. 2 (2004): 203-48.  
362 I clarify this difference shortly. 
363 DM 19.1.1 




(iv) There is nothing impeding the action with an equal power to resist it;367  
(v) The patient sP does not already have the accident that sA would cause;368  
(vi) Any action required beforehand which is presupposed for sA’s causing A in sP 
is already completed;369  
(vii) sA is not a free cause;370  
(viii) God concurs with sA’s causing A;371  
(ix) sA is not indifferent with respect to more than one effect;372  
 
It’s important to address the relation between conditions (i) through (ix) and some agent 
substance sA efficiently causing an accident A in a patient substance sP.  Conditions (i) 
through (ix), according to Suarez, constitute the total cause.  Further, there is a necessary 
relation between the total cause and sA’s efficiently causing A in sP.  The total cause 
necessitates the effect.373  Whatever the type of necessity is involved, it is quite strong.374  
As Suarez writes, “Still, if the matter is considered carefully, even God himself does not 
seem to be able to bring it about in the composed sense (as they call it) that a cause which 
                                                
367 Ibid. 
368 This fifth condition rules out causal overdetermination.   
369 DM 19.1.3 
370 DM 19.1.4 
371 Ibid. 
372 DM 19.1.5.  Suarez argues that the ninth condition is in fact entailed by or equivalent to one of the 
previous conditions.  While Suarez doesn’t specify which condition, precisely, entails or is equivalent, 
textual evidence points in favor of it being the seventh condition.  He writes, “Nonetheless, one should, it 
seems, reply that this [ninth] condition has rather to be traced back to one of the conditions posited above; 
that is, to the absence of one of those conditions.  For the condition of indifference, taken just by itself, is in 
some sense incompatible with the proper determination of natural agents, since it is proper for them to be 
determined to one effect.  How, then, can they have this indifference of themselves.”  See DM 19.1.6 
373 I’m less concerned with the exact type of necessity involved and more concerned with establishing that 
there is some sort of necessity involved between requirements (i) – (ix) and sA’s efficiently causing A in sP.  
Given that what is at issue is the particular effects of particular substances, natural necessity is the most 
likely candidate.  However, Walter Ott has recently argued that the necessity is in fact logical necessity.  
That is, the effect is logically necessitated by the Total cause because it is a contradiction to posit the Total 
cause and deny the effect.  Ott writes, “Now, once the requisite active an passive powers are in place, 
‘natural causes cannot prevent the action of a necessary agent, since they do not have the power to change 
the nature of things or to remove wholly intrinsic properties.’  Note what it would take for a natural cause 
to prevent the action of such an agent, i.e., to change the course of events: one would have to alter its 
intrinsic properties.  In other words, one would have to bring it about that fire was not fire.”  See Walter 
Ott, “Causations, Intentionality, and the Case for Occasionalism,” Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philosophie, 90 
(2008): 175. 
374 Assuming a difference between logical and physical or natural necessity, where the former is stronger 
than the latter.   
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by its nature acts necessarily should fail to act once all the things required for acting have 
been posited.”375  So the only way for sA to not efficiently cause A in sP would be for one 
of (i) – (ix) is not the case.  Not even God could bring prevent sA’s efficiently causing A 
in sP if (i) – (ix) are in place.376  God would have to remove one of (i) – (ix).377   
For an example of Suarezian substance causation where the substance acts of 
necessity, take the example of fire burning some wood.378  Fire—the agent substance—
has the power to burn some wood— the patient substance.  Fire burns the wood via its 
heat—a causal power of fire.  When the fire is appropriately situated near some wood, 
either through direct contact or with the right kind of medium between the fire and the 
wood—such as air, the fire will burn the wood as long as God concurs and no other 
substances impedes the fires burning the wood, such as a bucket of water spilled on the 
fire.  So in this case, the fire—a substance—produces an effect—burnt wood—of 
necessity.  While Suarez does not use the exact term, if conditions (i) through (ix) obtain, 
the fire is determined to burn the wood.   
It’s again important to stress the principle quod efficient cause—the efficient 
causal agent—is the fire, a substance in Suarez’s metaphysics.  Yet a power of the 
substance—specifically, the fire’s heat—plays a crucial part in explaining the substance’s 
efficiently causing the wood’s being burnt.  The fire’s powers also play a crucial part of 
the explanation for why the fire’s efficiently burning the wood is necessitated.  The fire’s 
                                                
375 DM 19.1.14.   
376 Suarez writes, “Still, if the matter is considered carefully, even God himself does not seem to be able to 
bring it about in the composed sense (as they call it) that a cause which by its nature acts necessarily should 
fail to act once all the things required for acting have been posited.”  (DM 19.1.14) 
377 Suarez continues, “Therefore, it is not the case that God brought it about that the fire did not act even 
though all the required things had been posited; instead, he removed one of those things.”  (DM 19.1.14) 
378 I use fire because it is a frequent example of Suarez’s.   
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powers are one of the necessary ingredients in the total cause.  It’s just that the fire’s 
powers are not efficient causal agents.  Instead, they are the agent’s powers.  
3.3.2 Deterministic Leibnizian Substance Causation 
I argue that if the scholastics can consistently hold that substances rather than their 
powers are the efficient causal agents that act of necessity, then Leibniz can consistently 
hold that monads are efficient causal agents which deterministically cause their effects.379  
There are, of course, important differences between the deterministic efficient causal 
activity of Leibnizian and scholastic substances.  In Leibniz’s metaphysics, the efficient 
causal agents are immaterial monads, which immanently efficiently cause their 
accidents—perceptions and appetitions—by means of their derivative powers— 
appetitions.  So the Leibnizian model is going to differ in some important ways from the 
scholastic model.  For a start, Suarezian conditions (ii) and (iii) will not apply to 
Leibniz’s model.   
 Another important difference that calls for further elaboration concerns how a 
Leibnizian power would be impeded.  It’s easy to imagine cases of corporeal scholastic 
substances being impeded from exercising their causal powers.  Fire would be impeded 
from burning some wood if a different substance—such as some cold water—were 
splashed onto the wood.  However, Leibniz’s account is burdened with answering how an 
immaterial monad would be impeded from exercising its powers since it doesn’t causally 
interact with other created substances and is instead causally responsible for all its 
miraculous accidents.  Of course, God could impede such a power, say by withholding 
                                                
379 I address soon the type of necessity involved in deterministic monadic efficient causation as Leibniz is 
adamant throughout his writings that such deterministic monadic efficient causation is contingent in some 
sense. 
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his concurrence, in which case the impediment would be miraculous.  But more pertinent 
here are natural impediments. 
 To address this question, it’s worth first noting that according to Leibniz, a key 
difference between monadic powers and the powers of scholastic substances is that 
monadic powers always act unless impeded, rather than needing a stimulus of some sort: 
Active force differs from the mere power familiar to the schools, for the active 
power or faculty of the scholastics is nothing but a proximate principle of acting, 
which needs an external excitation or a stimulus, as it were, to be transferred into 
action.  Active force, in contrast, contains a certain act or entelechy and is thus 
midway between the faculty of acting and the act itself and involves a conatus, It 
is thus carried into action by itself and needs no help but only the removal of an 
impediment.380  
 
So a monad’s powers will always be exercised unless impeded.  But again, what impedes 
a monad’s powers?  Following Mark Kulstad, let’s draw a distinction between the overall 
derivative force of a substance s in state N and the individual derivative forces which 
makeup s’s state N.381  The individual derivative force which make up state N are s’s 
appetitions AN1, AN2, AN3, . . . , ANx.  Recall that appetitions are always appetitions for 
various accidents.  As causal powers, appetitions are powers for s to produce such 
accidents.   
Yet these appetitions frequently conflict.382  The perception PN1 which appetition 
AN1 is an appetition for will conflict with the perception PN2 which appetition AN2 is an 
appetition for.  How such appetitions conflict takes us into Leibniz’s metaphysics of final 
                                                
380 L 433. 
381 Mark Kulstad, “Appetition in the Philosophy of Leibniz,” Mathesis rationis: Festschrift für Heinrich 
Schepers (1990): 133-151. 
382 Leibniz writes, “Various perceptions and inclinations combine to produce a complete volition: it is the 
result of the conflict amongst them.”  (G.V.178: NE 192). 
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causation, a subject of much recent scholarly debate.383  As I do not need to take a stand 
in this paper, I will only canvas the options found in Leibniz’s writings and the secondary 
literature.  AN1 conflicts with AN2 if (i) the goodness of PN1 is greater or lesser than the 
goodness of PN2 or (ii) the apparent goodness of PN1 is greater or lesser than the apparent 
goodness of PN2.384  The goodness (or apparent goodness) of PN1 which is greater or 
lesser than the goodness (or apparent goodness) of PN2 is either (ia/iia) the goodness of s 
or (ib/iib) the goodness of the whole universe.385  So two or more appetitions conflict 
when they differ with respect to (i) or (ii) and one appetition will impede another when it 
is stronger than the other in terms of either (i) or (ii).  So what impedes an individual 
appetition is either God or a different appetition. 
The total derivative force of s in state N is the result of the outcome of the various 
conflicting appetitions which makeup N.  In a sense, the total force could be understood 
as an appetition or tendency for the next complete state N+1.  But the total force is made 
up of the individual appetitions and the result of the conflict between them, it would not 
be impeded by an individual appetition.  Rather, I suggest that the only thing that could 
impede the total derivative force of a monad—its tendency for the complete next state 
N+1—is God.386   
 
 
                                                
 
383 See Rutherford, “Laws and Powers in Leibniz,” 169-174 and “Leibniz on Spontaneity,” 166-174; 
Bolton, “Change in the Monad,” 175-196; Jorati, “Leibniz on Causation –Part 2,” 398-405. 
384 Following Rutherford, call (i) the “natural” teleology view and (ii) the “desire” teleology view.   
385 Rutherford explains both of these views in greater depth in “Laws and Powers in Leibniz,” 170. 
386 With Kulstad, I think there is a strong and intended analogy in Leibniz’s metaphysics between the 
conflicting appetitions of a monad and the conflicting forces of a physical body.  See Kulstad, 139. 
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3.3.3 The necessity involved in Leibnizian Deterministic Substance Causation 
There is one last issue that needs to be addressed—  the necessity involved in Leibnizian 
deterministic substance causation.  I address this because in the account of scholastic 
causal necessitation I presented above, some scholars, such as Walter Ott, have argued 
that there is a logically necessary connection between the total cause and its effect, even 
in the many cases where the principle quod efficient cause is a substance.  Leibniz, 
however, argues throughout his career that created substances deterministically but 
contingently produce their effects.   
I address this with some irony, since as we’ve seen throughout this paper, the 
efficacious-substance interpretation has been challenged for being incompatible with 
whatever sort of necessity is required for deterministic causation.  Yet if the account of 
scholastic substances acting of necessity that I presented above is accurate and if the 
scholastic account sheds light on how Leibnizian substance causation can be 
deterministic, then prima facie it saddles Leibnizian substance causation with a type of 
necessity that he would deem too strong for deterministic substance causation— logical 
necessity.   
This worry is misplaced, however, once one takes into account the distinction 
between the total cause and the principle quod efficient cause.  Recall that Suarez writes, 
“Still, if the matter is considered carefully, even God himself does not seem to be able to 
bring it about in the composed sense (as they call it) that a cause which by its nature acts 
necessarily should fail to act once all the things required for acting have been posited.”  
According to Suarez, a substance will act necessarily or produce an effect when all the 
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things required for acting have been posited, where all the things required for acting are 
all of the elements of the total cause, instead of just the principle quod efficient cause.   
Leibniz’s distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity is important 
here, for what Leibniz specifically denies is that what is determined is absolutely 
necessary.387  Some truth is absolutely necessary when its denial entails a contradiction.  
A created substance s being in state N would not be absolutely necessary on Leibniz’s 
account, as the denial of the proposition “s is in state N” does not entail a contradiction.  
The claim “s’s being in state N efficiently causes the accidents which makeup state N+1” 
is also not absolutely necessary, as it’s denial would not entail a contradiction.  However, 
Leibniz would likely agree with Suarez, however, that there is a contradiction in any 
conjunction affirming a total cause but denying the effect of the total cause.  For the total 
cause is not limited to the created principle quod efficient cause modified in some way 
but also God or God’s concurrence and the laws of monadic change.388  
So Leibniz’s account of deterministic causation differs in some important ways 
from the scholastics’ accounts.  Yet, none of these differences entail that Leibniz can’t 
consistently hold that substances deterministically produce their effects while scholastics 
can hold that substances deterministically produce their effects.  Any objection to 
Leibniz’s account would affect scholastic accounts as well.  However, even if there are 
serious reasons to doubt the plausibility of deterministic substance causation, it’s valuable 
to at least document the historical precedent to the interpretation I’m defending.   
                                                
387 See (G IV.436-7: AG 45-6), (G III.400-1: AG 194), (G V.161: NE 176), (G VI.163-4: NE 178-9), (G 
VI.123-4: T 37), (G VI.131-2: T 53), (G VI.341-2: T 381), and (G VI.351: T 395). 
388 But the necessity involved when the effect follows from the Total Cause is hypothetical, rather than 
absolute necessity.   I note further that my account of contingent but deterministic causation differs little 
from Rutherford’s own account.  See Rutherford, “Laws and Powers in Leibniz,” 165-66. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued for a nuanced interpretation of the Efficacious-Substance 
Interpretation-- account of the causal relata in creaturely causation in Leibniz’s 
metaphysics.  This interpretation has the advantage of having historical precedent in 
many Scholastic accounts of efficient causation.  It is also supported by numerous 
passages in Leibniz’s writings.  More importantly, the interpretation I defended 
overcomes a serious challenge to the efficacious-appetition interpretation— Locke’s 
“Multiplication of Agents” objection.  Finally, the interpretation I defended showed how 
appetitions play an important explanatory role in monadic change and is consistent with 
appetitions determining monadic change even though such appetitions are not efficient 
















Appendix A.  Leibniz’s Missing Overdetermination Premise 
In at least two passages written early in his career, Leibniz argues that created substances 
are not transeunt causes because everything that happens to a created substance is the 
result of its own notion or complete concept.  In “Primary Truths”, Leibniz writes: 
Strictly speaking, one can say that no created substance exerts a metaphysical 
action or influx on any other thing.  For, not to mention the fact that one cannot 
explain how something can pass from one thing into the substance of another, we 
have already shown that from the notion of each and every thing follows all of its 
future states.389 (Emphasis added) 
 
In chapter 14 of his Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz also writes: 
We could therefore say in some way and properly speaking, though not in 
accordance with common usage, that one particular substance never acts upon 
another particular substance nor is acted upon by it, if we consider that what 
happens to each is solely a consequence of its complete idea or notion alone, since 
this idea already contains all its predicates or events and expresses the whole 
universe.390  (Emphasis added) 
 
Leibniz gives same argument against creaturely transeunt causation in both passages.  
Using the wording from the first passage, a first-pass of the argument can be expressed 
thus: 
(P)  From the notion of each and every thing follows all of its future states. 
(C)  So, no created substance exerts a metaphysical action or influx on any other  
  thing. 
 
Scholars have rightfully pointed out that (P) alone is not sufficient for (C).  Even if all of 
a substance’s future states follow from it’s complete concept— if the substance’s 
                                                
389 AG 33. 
390 (G IV.439: AG 47)   
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complete concept is the sufficient cause of all the substance’s future states, it is still 
possible that some states are also caused by different substances.391  To make the move 
from (P) to (C), Leibniz needs a further premise (P2) ruling out causal 
overdetermination.392  Unfortunately, Leibniz never supplies an argument for (P2) in the 
vicinity of the above passages, nor does he even state (P2).  Worse, an argument for (P2) 
in Leibniz’s corpus seems to be lacking.393  In this appendix, I shall argue that given 
Leibniz’s transference condition, Leibniz does have reasons to rule out causal 
overdetermination of the sort needed to allow him to make the move from (P) to (C). 
Before I present the argument, some justification is needed for why one should 
even bother with Leibniz’s argument from (P) to (C), as several objections can be raised.  
It is doubtful that Leibniz ever held the view that the complete concept does any efficient 
                                                
391 See Donovan Cox, “Leibniz on Divine Causation: Creation, Miracles, and the Continual Fulgurations,” 
Studia Leibnitiana, (2002): 189; Mark Kulstad and Laurence Carlin, "Leibniz's Philosophy of Mind", The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/leibniz-mind/; Nicholas Jolley, “Leibniz: Truth, 
Knowledge, and Metaphysics,” in G.H.R. Parkinson edited, Routledge History of Philosophy, Volume IV, 
The Renaissance and Seventeenth-Century Rationalism, 382; Christia Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: It’s 
Origins and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 227-230; and R.C. Sleigh, Jr., 
Leibniz & Arnauld: A commentary on their Correspondence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 
144. 
392 Kulstad and Carlin write, “Even if conceptual considerations about substances were sufficient to explain 
their apparent causal activity, it does not seem to follow that substances do not interact—unless one is 
assuming that causal overdetermination is not a genuine possibility. Leibniz seems to be assuming just that, 
but without argument.”  See Ibid. 
393 Sleigh draws attention to one potential statement against causal overdetermination.  In a letter to 
Arnauld, Leibniz wrote, “Anything capable of having many causes is never a complete entity.”  (G II.72)  
However, in the context, Leibniz is discussing the causation of substances.  A substance—being a complete 
being—could not have multiple causes.  Yet that doesn’t allow Leibniz to make the further move that 
accidents can’t have multiple causes.  In his Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz writes, “Since this is so, we 
can say that the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete 
that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this 
notion is attributed.  An accident, on the other hand, is a being whose notion does not include everything 
that can be attributed to the subject to which the notion is attributed.”  See (G IV.432-3: AG 41) and Sleigh, 
144. 
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causal work.394  Even if the early Leibniz did hold such a view, the mature Leibniz did 
not.  Instead, the law-of-the-series—an active entity--is responsible for a substance’s 
states, as opposed to the complete concept or notion—a static entity.395  Further, the law-
of-the-series just is the substance.396  So the mature Leibniz held that the substance is 
responsible for all of its states, a thesis I soon unpack and which I’ll call the Spontaneity 
Thesis (ST).  Finally, the mature Leibniz didn’t conclude that created substances are not 
transeunt causes because of the Spontaneity Thesis.  Instead, the mature Leibniz reasoned 
to the Spontaneity Thesis in part because he argued that created substances cannot be 
transeunt causes, as addressed in chapters 2 and 3.397     
However, I argue that there are two reasons why it’s worth addressing whether 
Leibniz had reasons to deny causal overdetermination, allowing him to infer (C) from 
(P).  First, while the later Leibniz didn’t infer (C) from (P), he also never explicitly 
denied that you could make the inference.  Second, whether or not Leibniz had reasons to 
                                                
394 Rather than the complete concept being the efficient cause of the substance’s states, J.A. Cover argues 
that Leibniz is merely expressing in the formal mode something intimately tied to what Leibniz expresses 
in the material mode.  Cover writes, “What Leibniz expresses in the formal mode, as the thesis that every 
predicate true of a substance has a reason or foundation in its individual concept, is intimately tied to what 
he expresses in the material mode, as the thesis that each state of a substance has its causal origin in 
preceding states.”  A better understanding, then, is that the substance is the cause of its states, rather than 
the concept. See J.A. Cover, “Non-Basic Time and Reductive Strategies: Leibniz’s Theory of Time,” Stud. 
Hist. Phil. Sci., 28, No. 2 (1997): 308. 
395 Donald Rutherford addresses the progression of Leibniz’s thought away from the complete concept as 
expressive of the substance’s nature towards the law of the series.  See Donald Rutherford, Leibniz and the 
Rational Order of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 138-154. 
396 In this section, I rely on J.A. Cover and John O’Leary Hawthorne’s argument that the law of the series is 
the substance, rather than a component of the substance.  See J.A. Cover and John O’Leary-Hawthorne, 
Substance & Individuation in Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 214-226. 
397 For example, in his 1695 “A New System of Nature,” Leibniz writes, “Therefore, since I was forced to 
agree that it is not possible for the soul or any other true substance to receive something from without, 
except by divine omnipotence, I was led, little by little, to a view that surprised me, but which seems 
inevitable, and which in fact has very great advantages and rather considerable beauty.  That is, we must 
say that God originally created the soul (and any other real unity) in such a way that everything must arise 
for it from its own depths, through a perfect spontaneity relative to itself, and yet with a perfect conformity 
relative to external things.”  See (G IV.484: AG 143). 
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affirm or deny the possibility of causal overdetermination is a question worth pursuing on 
its own in a project whose central focus is Leibniz’s metaphysics of causation.  
Before laying out the argument, I should also remark about the methodological 
approach I adopt in this appendix.  In this appendix, more than any other part of the 
dissertation, I utilize “philosophical” history of philosophy.  As in other parts, my usage 
of “philosophical” history of philosophy is in the service of “exegetical” or “explanatory” 
history of philosophy.  I’m interested in whether or not Leibniz is justified in making an 
inference that he made in important writings of his early and mid-career— whether or not 
Leibniz can infer (C) from (P).  In Chapter 1, I distinguished three ways the historian of 
philosophy can see look for connections between premises in an argument by a historical 
figure such as Leibniz when Leibniz doesn’t explicitly offer the justification:  (i) by 
searching through Leibniz’s writings for theses he did explicitly defend which can link 
(P) to (C), even though Leibniz does not himself show that or even state that such theses 
link (P) and (C);  (ii) by looking broader at theses widely held by historical figures whom 
Leibniz was familiar with that could link (P) and (C) and which Leibniz would have no 
reason to reject; or (iii) by engaging in metaphysical reasoning oneself to rationally 
reconstruct a link between (P) and (C).  In this appendix, I help myself to (i) and (iii) in 
addressing if Leibniz has reasons to reject causal overdetermination, therefore providing 
him the missing premise that allows him to infer (C) from (P).  Since this rational 
reconstruction will go significantly beyond the text, I’ve dealt with this topic in an 
appendix to the chapter instead of the main body.   
 Thus, I’m going to proceed with the argument.  Further, I’m going to do so by 
actually offering an argument that allows Leibniz to get the denial of creaturely transeunt 
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causation from either the Spontaneity thesis (that I soon present) or (P).  In keeping with 
the overall focus on this dissertation, I’ll start with the Spontaneity thesis.  By assuming 
the Spontaneity Thesis, I will show that Leibniz has an argument he can give from his 
mature metaphysics to the denial of creaturely transeunt causation via reasons Leibniz 
had to deny overdetermination.  The argument, once given, can then be re-applied to the 
older argument that assumes (on some interpretations) that the complete concept is doing 
real causal work— the view that the complete concept is the genuine cause of all of a 
substance’s states.  So Leibniz has the resources to deny that creatures are transeunt 
causes from (P), even if the mature Leibniz believes (P) is false.  
I now turn to the argument.  First, as indicated above, given that the mature 
Leibniz likely did not hold that the complete concept of a created substance did any 
efficient causal work.  Instead, the created substance itself is the natural cause of all of its 
accidents.  Leibniz maintains this throughout his later writings.  For example, in his 1695 
“A New System of Nature,” he writes, “That is, we must say that God originally created 
the soul (and any other real unity) in such a way that everything must arise for it from its 
own depths, through a perfect spontaneity relative to itself, and yet with a perfect 
conformity relative to external things.”398  A few lines further, he elaborates, writing: 
For why should God be unable to give substance, from the beginning, a nature or 
an internal force that can produce in it, in an orderly way (as would happen in a 
spiritual or formal automaton, but free in the case where it has a share of reason), 
everything that will happen to it, that is, all the appearances or expressions it will 
have, without the help of any created being?399 
 
 
                                                
398 Ibid. 
399 (G IV.485: AG 144). 
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In his New Essays on Human Understanding, Leibniz continues to affirm the spontaneity 
of created substances, writing, “Anything which occurs in what is strictly a substance 
must be a case of action in the metaphysically rigorous sense of something which occurs 
in the substance spontaneously arising out [arrive] of its own depths.” (New Essays A vi, 
6, 210)  In his Theodicy, Leibniz also defends the thesis of creaturely spontaneity against 
the occasionalists and skeptics of the efficacy of creatures such as Bayle: 
Bayle asserts, for instance, that by purely philosophical meditations one can never 
attain to an established certainty that we are the efficient cause [la cause 
efficiente] of our volitions. But this is a point which I do not concede to him: for 
the establishment of this system demonstrates beyond a doubt that in the course of 
nature each substance is the sole cause of all its actions, and that it is free of all 
physical influence from every other substance, save the customary cooperation of 
God.400  
 
Therefore, it’s worth replacing (P) with a different premise stating what I’ll call Leibniz’s 
“Spontaneity Thesis” (ST): 
For any created substance s and any accident A, if A naturally inheres in s and it is 
not the case that A initially inhered in s then s is the natural sufficient efficient 
cause of A’s inhering in s.   
 
I draw attention to five features of the Spontaneity Thesis.  First, the Spontaneity Thesis 
applies—as indicated—only to non-initial accidents.  I formulate the Spontaneity Thesis 
that way in order to leave open the possibility that either God is the efficient cause of 
initial accidents (upon the first moment of the creation of a substance).401  I note, 
                                                










however, that the Spontaneity Thesis is consistent with the created substance efficiently 
causing initial accidents (on some accounts where substantial forms are like functions, 
where God created the function and supplies the first argument but the substance/function 
is what outputs the state and thus efficiently causes the first state).402  Second, and 
relatedly, I include the term “natural” in the antecedent to focus on non-miraculous 
accidents.  For the purposes of this appendix, I understand a natural accident as a non-
initial accident that inheres in a substance and is not solely caused by God.   
Third, note the term “sufficient” in the Spontaneity Thesis, where s is a sufficient 
efficient cause of A’s inhering in s.  By sufficient, I mean what many early moderns and 
Scholastics meant by a “total” cause, something that is contrasted with a “partial” cause.  
Take two persons pulling a boat by rope, where each person is individually too weak but 
together the two are jointly strong enough to pull the boat.  Each person individually is 
then a partial cause of the boat’s motion.  The two persons taken together are a sufficient 
cause of the boat’s motion.   This notion of “sufficient” is what contemporary 
                                                
401 However, ST conjoined with other theses from Leibniz’s metaphysics is inconsistent with a different 
created substance causing a non-initial accident in s.  The two other considerations are that first, Leibniz 
holds that created substances can only come into existence through creation by God.  Second, we saw 
Leibniz’s claims in chapter 2 that created substances must have some accident or other.  So God cannot 
create a substance without that substance having some accident or other.  If God cannot create a substance 
without that substance having some accident or other, then we must address what caused the accident.  
There are three options:  God, s, or a different created substance s’.  The most obvious answer is God but 
the second option, s, also has merit.  God could create s and s cause A.  This would not be a temporal 
progression.  Instead, s is prior in nature to A.  So it is not the case that s exist at some time without having 
an accident inhere in it.   
But suppose that s’ cause A to inhere in s, where A is s’s first accident.  Given the thesis that a 
substance must have some accident or other, s’ cannot cause A to inhere in s at a time t’ later than the first 
moment of s’s existence.  So we have God creating a substance s and a different substance s’ causing A to 
inhere in s at the moment of s’s creation.  I don’t think this picture works. S’ has to have something to work 
with to cause A to inhere in s, but that presupposes that s exist prior to s’ causing A to inhere in s.  That is, 
if s’ can cause A to exist in s only if s exists.  But prior to the creation of s, s does not exist.   
402 Therefore, this option is consistent with a model of the substance proposed and defended at length by 
J.A. Cover and John-O’Leary Hawthorne.  See Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, Substance & Individuation 
in Leibniz, 214-252. 
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philosophers have in mind when discussing overdetermination.  Overdetermination 
occurs when there are two causes sufficient for some effect.  I’ll specify more precisely 
the sort of overdetermination at play soon.    
 Fourth, I use the term “naturally” in the consequent in order to make the 
Spontaneity Thesis consistent with divine concurrence.  Divine concurrentists such as 
Leibniz hold that God is also an efficient cause of accidents inhering in created 
substances.403  Thus, the Spontaneity Thesis as expressed is the thesis that the created 
substance is the only created cause needed for an accident to inhere in itself.     
Fifth and finally, I note that the Spontaneity Thesis itself is in fact consistent with 
a different created substance s2 also efficiently causing A to inhere in s1.404  That is, while 
ST holds that a substance causes all its natural non-initial accidents, those accidents could 
also be caused by a different created substance as well.  Thus, the Spontaneity Thesis 
needs a premise against overdetermination, seemingly lacking in Leibniz’s corpus, if it’s 
to get (C) – just as the first formulation of (P) needs a premise against overdetermination 
as well.   
I’ll replace (P) with the Spontaneity Thesis then as the first premise of the 
argument.  In keeping with the theme of my dissertation, I’ll replace or revise (C) with a 
conclusion denying creaturely transeunt causation.  The denial of creaturely transeunt 
causation can be expressed as follows:  
                                                
403 The details are complicated and go beyond the topic of this appendix, so I shall bracket the topic for 
now.  I note that in this appendix, I am concerned primarily with the possibility of creaturely causal 
overdetermination, where two or more created substances are sufficient causes of the same effect.   
404 ST is in fact consistent with a different created substance causing an initial or non-initial accident.  I’ve 
presented problems with a created substance causing an initial created accident in another substance in a 
footnote above.   
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For any created substance s and any accident A, if A inheres in s then it is not the 
case that there is some created substance s’ such that s is not identical to s’ and s’ 
is an efficient cause of A’s inhering in s.405   
 
As expressed above, Leibniz could only get the denial of creaturely transeunt causation 
from the Spontaneity Thesis if there were an additional premise against 
overdetermination.  Before I get to the main argument, I need to specify exactly what 
kind of overdetermination Leibniz would have to rule out, as there are several kinds of 
overdetermination.  Specifically, Leibniz needs a premise against what Eric Funkhouser 
calls independent causal overdetermination or what other philosophers call coincident 
overdetermination.406  As an example of independent causal overdetermination, take two 
assassins who both shoot the same person at the same time in the heart, where each bullet 
individually is sufficient for the person’s death.  The person’s death, event E, is then 
overdetermined.  Three features of E make E an effect that is independently 
overdetermined.  First, both assassins or assassins’ shootings are sufficient for E.  Both 
bullets struck the heart in such a way that the person would have died instantly without 
the other bullet.  This is in contrast to a scenario in which the assassins or assassins’ 
shootings are jointly sufficient and individually necessary but not individually sufficient, 
where, say, each assassin individually would seriously harm but not kill the person.   
 Second, both causes of E are distinct from each other.  This needs little 
elaboration.  Assassin A1 is not numerically identical to Assassin A2.  Third, both causes 
of E are independent of each other.  I don’t mean that the assassins have different 
                                                
405 I note that this denial of creaturely transeunt efficient causation applies to both initial and non-initial 
accidents. 
406 Eric Funkhouse, “Three Varieties of Causal Overdetermination,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 
(2002): 335-351. 
 193 
employers.  Instead, neither assassin or assassin’s shooting—as a cause—was necessary 
for the existence of the other cause.  This is best understood in contrast with certain types 
of non-independent and non-coincident overdetermination entailed by certain views on 
mental causation where two sufficient causes are distinct but dependent on each other.407  
Take a multiply realizable mental state M2 that has as a sufficient cause the previous 
mental state M1.  On some understandings of the relation between the mental and the 
physical, M2 also has as a sufficient cause the brain state B1, where B1 is distinct from M1.  
However, while M1 and B1 are distinct, M1 is dependent on B1.  That is, the token mental 
state M1 cannot exist without the token brain state B1.  Thus, in contrast to the assassins, 
M1 and B1 are non-coincident/non-independent overdeterminers of M2. 
 Given that what is at issue in the argument from the Spontaneity Thesis to the 
denial of creaturely transeunt causation is whether one created substance could be the 
efficient cause of an accident in another, the type of overdetermination ruled out then 
needs to be independent causal overdetermination, where there cannot be two sufficient, 
distinct, and independent causes (in this case created substances) of an accident inhering 
in a created substance.  So what reason(s) would Leibniz have to rule out 
overdetermination of that sort?  Prima facie, Leibniz has no good reasons, nor does 
anyone else.  Non-independent/non-coincident overdetermination is at least initially 
problematic, given that it would be widespread and systematic.  Appealing to one 
understanding of Ockham’s razor, if there is a theory requiring lawful overdetermination 
of event type E and a theory that doesn’t require lawful overdetermination of event type 
                                                
407 This is a view of mental causation criticized by Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument.  Kim gives 
this argument in several publications, including Jaegwon Kim, “Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory 
Confusion,” Philosophical Perspectives 3(1989): 77-108.  
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E, the latter theory is to be preferred to the extent that it posits less sufficient causes of 
the same effect.  But coincident/independent overdetermination is not systematic and 
widespread in that way.  Why couldn’t two assassins overdetermine E where E is the 
person’s death?  Ted Sider brings up a reason to rule out such independent 
overdetermination: 
Metaphysical objection:  overdetermination is metaphysically incoherent.  Here is 
a picture.  Causation is a kind of fluid divided among the potential causes of an 
effect.  If one potential cause acts to produce an effect, that fluid is used up, and 
no other potential cause can act.  Atoms causing the shattering of a window would 
use up the available causal fluid, leaving none of the baseball composed of those 
atoms.408  
 
But Sider rightly dismisses such a reason, writing, “This, of course, is a bad picture.  It 
takes seriously a view of causation that no one accepts.”409  I agree with Sider that the 
picture above is a picture of a theory no one accepts.  However, with some revisions, a 
similar picture can be developed that does capture how Leibniz understood creaturely 
transeunt causation.410  I grant that it is a mistake to think that when one cause C1 causes 
an effect E in a patient substance P, C1 drains or uses up all the causal fluid so that the 
other causes C2, C3, . . . , CN no longer have any causal fluid to give.  However, keeping 
the fluid analogy, I argue that one should think of P as a container.411  When C1 causes E 
in P, if C1 is a sufficient cause of E in P, then P is filled.  So while C2, C3, . . . , CN may 
have fluid to give, they can’t give it to P because P is already full.   
                                                
408 Theodore Sider, “What’s So Bad About Overdetermination?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 67 (2003): 719-726. 
409 Ibid. 
410 Additionally, the picture I develop captures how many contemporary metaphysicians understand 
causation, as I show in the final section of this appendix.   
411 Jonathan Jacobs first introduces the analogy of effects with containers.  See Jonathan D. Jacobs, “Causal 
Powers: A Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysic” (PhD diss., Indiana University, 2007), 29-30. 
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The above picture fits in with Leibniz’s understanding of creaturely transeunt 
causation given his transference condition for such causation.  As I argued in chapter 2, 
in spite of strongly worded denials from scholastics, Leibniz thought that if it were 
possible for a created agent substance to transeuntly produce an accident in a distinct 
patient substance, such causation would have to consist in the transference of the accident 
from the agent to the patient.412  Leibniz, using the language of figures such as Suarez, 
thought such causation—if possible—would have to consist in a literal “flow” or “influx” 
from the agent to the patient.  In other places, he describes it as an accident “passing” 413 
from one subject to another or “detaching” from the agent.414 The patient substance 
receives the effect—the accident—that the agent transfers.415  This gives Leibniz a reason 
to rule out causal overdetermination at least in cases where a created substance produces 
an accident in a patient, where such production consists in transference.  If a created 
substance s1 produces the token accident A in s2 and s1 is a sufficient cause of A’s 
                                                
412 See, for example, (G IV.498-500: L 459-60). 
413 Leibniz of course dismisses the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation because he thinks such 
passing is not possible, but the argument reveals that he thinks such passing is necessary if creaturely 
transeunt causation is possible, as I argue in Chapter 2.  Leibniz writes, “I am not surprised that you 
encounter insurmountable problems when you seem to be entertaining something as inconceivable as an 
accident’s passing from one subject to another; but I see no reason why we have to suppose such a thing.  It 
is almost as strange as the Scholastics’ notion of accidents which are not in any subject; though they are 
careful to attribute theirs solely to the miraculous workings of divine omnipotence.”  See (G V. 208: NE 
224).  See also L 269.   
414 Leibniz writes, “Monads have no windows, through which anything could come in or go out. And 
accidents cannot detach themselves and stroll about outside of substances, as the Scholastics' sensible 
species used to; so neither substance nor accident can come into a monad from outside”  See (G VI.607-8: 
AG 214).   
415 Leibniz does not think created substances can be acted on because, in part, he doesn’t think such created 
substances can “receive” accidents from other created substances.  But this shows that Leibniz thinks such 
“receiving” is a necessary condition for creaturely transeunt causation.  Leibniz writes, “Further, the action 
of one substance upon another is not an emission or a transplanting of some entity, as is commonly 
supposed; and it can be understood reasonably only in the way just shown.  It is true that we can easily 
conceive of both the emission and the reception of the parts in matter and can in this way reasonably 
explain all the phenomena of physics mechanically.  But since material mass is not a substance, it is clear 
that the action of substance itself can be only what I have just described.”  See (G IV.498-9: L 459).  See 
also (G IV.432-3: AG 58).   
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inhering in s2, then while s3, s4, . . . , sn may have accidents of the same type as A to give 
to s2, s2 already has A and so there is no “room” left. 
 A related analogy is to compare causation to work, a view defended by Ned Hall, 
amongst others.416  Jonathan Jacobs presents reasons to hold that the work view of 
causation doesn’t allow overdetermination as described above: 
On the causal work analogy, if I did the full amount of work required to get 
something done, there’s simply no work left for you to do.  And if you contribute 
work, either I did less than I otherwise would have, or we finished the task more 
quickly, or we produced something better than I would have if you hadn’t 
contributed your work.417 
 
It’s fair to attribute such an understanding of efficient causation in general to Leibniz.  
Recall, as we saw in Chapter 1, that the efficient cause, for Leibniz, is the “active 
cause”418 and is the cause which produces.419  Take two created substances s1 and s2 
which are hot rods and a third created substance s3 which is a pan of water to be heated.  
On the transference understanding of creaturely transeunt causation, if s1 causes a change 
in s3, say by heating s3 to 200F, s1 does so by transferring a number of accidents to s3.  If 
s1 is the sufficient cause of s3’s being 200F, then there’s nothing left for s2 to do.  If s2 
were also a cause, then, as Jacobs argues, either s1 transmits less, or if s1 transmits the 
same amount, then s3 heats up to 200F quicker or s3 heats up to a hotter temperature.   
 The above arguments give Leibniz reasons to argue that an effect which is 
transeuntly caused by a creature could not be causally overdetermined, whereby causally 
                                                
416 Ned Hall, “Two Concepts of Causation,” in J. Collins ed. Causation and Counterfactuals (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2004). 
417 See Jacobs, “Causal Powers: A Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysic,” 29-30. 
418 This is how Leibniz defines the efficient cause in his Table of Definitions, as we saw in Chapter 1.  
Leibniz writes, “efficiens est causa activa.”  C 472.  See also A.VI.2.490. 
419 (G V.211: NE 228). 
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overdetermined, I mean independently causally overdetermined.  Let “CTEC” stand for 
“Creaturely Transeunt Efficient Causation” and “COD” stand for “Causal 
Overdetermination”:  
(1) If CTEC then Transference. 
(2) If Transference then ~COD. 
(3) So, if CTEC then ~COD. 
 
With the argument above, Leibniz now has the resources to get the denial of Creaturely 
Transeunt Efficient Causation from the Spontaneity Thesis.  Suppose that the Spontaneity 
Thesis is the case.  If the Spontaneity Thesis is true, then for any created substance s1, s1 
is the sufficient efficient cause of all of s1’s non-initial natural accidents.  So if A inheres 
in s1 and A is a non-initial natural accident of s1, then s1 is the sufficient natural efficient 
cause of A.  But if the Spontaneity Thesis is true, and so s1 is the sufficient natural 
efficient cause of all of it’s non-initial naturally inhering accidents, then it cannot also be 
the case that some created substance s2, not identical to s1, is also the sufficient efficient 
of at least some of s1’s non-initial naturally inhering accidents.  For if s2 were to 
sufficiently efficiently cause some of s1’s non-initial naturally inhering accidents, then as 
that is a case of creaturely transeunt causation and the effect of such causation —given 
transference—could not be overdetermined, s1 could not also be the cause of the 
accident’s that s2 causes to inhere in s1.  That is, if s1 were to also to sufficiently 
efficiently cause the accidents that s2 causes, then that would be independent causal 
overdetermination, which can’t happen given creaturely transeunt causation, as I argue.   
So for any case of the creaturely transeunt causation of an accident, where the cause is a 
sufficient cause, that accident cannot also be efficiently caused by the patient substance.  
Leibniz now has reasons to argue from Creaturely Transeunt Efficient Causation to the 
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denial of the Spontaneity Thesis.  But if Leibniz can argue from creaturely transeunt 
causation to the denial of the Spontaneity Thesis, then Leibniz can also argue from the 
Spontaneity Thesis to the denial of creaturely transeunt causation via contraposition.  
Thus, Leibniz has a way to argue from the Spontaneity Thesis to the denial of creaturely 
transeunt causation, with a premise against overdetermination as the link.420   
Further, on the Spontaneity Thesis—in which case for any created substance s1, s1 
is the sufficient cause of all of its non-initial natural accidents, then s2 could not even be a 
partial cause of A’s inhering in s1.  Recall the work analogy:  If s1 does all the work 
needed, then there is no work left for s2 to do.  Suppose s1 is a pan of water.  If s1 
sufficiently causes itself to heat up to 200F, s2—a hot rod—could not also be an cause of 
s1’s heating up.  Given transference, s2 would heat s1 by transferring heat from itself to s1.  
But if s2 were to partially cause s1 to heat up by s2’s transmitting heat from itself to s1, 
then either:  (i) s2 caused s1 to heat up quicker than it would have in the absence of s2; (ii) 
in the absence of s2, s1 would have reached a lower temperature.  With respect to (ii), s1 
                                                
420 It’s worth presenting the argument in a more formal manner.  Below is one way the argument could be 
developed:   
 
(1) CTEC  ~COD.  [Premise] 
(2) If ~COD, then not (CTEC and ST) [Implication of ~COD] 
(3) So, if CTEC then not CTEC and ST. [HS 1 and 2] 
(4) Suppose CTEC. 
a. So, ~COD.  [MP 1 and 4] 
b. So, not CTEC and ST. [MP 4a and 2] 
c. So, not CTEC or not ST. [DeMorgans 4b] 
d. Not not CTEC. [DN 4] 
e. So, not ST.  [DS 4d and 4c] 
(5) So, if CTEC then not ST.  [CP 4 and 4e] 
(6) So, if ST then not CTEC.  [Contraposition 5] 
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would arguably have a different accident other than being-200F.  So I argue that if s1 is a 
sufficient cause of its being 200F, s2 could not even be a partial cause.421   
Given the above reasoning-- that an immanently and sufficiently produced 
accident cannot also be transeuntly caused, Leibniz can also argue from (P) to the denial 
of the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation.  For if the complete concept/notion of 
a created substance is sufficient for all the substance’s future states and so in some sense 
is the cause of those states, then a different created substance producing a state in the 
patient substance would overdetermine those states.  However, a different created 
substance producing a state in a patient substance is creaturely transeunt causation, but 
such the effects of such causation cannot be overdetermined.  So, for very similar 
reasons, Leibniz can argue that (P) entails the denial of creaturely transeunt causation, 
even though the mature Leibniz thought the antecedent—or at least some construal’s of 
(P) in which the complete concept actually efficiently causes a substance’s states—is 
false.  
                                                
421 With respect to (i), there is a potential complication that needs to be addressed.  One could object that (i) 
counts against s2’s being a partial cause of s1’s being 200F when s1 is a sufficient cause of s1’s being 200F 
only if the relatum on the effect side of the causal relation is fine-grained rather than coarse-grained.  With 
respect to the example I’ve used, a coarse-grained relatum would be s1’s being hot while the fine-grained 
relatum would be s1’s being 200F.  One could argue that while the same coarse-grained relatum could be 
caused by s1 alone or s1 and s2, a different fine-grained relatum would be caused depending on whether s1 
alone or s1 and s2 causes s1 to be 200F.  Again-- s1 alone would take a longer amount of time.  However, all 
one needs to do is reject that the relata are fine-grained and then they could reject (i).421     
The best way to respond is to argue that for Leibniz, the relata would have to be fine-grained.  On 
the effect side, the relatum is an accident:  the accident A produced.  Accidents—such as being 200F, 
however, are fine-grained.  If the effect was an event, such as the event of s1’s increasing in temperature, 
then it could be coarse-grained.  But as I’ve argued throughout this project, the effects of efficient causation 
in Leibniz’s metaphysics are accidents (when the cause is a created substances) or substances (when the 
cause is God). Jonathan Schaffer canvasses the various implications of holding that the relata in causation 
are coarse-grained or fine-grained in Jonathan Schaffer, "The Metaphysics of Causation", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/causation-metaphysics/>. 
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In summary, I’ve argued that Leibniz can make the move from the Spontaneity 
Thesis to the denial of creaturely transeunt causation, and the way in which he can do so 
is via a premise denying causal overdetermination.  The reason is that Leibniz’s views on 
creaturely transeunt causation provide reasons to deny causal overdetermination.  The 
same reason also gives Leibniz the resources to move from (P) to (C), as he did several 



















Appendix B.  Leibniz on Transubstantiation. 
According to the Catholic view of the Eucharist, codified in the Council of Trent (1545-
1563) and developed at length earlier by influential Catholic philosophers such as 
Aquinas, during the Eucharistic mass, when the priest recites Christ’s words of the 
institution, the bread and wine are converted or transubstantiated into the body and blood 
of Christ.422  While the bread and wine are transubstantiated into the body and blood of 
Christ, the accidents of the bread and wine continue to exist.423  That the accidents 
continue to exist is evident to the senses, for the there is something that looks, feels, and 
tastes like bread. 424  However, the accidents no longer inhere in the bread and the wine 
because it has been converted into Christ’s body and blood.  The accidents do not inhere  
in Christ’s body and blood, because of Christ’s impassibility.  Further, the accidents do 
not inhere in a third type of substance, such as the surrounding atmosphere.   
According to Aquinas’s influential account of transubstantiation, the reason the 
accidents do not swap substances, say from the bread and wine to the atmosphere is 
                                                
422 The words of the institution, according to Christian tradition, are “This is my body, which is for you, do 
this in remembrance of me” and “This cup is the new covenant in my blood; do this, as often as you drink 
it, in remembrance of Me.”  See 1 Corinthians 11.   
423 According to the Council of Trent, the accidents “which present themselves to the eyes or other senses 
exist in a wonderful and ineffable manner without a subject.  All the accidents of bread and wine we can 
see, but they inhere in no substance, and exist independently of any; for the substance of the bread and wine 
is so changed into the body and blood of our Lord that they altogether cease to be the substance of bread 
and wine.”  Catechism of the Council of Trent for Paris, Priests, trans. John McHugh and Charles Callan 
(New York: Joseph Wagner, 1962), 228-9, quoted in Daniel Fouke, “Dynamics and Transubstantiation in 
Leibniz’s Systema Theologicum,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 32, No. 1 (1994): 49 
424 Jeffrey E. Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World:  Change, Hylomorphism, and Material 
Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 235-258. 
 202 
because he, like many Catholic philosophers, affirmed a variant of the Ownership Thesis 
of Accidents: 
Accidents are not transferred from subject to subject, so that numerically one and 
the same accident inheres first in one subject and later in another.  For an accident 
is individuated by its subject.  Hence, it is impossible for numerically one and the 
same accident to inhere in one subject at one time and in another subject at 
another time.425  
 
Instead, the accidents of the bread and wine exist but without inhering in any substance.   
Later Scholastics such as Suarez distinguished between two kinds of accidents—
modifications and real qualities—to explain transubstantiation.  Real qualities were 
accidents that could exist—at least with the miraculous help of God—without inhering in 
a substance.426  The accidents of the bread and wine that continued to exist during 
transubstantiation were among the real qualities.  Modifications, on the other hand, could 
not exist even miraculously without a substance.  That is, not even God could hold a 
modification existence without that modification inhering in a substance.   
Three of Leibniz’s metaphysical theses that I have argued in this dissertation are 
crucial for his metaphysics of causation are in tension with the Trenton understanding of 
transubstantiation— the dependency of accidents on substances, the ownership thesis of 
accidents, and the thesis that all accidents are modifications.  The dependency of 
accidents on substances, recall, is thesis that accidents only exist when inhering in 
substance.  The ownership thesis of accidents is the thesis that an accident can only ever 
inhere in its original substance.  The accident cannot swap substances or inhere in two or 
more substances at the same time.  The reason for both the dependency and ownership 
                                                
425 ST 1 q77 a1 
426 See Suarez, DM 7.   
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theses is that Leibniz believed that all accidents are modifications and all modifications 
are limitations, as I argued in Chapter 3.   
Given these theses, Leibniz could not consistently affirm the Trenton 
understanding of transubstantiation where the accidents of the bread and wine continue to 
exist without inhering in a substance.  As Leibniz was a Lutheran, one might think that he 
did not have to explain transubstantiation or be committed to the Trenton view that 
accidents can exist—at least supernaturally—without a substance.  However, at several 
stages in his career, Leibniz developed accounts of the metaphysics of transubstantiation, 
leading to a tension with the dependency and ownership theses and the thesis that all 
accidents are modifications.   
Early in Leibniz’s career, during the 1660s and 70s, Leibniz in fact affirmed 
transubstantiation and argued that the Lutheran view of the Real Presence was the same 
as the Catholic Trenton view of transubstantiation.  His understanding of 
transubstantiation in these earlier writings was importantly different from Scholastic 
understandings, but nonetheless, in several works, Leibniz explicitly argued that his own 
(earlier) metaphysical views were not only consistent with but explained 
transubstantiation.427   
For example, in his 1668 (?) De Transsubtantiatione, Leibniz argued that bodies, 
such as the bread and wine, were substances only when united with a mind.428  A human 
body was a substance only because it is united with a human mind.429  Substances of 
                                                
427 For a helpful overview of Leibniz’s views on transubstantiation in the 1660s and 70s, see Daniel C. 
Fouke, “Metaphysics and the Eucharist in the Early Leibniz,” Studia Leibnitiana (1992): 145-159. 
428 L 116. 
429 Ibid. 
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bodies that lack reason, such as the bread and wine in the Eucharist, are substances when 
united with God.  When considered apart from their union with a mind (Divine or 
human), bodies are merely accidents or appearances.  When the bread and wine are 
transubstantiated into the body and blood of Christ, the accidents are united with Christ’s 
mind rather than the general concourse, which God’s mind has with all bodies (which are 
not united with human minds).430   This account developed by the young Leibniz is in 
tension with Leibniz’s Ownership Thesis of Accidents.  For the bread and wine on this 
account, considered apart from their union with a mind, are accidents that swap 
substances.  However, Leibniz abandoned this defense of Transubstantiation by 1690.431   
More pertinent to my project, however, are accounts of transubstantiation Leibniz 
developed in his later writings.  Specifically, during his multiple-years spanning 
correspondence with Des Bosses, Leibniz expended a great deal of ink describing what 
would have to be the case in order for his metaphysics to be compatible with 
transubstantiation.  If the mature Leibniz genuinely believed in transubstantiation and 
such transubstantiation involves accidents existing without a substance or swapping 
substances, then this results in a deep tension within his mature metaphysics.  As I argued 
in chapters 3 and 4, the dependency thesis, ownership thesis, and theses that accidents are 
modifications play crucially important roles both in his positive account of causation and 
change and his criticisms of competing accounts.   
Early on in their correspondence, Des Bosses wanted to know how Leibniz 
reconciled transubstantiation with his metaphysics of non-corporeal non-causally 
                                                
430 Ibid. 
431 Fouke, Ibid., 159 
 205 
interacting substances, writing “But principally it would have been helpful to have known 
how you would defend by your principles the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, a 
matter which I believe you have discussed to some extent in your anti-Bayle work.”432  
Throughout the remaining letters, Leibniz went to great lengths to sketch out what would 
have to be the case for the possibility of transubstantiation within his metaphysics by 
introducing an entity, the vinculum substantiale.  According to Leibniz, bread—being 
corporeal—is not a substance but an aggregate of simple substances or monads.433  To 
unite the collection of monads so that the aggregate is an unum per se or genuine 
substance, however, an additional entity would have to be added— the vinculum 
substantiale.434  The substantiality of the bread would then consist of this uniting entity.  
During the Eucharist, a different bond, substituted by God, would replace the original 
vinculum substantiale—uniting the monads into the bread—.435 While the bond is 
substituted, however, the situation would be phenomenally equivalent to the previous 
union of monads.436  Thus, the phenomena remains constant, as do the monads 
themselves, but the substantiality of the bread is changed given that the substantial bond 
has changed.   
However, two reasons count against concluding Leibniz meant for his account of 
the vinculum substantiale—which he developed to explain transubstantiation—to be a 
part of his strict metaphysics.  These reasons also point towards the mature Leibniz 
denying transubstantiation.  First, early in his correspondence with Des Bosses, after 
                                                
432 G II.388. 
433 G II.399. 
434 Ibid. 
435 (G II.461: L 607). 
436 G II.399. 
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initially presenting the notion of a vinculum substantiale in response to Des Bosses’s 
question about how Leibniz would explain transubstantiation, Leibniz wrote, “But we 
who reject transubstantiation do not need such a thing [vinculum substantiale].437  Hence, 
even after introducing the idea of the vinculum substantiale, Leibniz explicitly denies 
transubstantiation.   
Second, as Brandon Look has shown in his own work on the topic438, the 
vinculum substantiale is a (i) a principle of action439 insofar as it is a source of 
modifications440; (ii) which unites monads441; but (iii) which can exist independently of 
the monads it unites.442  Thus, the vinculum substantiale ought to count as a substance in 
Leibniz’s metaphysics.443  The only difference between the vinculum substantiale and 
other substance is that the former doesn’t have perceptions.444   
What’s especially key here is the role of the vinculum substantiale as unifying 
what would otherwise be a mere aggregate of monads into an unum per se.  Leibniz is 
                                                
437 G II.399. 
438 Brandon Look, “Leibniz and the Substance of the Vinculum Substantiale,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 38, No. 2 (2002):  203-220. 
439 Leibniz writes, “This vinculum will be the principle of action of the composite substance.”  L 613 (G II 
503: L 613). 
440 Leibniz argues that the vinculum substantiale is a source of modifications. (G II 503-4). 
441 See, for example, (G II.516: AG 202).  
442 Leibniz writes, “A vinculum substantiale superadded to the monads is in my opinion something 
absolute, such that although it corresponds accurately, in the course of nature, to the affections of the 
monads, that is, to their perceptions and appetites, and can therefore be taken to be within the monad in 
whose body its body is, it can nevertheless be independent of the monads in a supernatural sense and can be 
removed and adapted to other monads while its former monads remain.”  (G II.474: L 608).  
443 As opposed to just a relation between the monads it unites, which Leibniz rules out.  Leibniz writes, 
“For orders, or relations which join two monads, are not in one monad or the other, but equally well in both 
at the same time, that is, really in neither, but in the mind alone.  You will not understand this relation 
unless you add a real vinculum, that is, something substantial which is the subject of the predicates and 
modifications joining them together.”  See (G II.517: AG 203) 
444 Look, 220. 
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adamant that without the vinculum substantiale, the monads would be a mere aggregate 
and bodies (such as the bread and wine) would have merely phenomenal reality: 
If that substantial bond [the vinculum substantiale] of monads did not exist, all 
bodies together with all of their qualities, would be nothing but well-founded 
phenomena, like a rainbow or an image in a mirror, in a word, continual dreams 
perfectly in agreement with one another, if a body is a substance, it is a making 
real of the phenomena over and above their agreement.445   
 
However, in order to unify the various monads into a genuine substance or unum per se, 
it must be capable of exercising causal powers on those monads.446  For the vinculum 
substantiale is not a mere relation between the various monads of the bread and wine.  
Instead the vinculum substantiale is a bond and a unifying reality that makes the monads, 
which would otherwise be an aggregate, into an unum per se.447  Given that Leibniz is 
adamant that no created substance (such as the vinculum substantiale uniting the monads 
prior to transubstantiation) can causally affect other substances, as we saw in Chapter 2, I 
argue that Leibniz should not have posited the vinculum substantiale in his metaphysics. 
Given Leibniz’s claim that those who reject transubstantiation (a group he counts 
himself in) do not need the vinculum substantiale, I further conclude that Leibniz in fact 
did not posit it in his metaphysics.  Instead, I argue that Leibniz’s accounts of the 
vinculum substantiale in his letters to Des Bosses should be viewed as a conditional with 
both an antecedent and consequent that Leibniz in fact rejected:  Transubstantiation is 
                                                
445 (G II.435-6: AG 198-99). 
446 Look, 219-20. 
447 Leibniz writes:  “. . . either bodies are mere phenomena and so extension will also be only a 
phenomenon and the monads alone will be real, the union will be provided by the operation of the 
perceiving mind on the phenomena, or, if faith compels us to accept corporeal substances, we must say that 
the substance consists in that unifying reality that adds something complete (and therefore substantial), 
though in flux, to those things that are to be united.”  (G II.435: AG 198). 
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explainable in Leibniz’s monadological metaphysics only if there is a vinculum 























Appendix C.  Leibniz’s “De Realitate Accidentium”448 
It is worth considering, whether accidents have a reality that is something more than 
modal, and in what that [reality] consists.  And at least if we posit the accidental reality, 
whether their reality is part of the reality of the substance, or if it adds to the substance a 
new reality.  If it is part of the reality of the substance, it follows that the substance itself 
perishes in accidental change, or it becomes a new thing, and myself yesterday exists not 
yet, but another although very similar to me, so that the ship which is repaired, or the 
republic, or the river, are the same in name, are not really [the same].  For with a part 
destroyed, truly the same thing does not remain, even if thus far it is denominated the 
same thing by a more important surviving part, otherwise it is able to take place, so that 
with all of the parts little by little destroyed, which now belong to, yet it is finally said to 
be the same thing, just as the ship of Theseus.  If a true part is understood to always 
remain, it at least will be the same, whereas the whole arrangement itself will not be.  
Therefore, if someone wants permanent part of the reality and a changeable part, they fall 
into their opinion, those who prefer to add to the substantial reality something from 
accidents.  If however it is admitted that the substance perishes and comes into existence 
by change (Which is the thought of the duke of Buckingham in the ingenious writing 
about true religion the Schediasmate) they in reality remove all changeable substance.  
For since the changes of things are perpetual, so that nothing remains in the same state 
                                                
448 A.VI.iv 994-996. 
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through the smallest intervals of time, it follows that no changeable substance ever exist 
and actually endures a minimum time, for any moment whatever it is born and perishes, 
neither is it said to properly exist, nor to act, neither is it able to produce anything or to 
endure since nothing is brought about unless enduring for some time.449   It follows 
therefore that all enduring things are by nature changeable substances, which by reason 
we fall into the doctrine of Spinoza and of the Averroists, and the certain long established 
tradition, which considers God alone or nature as a substance, creatures otherwise have 
no reality other than as a mode of God.450  Truly, nor do they thus avoid [the problem], so 
that in this way the changes which created substances undergo (naturally enduring) are 
forced to be brought over into God, and thus neither shall God himself endure, but shall 
continuously perish and be born.  Whence it follows that in the end nothing exists 
altogether, for if each thing perishes once, so that from here it follows, nothing will be 
because nothing revives it; for out of nothing comes nothing, and nothing is produced 
freely from itself.  Therefore, it is necessary that something in things persist through 
change.  But if now a part of the divine reality remains, and a part perishes, we return 
back to those who add accidental realities to the substances, and why do they not admit it 
in creatures, because now we say [it is] in God, and indeed we relinquish created 
substance? 
 
                                                
449 Mugnai’s Translation: Given that things change perpetually so that nothing remains in the same state for 
even the smallest amount of time, it follows that there is not a changeable substance and that it [i.e. the 
substance] does not endure even a minimal amount of time.  What in any moment is born and then perishes, 
one cannot say it exists in a proper sense, for it does not act or undergo anything, because everything needs 
time to exist.  (A VI, 4A, 995) 
450 Mugnai’s Translation: [. . .] they [Spinoza and the Averroists] consider only God as substances or as 
nature, and regard creatures as the modes of God.  (A VI, 4A, 995) 
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We now come to those who think that substances have a two-fold reality, one 
substantial and the other accidental.  These [views] do not themselves also lack their own 
difficulties.   For it will be able to be asked why those added realities are said to belong to 
the substance as it were in a subject, and why it is not considered as a thing per se, even 
though not enduring.451  But if that inherence seems to really affect the reality of the 
substance, so that it exists somehow in close union by some real it exists, it is not 
apparent, how the accidental [reality] is able to perish, without change in the substantial 
reality it [the accidental reality] originates from.  Therefore, it itself will be divided again 
into a perishing and permanent part, contrary to hypothesis.452   
Nor thus far do I see another way to avoid these obstacles, how if abstracta are 
considered as things, but as shorthands of speaking, as when I call heat, it is not useful in 
order that I bring about naming of any wandering subject; or if in order that I say that 
something is hot, and so far I am a nominalist, at least through caution.453  I say therefore 
that substances change, or at diverse times their attributes are unlike; for this has no 
doubt, whether however in change there is something real that perishes and is born; and 
whether there are diverse realities in a substance, which are the foundations of diverse 
predicates, it is not necessary to ask, and, if asked it is difficult to decide.454  It’s enough 
                                                
451 Mugnai’s Translation: Why does one believe that the added reality inheres in the substances, as in a 
subject, and why does one not consider it to be a thing in itself, even though it does not persist? 
452 Mugnai’s Translation: If this inherence, being some kind of real connection, affects the substantial 
reality, it is not clear how the accidental reality may perish without causing any change in the substantial 
one.  The entire substance would, therefore, divide again into perishing and persisting parts, contrary to the 
hypothesis. 
453 Mugnai:  It seems to me that, till now, the only way to avoid these obstacles was to consider the abstract 
terms not as [corresponding to] things, but as a kind of shorthand for discourse [. . .] and it is exactly on this 
point that I am a nominalist, even though it is only to be precautious. 
454 Mugnai:  I will therefore say that the substance changes, meaning that, in different times, its attributes 
are different, since this is beyond any doubt.  It is not necessary, however, to ask whether there is 
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for substances alone to be posited as things, and to say truths about them.455  Geometers 
don’t actually use abstract definitions, but they reduce them to the concrete; thus, Euclid 
doesn’t use the definition of ratio which he has, but he explains those things in the ratio, 

















                                                
something real that perishes and is born, which corresponds to a given change, nor whether there are 
different realities in a substance that are the foundations of different predicates.  If someone were to pose 
these questions, it would be very difficult to answer them. 
455 Mugnai: “It suffices alone to consider the [individual] substances as things and to state truths about 
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